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Abstract 
 
This thesis engages with a debate in the literature on the political economy of China’s 
industrial reforms about the determinants of major policy trajectories in that country’s 
strategic industries. A common approach understands central-level policy processes and 
their structural outcomes in strategic sectors to be subject to active and effective central 
government guidance, often applied via control over state-owned industry. A less 
common perspective, on the other hand, has argued that policy formulation and 
implementation in a number of strategic industries are often dominated by large central 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) capable of imposing their own preferences on sectoral 
policy.  
Addressing these partially opposing perspectives, this thesis analyses political processes 
underlying major policy developments in China’s electricity supply industry since 2002, 
finding that neither approach sufficiently accounts for the complexity of interactions 
between government and SOEs during the formulation and implementation of sectoral 
policy. ‘Government-centred’ accounts were found to have exaggerated the 
effectiveness of central government’s policy guidance while underappreciating SOEs’ 
considerable sectoral policy impact. ‘SOE-centred’ accounts, on the other hand, have 
similarly overstated their claims while furthermore giving a distorted perspective of the 
mechanisms through which SOEs’ policy influence occurs. 
Building on findings from the case of electricity supply, this thesis establishes an 
alternative account of the political interplay between both sides and its relevance for 
sectoral policy-making in China’s strategic industries. It illustrates that central SOEs 
autonomously pursue their own industrial reform agendas which often deviate from 
government’s sectoral preferences and from existing sectoral policy. However, it 
contends that these firms are only able to realise contentious sectoral objectives by 
tactically ‘synchronising’ them with cross-sectoral policy agendas pursued by central 
government. When sectoral reform goals diverge and ‘synchronisation’ is absent, policy 
gridlock often ensues. Overall, this thesis finds that central government’s sectoral 
guidance over strategic industries is subject to substantial interference by central SOEs, 
but that this interference largely takes place within the confines of government-
sanctioned cross-sectoral policy.  
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1 Introduction 
Scholarly debates on the political economy of China’s industrial reforms since the turn 
of the millennium have focused much of their attention on interpreting the role of 
central government in the reform process and trying to discern and categorise dominant 
modes of economic governance underlying China’s central level economic policy-
making. A particular focus of inquiry has been the determinants of policy trajectories 
within the country’s ‘strategic’ industries, i.e. industries that, due to their importance for 
broader economic development or national security, have been declared by government 
‘lifelines’ of the economy.1  A commonly held perspective maintains that while less 
strategic industries are liberalised and opened to market competition with decentralised 
and delegated government oversight, central government perpetuates its immediate 
control over strategic parts of the economy via state-owned industry. Despite significant 
variance regarding overall interpretations of China’s trajectory in the realm of economic 
governance, there is a widely shared perception of active and effective central 
government guidance underlying central-level policy processes and their structural 
outcomes in the ‘commanding heights’ of the country’s economy. Correspondingly, 
central government’s policy preferences are often viewed as the main explanatory factor 
for how economic policy decisions in these areas arise and are applied. 2  This 
‘government guidance’ viewpoint has become widely accepted and on some occasions 
has even been applied as an a priori assumption in the analysis of policy processes3 or as 
a post-hoc explanation of policy output or outcomes in lieu of empirical scrutiny.4 
                                                
1 Margaret M. Pearson, “The Business of Governing Business in China,” World Politics 57, no. 2 (2005): 
297; Mikael Mattlin, “The Chinese Government’s New Approach to Ownership and Financial Control of 
Strategic State-Owned Enterprises,” Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition, BOFIT 
Discussion Paper (October 2007), p. 16. 
2 See, e.g., Pearson, 2005; Margaret M. Pearson, “Governing the Chinese Economy: Regulatory Reform in 
the Service of the State,” Public Administration Review 67, no. 4 (2007): 718–730; Roselyn Hsueh, China’s 
Regulatory State: A New Strategy for Globalization (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011); Sebastian 
Heilmann and Lea Shih, “The Rise of Industrial Policy in China, 1978-2012,” Harvard-Yenching Institute 
Working Paper Series, 2013; Sarah Eaton, “The Gradual Encroachment of an Idea: Large Enterprise 
Groups in China,” The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 31, no. 2 (2013a): 5–22; Chen Li, China’s 
Centralised Industrial Order. Industrial reform and the rise of centrally controlled big business (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2015). 
3 Daniel Ho and Angus Young, “China’s Experience in Reforming Its State-Owned Enterprises: 
Something New, Something Old and Something Chinese?” International Journal of Economy, Management and 
Social Sciences 2, no. 4 (April 2013): 84. 
4 Eric Girardin, Guy Liu and Jinghai Zheng, “An introduction: the challenges of the Chinese electricity 
industry and its reform,” Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies 12, no. 4 (2014): 334. 
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At the same time, there are claims in niche areas of the literature on China’s industrial 
reforms that the formulation and implementation of central-level policy in some of 
China’s most strategic sectors, particularly in the energy field, are not grounded in 
deliberate central government guidance, but rather tend to be driven by large central 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) based on motives that are not necessarily aligned with 
those of central government. A core claim among these studies is that central state firms 
have become forceful participants in central-level policy processes and often dominate 
both policy-making and policy implementation due to their high administrative rank, 
excellent political connections, and increasing political and financial autonomy, while 
central government’s oversight at the industry level is often deemed weak and 
ineffective.5  
 
Overview of research conducted and of the main findings 
In order to address these theoretical and empirical inconsistencies regarding the 
determinants of sectoral policy and its application in China’s strategic industries, this 
study analyses central-level political processes underlying shifts in major policy 
trajectories in one of China’s most strategically important sectors – the electricity supply 
industry – and the particular role played by state industry as part of these processes, 
thereby touching upon the balance of political power between central government and 
large SOEs, as well as the limits of power on both sides. Applying a mixture of within-
case research strategies such as process tracing and the congruence method,6 the validity 
of the counterclaims made by ‘SOE-centred’ accounts about central state firms’ sectoral 
policy influence is tested against empirics from a ‘most likely’ case for claims of active 
and effective central government guidance over China’s strategic industries as expressed 
in a series of widely-read ‘government-centred’ accounts of the political economy of 
China’s industrial reforms. Following this single industry case study logic, it is 
                                                
5 See, e.g., Erica S. Downs, “Business Interest Groups in Chinese Politics: The Case of the Oil 
Companies,” in China’s Changing Political Landscape: Prospects for Democracy, edited by C. Li (Washington 
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2008a), pp. 121–41; Yi-chong Xu, “‘Strong enterprise, weak 
government’: energy policy making in China,” International Journal of Global Energy Issues 29, no. 4 (2008): 
434-453; Ling Chen, “Playing the Market Reform Card: The Changing Patterns of Political Struggle in 
China’s Electric Power Sector,” The China Journal 64 (2010): 69–95; Yi-chong Xu, “The State Grid 
Corporation of China,” in The Political Economy of State-Owned Enterprises in China and India, edited by Yi-
chong Xu (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 128-150; Chung-min Tsai, “Regulating China’s Power 
Sector: Creating an Independent Regulator Without Autonomy,” The China Quarterly 218 (2014): 452–73; 
Yin-Fang Zhang, “The Regulatory Framework and Sustainable Development of China’s Electricity 
Sector,” The China Quarterly 222 (2015): 475-498. 
6 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2005), pp. 179-184. 
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investigated whether central SOEs, through both action and intent, have been able to 
influence the formulation and implementation of sectoral policy, and if so, under which 
conditions, through which mechanisms and to what effect. Based on the deductively 
derived conclusions to this endeavour, a basic model of central SOEs’ policy impact on 
the formulation and implementation of sectoral policy in the electricity industry is 
presented which suggests revised claims and accounts for the interaction of both top-
down and bottom-up dynamics between central government and state industrial actors. 
In a final step, the validity of this model is re-tested by applying a series of targeted 
‘before-after’ comparisons7 to a body of additional empirical material from the same 
industry case.  
Both the formulation and implementation of central-level sectoral policy in the 
electricity supply industry were found to be characterised by contentious interactions 
between central state industry (a focus being placed on the State Grid Corporation of 
China) and central government departments/agencies that occur in the form of a bi-
directional deliberative process in which both sides are generally capable of blocking 
each other’s policy and project pursuits while usually being unable to overcome their 
mutual resistance without compromise (‘basic conflict mode’). Generally open-ended in 
outcome, these deliberative processes also produced evidence of a distinct mechanism 
via which central state industry is able to circumvent central government opposition to 
its often controversial sectoral policy and project development propositions, namely by 
making use of the lack of coordination between policy at different levels of abstraction. 
By tactically ‘synchronising’ the argumentative portrayal of its own sectoral reform 
agendas with related or relatable cross-sectoral policy, state industry has shown the 
ability to overcome political obstacles at the sectoral level and to pressure sectoral 
authorities into compliance (‘synchronisation mode’). 8 The successful application of this 
‘synchronisation’ mechanism appeared to be dependent on sufficient administrative 
rank to allow access to policy-making circles, and on a high level of control over 
                                                
7 George and Bennett, 2005, p. 166. 
8 ‘Sectoral policy’ is defined here as policy which is targeted at industry-specific issues and which only 
applies within the confines of  a specific industry. It can be published either by the State Council, 
comprehensive economic commissions, or by industry-level authorities. ‘Cross-sectoral policy’, on the other 
hand, refers to policy or guidelines which are targeted at non-industry-specific issues and which apply 
beyond the confines of single industries. They include no, or only vague, sector-specific implementation 
indicators which are then to be specified at the sectoral level. They can be of a formal nature (i.e. formal 
policy published by the State Council or comprehensive economic commissions) or of an informal nature 
(i.e. policy preferences or opinions expressed by top officials). 
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industry expertise, while bureaucratic manoeuvring on the basis of these two factors 
alone rarely sufficed for shaping sectoral policy.  
Overall, it was found that central government’s guidance over the electricity supply 
industry as a strategically important sector of the country’s economy is subject to 
substantial interference by central state firms. Based on the aforementioned mechanism 
and subject to the distinct limitation of needing to engage with industry-level policy on 
the basis of, and within, the confines of existing – usually cross-sectoral – policy, these 
firms showed the ability to shape the sectoral environment according to their own 
policy preferences which often differed sharply from both the respective cross-sectoral 
guidelines and existing sectoral policy. In the case study at hand, the immediate goals 
pursued by state industry in response to a major State Council policy aimed at far-
reaching industry marketisation were found to be threefold, namely a) the preservation 
and expansion of monopoly structures across industry segments, b) the establishment 
of controlling market positions in adjacent, nominally competitive industry segments, 
and c) the creation of industry structures in which factors a) and b) could be 
permanently combined and sustained so as to safeguard organisational unity and 
maximise economic results at the firm level. 
Based on the uncovered dynamics of mutual dependence, prolonged policy deadlock 
and recurrent state firm policy influence derived from the systematic application of 
‘synchronisation’ tactics, it is argued that authors following almost exclusively 
government-centred approaches fail to explain shifts in policy trajectories in their own 
‘most likely’ case.9 While further research is necessary to determine the extent to which 
this study’s results are applicable to other strategic industry settings in China, the 
findings suggest that this part of the literature overstates central government’s ability to 
exercise active and effective policy guidance in strategic industries while understating 
the influence of large SOEs on sectoral policy formulation and implementation 
processes at the central level. SOE-centred accounts, on the other hand, while being 
correct in placing strong emphasis on the policy influence of large state firms, were 
found to have exaggerated their impact while presenting a partially skewed perspective 
of the mechanisms through which this influence occurs. Both camps are encouraged to 
reconsider their claims so as to account for the intervening influence on the part of state 
                                                
9 E.g., Hsueh, 2011; Pearson, 2005, 2007; Heilmann and Shih, 2013, among others. 
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industry displayed in this study, as well as for the particular conditions and mechanisms 
under/through which this influence may occur. 
 
 
1.1 Review of middle-range theory on the political economy 
of China’s industry reforms 
Given the authoritarian nature of China’s political system, analyses of the modes of 
economic governance underlying China’s central level economic policy-making have 
tended to focus on the role of central government, its administrative structure and the 
actions of the different bodies it is comprised of, as well as its policy preferences and 
the pursuit of those preferences. Core topics of study have been the various rounds of 
restructuring of the state bureaucracy in the economic governance realm, the gradual 
separation of government and enterprise functions, and the reorganisation of state 
industry. While very different interpretations emerged regarding the overall rationale 
and trajectory of reforms, numerous studies have shared the view that central 
government has maintained or enhanced its authority over the country’s path of 
economic development. This finding was then usually interpreted either as the 
increasingly efficient application of governmental authority during an ongoing transition 
to a functioning market economy, 10  as the deliberate perpetuation of politically 
motivated government intervention in strategic industry sectors in order to steer the 
overall economy, particularly via the control of large state firms,11 or as a mixture of the 
two.12  
The following section will briefly discuss some important contributions reflective of 
these different interpretations of the purpose and nature of central government 
authority over strategic industries. While recognising the significant variance among 
them it will not, however, attempt to compare their relative explanatory power or 
resolve their disagreements. This study rather aims to engage with the basic premise of 
active and effective central government guidance which tends to underlie these 
                                                
10 See, e.g., Dali L. Yang, Remaking the Chinese Leviathan. Market Transition and the Politics of Governance in 
China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004); Edward S. Steinfeld, Playing Our Game: Why China’s Rise 
Doesn’t Threaten the West (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
11 See, e.g., Pearson, 2005, 2007; Minxin Pei, China’s Trapped Transition. The Limits of Developmental Autocracy 
(London, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); Eaton, 2013a; Li, 2015. 
12 See, e.g., Hsueh, 2011; Heilmann and Shih, 2013. 
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otherwise very different interpretations of the determinants of policy output and 
outcomes in strategic parts of the country’s economy. As such, these studies will, in a 
further step, be contrasted with a less prominent but related sub-literature which has 
argued for the paramount significance of a factor that tends to be rarely discussed in 
these government-centred accounts, namely the policy influence of large central state 
firms.13 
 
1.1.1 The spectrum of ‘government-centred’ accounts of the political 
economy of China’s industrial reforms 
Perspectives that emphasised enhanced government authority via growing institutional efficiency in an 
emerging market economy 
One important narrative of the political economy of China’s industrial reforms has been 
that the country is undergoing an incremental transition from planned economy to 
market economy, slowly opening up to domestic and international market competition 
and gradually adapting to international practises of economic regulation in liberalised 
markets. In an earlier account of change in China’s economic governance after the 
beginning of the ‘reform and opening’ period post-1978, Naughton (1995) argued that 
China was “growing out of the plan” and noted that the decline of state planning was 
matched by the emergence and growth of a progressively more market-oriented 
economy, a perspective which has shaped the analytical parameters for cohorts of 
scholars following after. 14  Building on this overall outlook, Dali Yang (2004), for 
instance, argued that the restructuring and downsizing of China’s government 
bureaucracy, the divestiture of state institutions’ business operations and numerous 
unprofitable SOEs, and the emergence of new “institutions of horizontal 
accountability” were all signs of “real progress toward making the Chinese state into a 
regulatory state suited to a functioning market economy”15  characterised by a level 
competitive playing field. 16  While curbing its own immediate participation in the 
                                                
13 See, e.g., Downs, 2006; Xu, 2008, 2012; Chen, 2010; Tsai, 2013. 
14 Barry Naughton, Growing Out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 1978-1993 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995). 
15 Yang, 2004, pp. 17-18. 
16 Ibid., pp. 296, 308-311. Other studies that have presented similar arguments on the gradual emergence 
of a liberal market economy include Yingyi Qian and Jinglian Wu, “China’s Transition to a Market 
Economy. How Far Across the River?” in How Far Across the River? Chinese Policy Reform at the Millennium, 
edited by Nicholas C. Hope, Dennis Tao Yang and Mu Yang Li (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2003), pp. 31-64; Jinglian Wu, Understanding and Interpreting Chinese Economic Reform (Singapore: Thomson, 
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economy via a “transformation of institutions”, the reforms undertaken by the Chinese 
leadership were, however, “by no means intended to weaken the power of the state and 
their own control over that power”, but were rather a “key aspect of [...] efforts to 
enhance the efficiency and legitimacy of the state apparatuses and augment the central 
leadership’s capacity to project power nationally in an era of socioeconomic 
liberalisation”.17 Yang particularly located these increases in government authority via 
enhanced regulatory capacity in crucial segments of the economy such as the financial 
system as well as industry and commerce.18 
 
Perspectives that emphasised sustained political control by central government via ‘strategic’ industries 
Around the mid-2000s, several counter-perspectives to the narrative of China’s gradual 
conversion to a regulated liberal market economy emerged. In an anti-thesis to Yang, 
Minxin Pei (2006) depicted China as being caught in a ‘partial reform equilibrium’ 
caused by gradualist economic reforms which were predominantly geared towards 
ensuring the political survival of the ruling elites.19 “Constrained by this logic”, Pei 
wrote, “economic reform cannot infringe upon the ruling elites’ ability to protect and 
allocate rents in critical economic sectors. This means that reform measures taken to 
improve the efficiency of these sectors are bound to be partial, compromised, and 
ultimately ineffective.”20 Consequently, rather than testifying to the gradual emergence 
of a functioning market economy, Pei placed more argumentative emphasis on the 
state’s continued immediate intervention in strategically important industries, albeit as a 
symptom of generally unsuccessful partial reforms of the economic system resulting 
from the necessity to preserve existing patronage networks as well as the leadership’s 
ability to allocate critical resources.21  
A slightly different perspective on persistent government intervention in the Chinese 
economy was presented by Margaret Pearson (2005, 2007), who also responded to 
‘regulatory state’-based narratives of China’s economic reform process while contrasting 
them in their applicability to the Chinese case with the East Asian ‘developmental state’ 
                                                                                                                                     
2005); Steinfeld, 2010. For more information on the concept of the ‘regulatory state’, see Giandomenico 
Majone, “From the positive to the regulatory state: causes and consequences of changes in the mode of 
governance,” Journal of Public Policy 17, no. 2 (1997): 139–167; Giandomenico Majone, “The regulatory 
state and its legitimacy problems,” Western European Politics 22, no. 1 (1999): 1–24. 
17 Yang, 2004, pp. 64, 291-311. 
18 Ibid., pp. 291-311. 
19 Pei, 2006, pp. 109, 223. 
20 Ibid., p. 109. 
21 Ibid., p. 134. 
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model.22 In her studies, Pearson analysed patterns of state involvement in industries that 
had been tagged by central government itself as strategically important “lifeline 
industries” ( 经 济 命 脉 ), 23  arguing that the Chinese leadership ultimately followed a 
number of “financial/strategic and social/political imperatives” such as “the need to 
control and maintain a revenue stream from major state assets, the creation of national 
champions, and the achievement of employment, universal services, and social security 
goals” which it aimed to achieve through these sectors. 24  Her model of regulatory 
patterns in strategic industries suggested that, even during a push for market transition, 
strong central-government influence and a dominant ‘market’ position of state firms 
remained defining aspects of economic life, that government agencies would aim to 
identify state enterprises as ‘winners’ and proceed to reorganise them in order to find 
industry structures suitable for fulfilling those imperatives.25 Applied mechanisms of 
government authority over strategic industries following the “leadership’s metavision”26 
included the “predominance of state ownership, oversight by the comprehensive 
economic commissions, continued inclusion of firms in the state planning process, and 
continued high-level governmental and, ultimately, party control of personnel 
appointments in regulatory bodies and state firms”. Based on these tools, a major role 
of government within strategic industries was to actively structure markets and “control 
the nature of competition”.27 Overall, Pearson attested to a “strongly state-led system of 
economic governance” 28  at the centre of which stood central government with its 
enhanced administrative control over strategic segments of the economy and insistence 
on direct and active guidance, all in pursuit of broader economic development. 
 
Perspectives that attempted to model variance across sectors and shifts over time in the extent and nature 
of government control over industry 
In response to the studies of China’s economic governance that focused their attention 
either on elements that signalled a shift towards a functioning market economy or 
                                                
22 Pearson, 2005, 2007. For a discussion of the East Asian ‘developmental state’ model and its lacking 
applicability to the Chinese case with particular emphasis on central government’s implementational 
limitations, please refer to Jude Howell, “Reflections on the Chinese State,” Development and Change 37, no. 
2 (2006): 273–297. 
23 Pearson, 2005, p. 297. 
24 Ibid., pp. 313-314. 
25 Ibid., pp. 315-317. 
26 Ibid., p. 320. 
27 Pearson, 2007, p. 725. 
28 Ibid., p. 727. 
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rather on indications of sustained state control, other approaches emerged that 
attempted to combine both perspectives and explain the coexistence of decentralised 
competitive market structures in some sectors of the economy and of centralised 
monopolies or oligopolies in others, as well as shifts over time between phases that saw 
a deepening of market reforms and phases that were characterised by enhanced 
government intervention and guidance in different segments of the economy.  
Building strongly on Pearson’s work, Hsueh (2011) contended that China has fused 
liberalisation at the macro-level with a selective continuation of state control at the 
sectoral level, and that sectoral variation in the extent and pattern of state control was 
mainly explained by variance in the strategic value of an industry as perceived by central 
government. 29  Defining ‘strategic value’ across different political and economic 
dimensions, 30  Hsueh observed that central government had liberalised markets and 
delegated rule-making to lower administrative levels in industries with low strategic 
value while industries with high strategic value, on the other hand, were subject to 
selective regulation or re-regulation that was primarily geared towards securing central 
government’s “authority to manage sectoral developments” through administrative and 
corporate restructuring and by strictly controlling ownership structures and market 
entry, as well as companies’ business scope. 31  Given China’s authoritarian form of 
government, central government, according to Hsueh, remained “insulated from 
domestic political pressures” and “intervenes in strategic sectors and issue areas when it 
sees fit without having to face political retaliation or opposition.”32 Following this logic, 
she argued, “the Chinese government ensures the enhancement of state authority in 
these industries first and foremost, and from there it pursues industrial development 
that achieves security and economic goals.” 33  Particularly noteworthy in Hsueh’s 
perspective are the posited immediate linkages between central government’s ‘strategic 
value’-based policy preferences, a particular approach towards sectoral restructuring 
which in strategically important industries is aimed at reinforcing government control, 
and government’s uninhibited ability to implement said sectoral restructuring in a way 
that mirrors its original ‘strategic value’ considerations. The conceptual conflation of 
“the Chinese government” and the “state”, together with the assertion that government 
possessed the unrestricted capacity to shape strategic industries in a top-down fashion 
                                                
29 Hsueh, 2011, pp. 3-4. 
30 Ibid., p. 34. 
31 Ibid., pp. 16-17, 22-23, 193, 255. 
32 Ibid., p. 269. 
33 Ibid., p. 255. 
  21 
and “when it sees fit”, indicate that Hsueh understands central government as a more or 
less unitary actor that independently devises and implements structural reform strategies 
at its own discretion. 
A further important ‘reconciliatory’ contribution was made by Heilmann and Shih 
(2013) who aimed to explain shifts over time across strategic segments of China’s 
economy between macro-level policy in favour of competitive market building and 
policy reflective of more immediate state control via targeted industrial policy, i.e. 
“measures and programs undertaken by government to shape the sectoral structure of 
the economy through channelling resources into selected ‘pillar’, ‘strategic’ or ‘emerging’ 
industries while - ideally or purportedly - preserving market competition and firm-level 
decision autonomy in the targeted sectors.”34 Through the lens of industrial policy the 
authors emphasised a growing role of government guidance over crucial parts of the 
economy and China’s economic development path as a whole, partially at the expense 
of prior tendencies towards market liberalisation. Differing from Hsueh’s emphasis on 
central government’s ‘strategic value logic’ and Pearson’s focus on ‘regulatory 
imperatives’, Heilmann and Shih explained these changes via shifts in ideas about 
economic governance within central government which, according to the authors, 
coincided with shifts in the balance of power between different central government 
factions in favour of market liberalisation, sectoral industrial policy, cross-sectoral 
indicative planning and imperative planning respectively. Following this line of 
reasoning, the authors attempted to pinpoint causal linkages between such broader 
ideational shifts within central government and changes in national-level macro policy 
for China’s strategic industries without, however, tracing the declared connections to 
specific policy decisions. 
 
Shared perspectives of government control via strategic industries 
To summarise, despite strongly varying interpretations of overall development 
trajectories in China’s economic governance, numerous widely-read contemporary 
works on the political economy of the country’s industrial reforms share the perception 
of effective central government guidance over the country’s strategic industries and 
explain the content, as well as the structural outcomes, of core policy pertaining to the 
functional logic of these industries “almost exclusively in terms of leadership 
                                                
34 Heilmann and Shih, 2013, p. 2. 
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perceptions and preferences”.35 There is widespread agreement across otherwise very 
different studies that central government in these segments of the economy more or 
less autonomously develops solutions to policy challenges on the basis of a broader 
strategic political vision and then applies its political leverage in order to implement 
those solutions.  
A second shared feature among these studies is that the presupposition of active and 
effective central government guidance also tends to be extended to the main industrial 
players in China’s strategic industries as well as to the functional logic of the industrial 
environment that they operate in. Large central-level state firms’ organisational 
structure, business scope and business endeavours are analysed almost exclusively 
through a central government prism. Since assets are state-owned and top executives 
are chosen by CCP and central government organs,36 central SOEs, as the formal target 
of numerous reform and restructuring endeavours, have been predominantly viewed as 
being on the ‘receiving end’ of central government decision-making while their own 
political relevance has rarely been taken into account in this part of the literature. 
Hsueh’s (2011) study, for instance, displays a perspective on the Chinese state sector in 
which the terms ‘government’ and ‘the state’ are used almost interchangeably and in 
which state ownership and actual government control over state assets are for the most 
part treated as synonyms, while central SOEs themselves hardly feature at all and are 
viewed as little more than passive recipients of government orders. Pearson (2005, 
2007) refers to government’s slow restructuring of state assets as a hindrance to the 
overall economic reform process, but equally views state industry mainly as 
government’s extended political arm through which it realises different strategic 
imperatives at the sectoral level. Other studies briefly refer to state industrial firms as 
potentially influential participants in sectoral policy processes, but do not further engage 
with this issue. Heilmann and Shih (2013), for instance, hint at the political strength of 
large SOEs in a brief side note, but deliberately avoid further engagement that would 
                                                
35 As noted by Lieberthal in criticism of much earlier accounts of policy-making in China, an observation 
which remains applicable to the contemporary perspectives discussed here. See Kenneth G. Lieberthal, 
“The ‘Fragmented Authoritarianism’ Model and its Limitations,” in Bureaucracy, Politics and Decision Making 
in Post-Mao China, edited by Kenneth G. Lieberthal and David M. Lampton (Berkeley, Los Angeles, 
Oxford: University of California Press, 1992), p. 11. Even Yang’s (2004) otherwise very different and 
strongly contested perspective of an emerging functional market economy and ‘regulatory state’ is 
ultimately based on the argument that formal changes to government bureaucracy have translated into 
effective policy and efficient government authority over crucial parts of the economy as part of the 
leadership’s agenda to “augment [its] capacity to project power nationally”. See Yang, 2004, p. 64. 
36 Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, “Politics and Business Group Formation in China: the Party in Control?” The 
China Quarterly 211 (2012): 624–48. 
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specify the nature of their relevance.37  Eaton (2013b), in a study of China’s airline 
industry, equally alludes to the potential impact of large SOEs on crucial sectoral policy 
decisions, 38  while Pei’s (2006) account of China’s ‘gradual reform’ dilemma lists 
opposing action by state industry as one reason behind a number of failed market 
reform attempts, notably in the telecommunication sector, but then focuses entirely on 
conflicts within the government bureaucracy to explain outcomes.39 
 
Studies on the emergence of large central state-owned enterprise groups 
While the government-centred perspectives referenced above largely circumvent 
questions related to the relevance of central state firms for the logic underlying central-
level decision-making, a number of very insightful studies exist that do analyse the 
significance of central SOEs in a more detailed fashion and with particular attention to 
central government’s rationales for and approaches towards concentrating the, in pre-
reform times, dispersed economic activities under various central government ministries 
into large state-owned industry conglomerates. Both Sutherland (2003) and Eaton 
(2013a), for instance, have traced the ideational foundations of the government’s ‘large 
enterprise strategy’ since its first appearance in the 1980s.40 Nolan (2001, 2003, 2004), 
moreover, conducted important work on government’s attempts to transform state-
owned enterprises into globally competitive firms.41 Groundwork for understanding the 
formal linkages between government and state industry was prepared by Naughton 
(2005, 2006a, 2006b, 2007) in a series of articles on China’s State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), the government agency 
mandated with overseeing central-level SOEs. In these articles, Naughton discussed the 
evolving relationship between SASAC and its subordinate firms, as well as the structural 
foundations for the partially contradictory political and economic pressures that central 
                                                
37 Heilmann and Shih, 2013, p. 4. 
38 Sarah Eaton, “Political Economy of the Advancing State: the Case of China’s Airlines Reform,” The 
China Journal 69 (2013b): 64–86. 
39 Pei, 2006, pp. 116-122. 
40 Quotes taken from Eaton, 2013a, pp. 11-13. See also Dylan Sutherland, China’s Large Enterprises and the 
Challenge of Late Industrialisation (London and New York: Routledge, 2003). 
41 Peter Nolan, China and the Global Business Revolution (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2001); Peter Nolan and Jin Zhang, “Globalization Challenge for Large Firms From Developing 
Countries: China’s Oil and Aerospace Industries,” European Management Journal 21, no. 3 (2003): 285–99; 
Peter Nolan and Huaichuan Rui, “Industrial Policy and Global Big Business Revolution: the Case of the 
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SOEs are exposed to. 42  Building on Naughton’s work, Brødsgaard (2012) raised 
questions about the complexities of institutional linkages between central government 
and central SOEs and about the meaning of potential conflicts of interest between the 
two for the practise of government oversight.43  
In conjunction, these studies gave a compelling account of the emergence of large 
central state firms since the beginning of China’s economic reforms as well as of the 
formal system of state asset management, but their predominant focus was on these 
firms’ evolution as industrial and economic actors, both in a domestic and international 
context, as well as on government policy towards state firms aimed mainly at enhancing 
their performance. The political role in domestic policy processes played by these firms 
since their emergence as well as the ways in which these firms themselves may shape 
politics, however, remained largely unexamined. 
 
1.1.2 ‘SOE-centred’ literature as a counter-perspective 
Around the mid-2000s, a small sub-literature began to emerge that challenged the 
widely held view of active and effective top-down central government guidance of 
China’s strategic industries. It focused specifically on the political role of large central 
SOEs which were portrayed as extremely influential political actors with policy 
preferences that often differed strongly from those of central government and which 
were argued to play a crucial role in shaping the policy environment in strategic 
segments of the economy.44  
The origins of this sub-literature can be traced back to prominent earlier studies on 
economic policy-making in China which for many years have pointed towards a 
significant horizontal and vertical fragmentation of state authority as well as resulting 
obstacles to political decision-making and policy implementation. Particularly influential 
in this regard was Lieberthal’s (1988, 1992) ‘fragmented authoritarianism’ framework, 
which posited that “authority below the very peak of the Chinese political system is 
                                                
42 Barry Naughton, “SASAC Rising,” Hoover Institution, China Leadership Monitor #14 (2005); Barry 
Naughton, “Claiming Profit for the State: SASAC and the Capital Management Budget,” Hoover 
Institution, China Leadership Monitor #18 (2006a); Barry Naughton, “Top-Down Control: SASAC and 
the Persistence of State ownership in China,” paper presented at the University of Nottingham, 23 June 
2006 (2006b); Barry Naughton, “SASAC and Rising Corporate Power in China,” Hoover Institution, 
China Leadership Monitor #24 (2007). 
43 Brødsgaard, 2012. 
44 See e.g. Downs, 2006, 2008a; Xu, 2008, 2012; Chen, 2010; Tsai, 2013; Liao, 2014. 
  25 
fragmented and disjointed” and that “China’s bureaucratic ranking system combines 
with the functional division of authority among various bureaucracies to produce a 
situation in which it is often necessary to achieve agreement among an array of bodies, 
where no single body has authority over the others.”45 In conclusion, Lieberthal attested 
to a “reduce[d] [...] extent to which organs respond in disciplined fashion to instructions 
from higher levels” as well as to a “strengthened [...] tendency of bureaucratic units to 
work vigorously to promote and protect their own interests in the policy-making 
process”.46 Against this background, Lieberthal viewed the explanatory power of ‘top 
down’ perspectives on Chinese politics as insufficient and instead focused on processes 
of bureaucratic bargaining among different government departments and within the 
state sector at large, as well as on the “effects of the interactive processes among the 
constituent elements of the Chinese polity” on policy formulation and 
implementation.47 Arguing in the tradition of Lieberthal’s ‘fragmented authoritarianism’ 
framework, a number of cross-sectoral as well as industry-specific studies have emerged 
that considered the political influence of large central SOEs on China’s economic 
governance in more detail. 
 
Cross-sectoral studies on large SOEs’ policy relevance 
Important foundational work on the ‘bottom-up’ component of the interaction between 
government and industry over particular policy challenges was conducted by Kennedy 
(2005) who compared the influence of state-owned and private businesses on central-
level policy-making across different industry sectors.48 Emphasising mutual dependence 
between government and industry, Kennedy argued that: 
                                                
45 Lieberthal, 1992, p. 8. Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, Policy Making in China. Leaders, 
Structures, and Processes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). 
46 Lieberthal, 1992, p. 9. 
47 Ibid., pp. 10-12; See also David M. Lampton, “A plum for a peach: Bargaining, Interest, and 
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Kenneth G. Lieberthal and David M. Lampton (Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University of California 
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central-local relations (e.g. Jean C. Oi, “The role of the local state in China’s transitional economy,” The 
China Quarterly 144 (1995): 1132-1149), and furthermore on the influence of  non-governmental actors on 
policy. Notable studies in this regard, albeit with an exclusive focus on private actors, were written by 
Mertha (2009) on ‘policy entrepreneurs’ and by Steinberg and Shih (2012) on the effect of  export-
oriented manufacturers’ business interests on China’s exchange rate policy. See Andrew Mertha, 
“‘Fragmented Authoritarianism 2.0’: Political Pluralization in the Chinese Policy Process,” The China 
Quarterly 200 (2009): 995-1002; David A. Steinberg and Victor C. Shih, “Interest Group Influence in 
Authoritarian States: The Political Determinants of  Chinese Exchange Rate Policy,” Comparative Political 
Studies 45, no. 11 (2012): 1405–1434. 
48 Scott Kennedy, The Business of  Lobbying in China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005). 
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While the government is in a position to influence business, firms 
have gained policy leverage because they are central to accomplishing 
government objectives such as a growing economy, stable prices, high 
employment, and expanding tax receipts. Without industry’s 
cooperation, these and other goals cannot be achieved, either for a 
specific bureaucracy or for the government as a whole. Relatedly, 
because of  their involvement in the economy, businesses are a critical 
source of  knowledge on issues that affect their success.49  
Its importance for achieving policy objectives and superior knowledge together 
provided industry with a “‘privileged position’ at the policy table.”50 Large SOEs, having 
developed their own political standing as well as their own set of interests, were viewed 
as especially influential due to their direct access to the government bureaucracy, as well 
as their ability to criticise existing policies and recommend policy changes.51 Kennedy’s 
comparative work convincingly showed that industrial firms are important participants 
in central-level Chinese politics and large SOEs are particularly successful at furthering 
their interests via national policy. For the purpose of the present study, however, a 
limitation of his work is that it focused entirely on assessing the relative policy impact of 
firms given variance in ownership, size and levels of access to the bureaucracy, while 
lacking an analysis of firms’ policy influence in settings where their policy preferences 
were at odds with those of central government. Almost all of the examples of state 
firms’ policy influence presented by Kennedy in his most ‘strategically relevant’ case 
study (the steel industry) were related to policy challenges that were equally problematic 
for both central government and industry and that government appeared eager to 
remedy as both government and state firms were set to benefit. Without providing 
evidence that showed SOEs making use of their ‘access to the bureaucracy’ in order to 
overcome government opposition or change government opinions on previously 
contentious matters, it remains unclear through which mechanisms and under which 
conditions ‘access’ as such translates into political influence. 
Slightly stronger claims of state firms’ policy impact were made in a study by Lorentzen, 
Landry and Yasuda (2013) who analysed the effect of the presence of predominantly 
large state-owned industrial firms on the practical application of environmental policies 
in different localities, finding the presence of such firms associated with serious 
implementation problems to a degree which, the authors argued, “restrict[s] the ability 
of China’s top leaders to implement political reforms, even when these reforms are 
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aimed at promoting sustainable long-run economic growth and preserving CCP rule”.52 
Due to their focus on showing quantitative effects the authors, however, equally have 
little to say about the mechanisms through which large firms may affect policy in its 
application or about the nature of policy-relevant interactions between central 
government and large SOEs. Nevertheless, their findings support the notion that large 
state-owned industrial firms need to be taken seriously as political actors, particularly 
across China’s strategic industries in which they feature so heavily. 
 
Industry-specific studies on SOEs’ policy impact 
A number of other studies have focused more specifically on the policy impact of 
central SOEs at the sectoral level and have arrived at findings which further challenged 
the notion that large state firms mostly fulfil a function as central government’s 
‘instruments’ for exercising control. They argue instead that a de facto erosion of 
government authority had occurred in a number of strategic industry settings, regarding 
both state firm oversight as well as regarding processes of policy-making and policy 
implementation.53 While some of the government-centred accounts introduced in the 
previous section had already hinted at the influence of large SOEs in fields such as the 
telecommunication and airline industries, a strong empirical focus among these SOE-
centred studies was placed on the different segments of the energy sector; they 
contended that structural and policy developments in highly strategic fields such as oil, 
natural gas and electricity were subject to severe state firm interference or even mainly 
driven by state firms’ policy preferences.  
Xu (2008), in an article on energy policy-making, argued that the transformation of 
previously existing line ministries into corporatised state firms had created an 
“asymmetric situation” between government and SOEs in which state firms had gained 
control over the energy segment while government “seems to have lost its ability to 
regulate”. 54  As state firms had become “the key players” in China’s energy policy-
making, administrative control over large state-owned energy corporations was not only 
“long gone and the party and the government can no longer ‘order’ them what to do 
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and what not to do”,55 central SOEs furthermore treated sectoral regulators “at best as 
an inconvenience and at worst as the impediment of their development”, often simply 
ignoring them.56 Regarding the nature of the policy process, Xu further specified that 
this ‘asymmetric situation’ did not mean that government devised policy “on behalf of 
the energy companies at the expense of the country”, but rather that policies were 
“formulated ex-post by the government’s endorsement of a series of incremental and 
individual decisions made by the energy corporations that are driven more by market 
opportunities than a set of ideologies or pre-determined national energy strategy”.57  
Similar views on central SOEs’ increased autonomy from government have been 
expressed by Downs (2006, 2008a) and Liao (2014) in their work on China’s oil 
industry.58 Given the weakness and fragmentation of the sectoral bureaucracy and a 
“heightened divergence between corporate and national interests”, Downs posited, 
“China’s top leaders are not only less able to bend the NOCs [national oil companies] 
to their will but must also balance the companies’ demands with those of an increasing 
number of other interest groups”. In summary, Downs maintained that “the projects 
pursued by the energy SOEs tend to shape the country’s energy policies rather than vice 
versa”. 59  Findings of government inability to provide effective policy guidance in 
strategic industries also come from studies on China’s electricity sector where Chen 
(2010) and Xu (2012), in brief but insightful overviews, sketched out strategies applied 
by state-owned electricity companies to interfere with sectoral restructuring, which Xu 
summarised as “gaming the system and taking advantage of the diverse interests of 
government agencies”. 60  Zhang (2015) furthermore depicted state-owned electricity 
companies as “too powerful to be fully subject to the authority of the agencies”61 that 
are meant to supervise them, while a study by Tsai (2014) on administrative reforms in 
the electricity sector designated them as the “mightiest interest group in the country” 
                                                
55 Ibid., pp. 442, 445. 
56 Ibid., pp. 447-448. 
57 Ibid., p. 450. 
58 Downs, 2008a, pp. 121-122; Erica S. Downs, “China,” The Brookings Foreign Policy Studies Energy 
Security Series, 2006; Janet Xuanli Liao, “The Chinese government and the national oil companies 
(NOCs): who is the principal?” Asia Pacific Business Review 21, no. 1 (2014): 44–59. For further information 
on China’s oil sector see Kun-Chin Lin, “Corporatizing China. Reinventing State Control for the 
Market,” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 2003). 
59 Downs, 2008a, pp. 128-129, 137. 
60 Xu, 2012, p. 141; Chen, 2010. 
61 Zhang, 2015, p. 486. 
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which had successfully undermined the authority of a newly created regulatory agency 
via ‘capture’ and by playing off different government agencies against each other.62  
 
Summary of claims made across the ‘SOE-centred’ literature 
While testifying to the political power and influence of central state firms, the studies 
introduced above have suggested a number of mechanisms through which these 
companies are able to shape policy in its formulation and implementation. As core 
avenues, all of the studies emphasised these firms’ direct access to all relevant parts of 
the bureaucracy, their formal connections to central government due to their high 
administrative rank, informal connections to top officials due to firm executives’ 
membership in CCP committees which allowed them to circumvent sectoral authorities 
and liaise directly with top leaders, and their active participation in policy-making.63 
Furthermore, Kennedy (2005) argued that central SOEs’ role during policy-making was 
strengthened by central government’s strong reliance on firms’ expertise concerning 
their respective industries.64 Downs (2008b), in her work on energy policy, and with 
slight variance also Chen (2010) and Xu (2012) with findings from the electricity sector, 
additionally asserted that central SOEs were particularly successful at driving sectoral 
policy if they managed to argumentatively link their suggestions for sectoral policy 
content or project development to broader notions of the ‘national interest’ as 
expressed by the top leadership.65 Finally, building on Downs’s (2008a; 2008b) and Xu’s 
(2008; 2012) observations of the uncoordinated interplay of central government 
institutions and the weakness of the sectoral administration in a number of highly 
strategic sectors, Tsai (2014) argued that large electricity SOEs have been able to 
‘capture’ sectoral regulators and to play off different parts of the bureaucracy against 
each other in their own favour.  
 
                                                
62 Tsai, 2014, pp. 470, 471. See also Chung-min Tsai, “The Paradox of  Regulatory Development in China. 
The Case of  the Electricity Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University of  California, Berkeley, 2010). 
63 Kennedy, 2005, pp. 72-74; Downs, 2008a, pp. 128-129, 2008b, 42-25; Xu, 2008, pp. 443-444, 447-448; 
Liao, 2014, p. 52; Zhang, 2015, p. 486. 
64 Kennedy, 2005, p. 55. 
65 Erica S. Downs, “China’s ‘New’ Energy Administration,” China Business Review (November 2008b): 42-
45; Xu, 2012; Chen, 2010, focuses exclusively on state firms’ argumentative references to government’s 
market building principle under the heading of  “playing the market reform card”. 
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Lack of empirical depth as a core shortcoming of the ‘SOE-centred’ literature 
While delivering strongly phrased counter-claims to government-centred accounts, all of 
the industry-specific SOE-centred studies surveyed here share as a distinct weakness a 
severe lack of empirical depth. Emphasising large SOEs’ profound influence on policy 
in its emergence and application, these studies all argue their case based on sparse and 
anecdotal empirical evidence, for the most part either select examples of state firms’ 
oppositional conduct to central government policy during the implementation stage or 
examples of policy output that coincided with (often-times assumed) SOE interests. 
Although the evidence presented certainly suffices as a basis for arguing that central 
government and SOE policy preferences are often at odds with each other and have led 
to prominent instances of confrontation over the shape and content of sectoral policy, 
none of these studies engage in in-depth analyses of SOEs’ conduct during, and 
influence on, policy processes which would actually systematically demonstrate the 
declared mechanisms of state firm influence in action. Tsai (2014), for instance, writes 
about SOEs’ role in “obstructing” policy and “capturing” regulators, as well as 
“lobbying” and “persuading” government, 66  yet the processes through which these 
different types of policy influence materialise are not presented in any notable detail, 
just as the conditions under which they may occur, succeed or fail remain undiscussed. 
Downs (2008a) provides some evidence of SOEs’ obstructive behaviour in the oil 
sector, but she fails to show that this behaviour was actually instrumental in bringing 
about any of the desired changes and furthermore declares outcomes as being 
congruent with SOE interests without showing how or why these outcomes arose. Xu 
(2008) declares that central government had lost its “ability to regulate”67 China’s energy 
sector and that it formulates policy based not on any broader strategic considerations 
but rather by choosing in hindsight among policy alternatives derived from actions that 
have already been taken by state firms, yet the evidence presented to demonstrate this 
purported dynamic remains extremely scarce.68 Chen (2010) and Xu (2012) similarly 
assert that state firms advocated their own policy suggestions in particular ways and that 
particular outcomes arose because of it, but aside from a very small number of relevant, 
but anecdotal, examples they do not show whether or how advocacy and outcomes 
were procedurally linked to each other.  
                                                
66 Tsai, p. 470. 
67 Xu, 2008, p. 435. 
68 Ibid., pp. 435, 450. 
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The general lack of systematic process-based empirical evidence across this part of the 
literature makes it very difficult to judge whether and how the presented mechanisms 
apply and whether there is indeed a systematic nature to the ways in which the action 
and intent of central state firms influence the shape, content and application of central-
level policy. At the same time, the persisting uncertainty regarding this potentially 
important factor, which has been widely omitted across the previously introduced 
government-centred accounts, opens opportunities for further research. 
 
1.1.3 Clash of perspectives as point of departure for new research 
In summary, there remains considerable doubt across the literature on the political 
economy of China’s industrial reforms regarding the factors that determine policy 
trajectories in China’s ‘strategic’ industries and particularly regarding the influence of 
central-level SOEs in the associated policy processes. Dominant parts of the literature 
strongly emphasise central government guidance, for example, Hsueh’s (2011) focus on 
central government’s strategic value considerations, Pearson’s (2005, 2007) emphasis on 
central government’s different political imperatives across strategic industries and 
Heilmann and Shih’s (2013) focus on shifts in ideas among government leaders as the 
determinants of political shifts in how strategic parts of China’s economy are governed. 
While the political role of large SOEs in central-level policy processes is largely ignored, 
some authors acknowledge limitations to government’s institutional capacities while 
partially recognising the relevance of state industry’s policy preferences, but then equally 
limit their analysis to the causes and outcomes of lacking institutional capacity and give 
little indication of how central state firms might add to the overall scenario.69 Others 
again refer to central state industry under the label of a government-steered “China 
Inc.”, attesting to the evolution of an effective system of centralised government 
leadership over industry 70  or even to the emergence of a “new form of state led 
paternalistic governance”71 under central government’s “near absolute control.”72 
SOE-centred accounts as introduced in the previous section, on the other hand, argue 
that central government’s sectoral oversight in several strategic industries is weak and 
that central state firms essentially dominate the policy arena. At the same time, they 
                                                
69 E.g. Pei, 2006; Eaton, 2013b; Heilmann and Shih, 2013. 
70 Li, 2015, p. 107. 
71 Ho and Young, 2013, p. 84. 
72 Ibid. 
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provide very little systematic evidence as to how, why, or under which conditions state 
firm influence occurs, which may partially explain why the claims made by this small 
sub-literature have thus far been of limited practical consequence to more broadly 
debated perspectives of China’s economic policy-making. Despite its empirical 
weaknesses, the basic questions raised by this literature regarding the practical 
controllability of China’s strategic industries and the large state firms which populate 
them are of considerable importance for our broader understanding of the trajectory of 
China’s industrial reforms. Building on the mismatch between both perspectives – 
deliberately reduced to essentials for the purpose of operationalisation – this study 
further analyses the role played by large central state-owned industrial enterprises in 
strategic industry sectors during processes of policy-making and policy implementation. 
This endeavour is pursued by testing in a ‘most likely’ industry case for government-
centred accounts whether the hitherto largely unsupported claims made by the SOE-
centred literature regarding mechanisms for state firms’ policy influence actually apply, 
i.e. whether, under which conditions, how and to what effect large central SOEs are 
able to shape core sectoral policy in China’s strategic industries. 
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1.2 Research design 
1.2.1 Research question 
‘Are central SOEs able to influence sectoral policy in China’s ‘strategic’ industries? If so, 
under which conditions, how and to what effect?’73 
 
1.2.2 Introduction to the case study 
The stated research question will be applied to the case of the electricity supply industry 
which, due to its great strategic importance both economically and politically, fulfils the 
criteria of a ‘most likely’ case for ‘government-centred’ perspectives on economic 
governance in China’s ‘strategic’ industries as introduced in the literature review. At the 
same time, the industry can also be characterised as a ‘most likely’ case for the SOE-
centred perspective given the presence of some of China’s largest central state-owned 
enterprises.  
The electricity supply industry is furthermore particularly suited as a test case for the 
different viewpoints on economic governance in China’s strategic industries as it has 
witnessed considerable shifts in sectoral reform agendas since the turn of the 
millennium. In 2002, a comprehensive reform agenda aimed at unbundled competitive 
regional market building was introduced to the hitherto vertically integrated monopolistic 
industry setting but then started to lose its political momentum in the mid-2000s when a 
new reform plan aimed at the development of an integrated non-competitive nationally unified 
supply system began to emerge and was partially applied thereafter. These two agendas 
stood in stark contrast to each other and imagined entirely different outcomes regarding 
industry structure (unbundled and regionalised vs. integrated and centralised) as well as 
regarding the functional logic of electricity supply (competitive upstream and 
                                                
73 Indicators and definitions: ‘Central SOEs’ refer to state-owned enterprises administered by the central 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission. A full list of  these firms is available 
under: SASAC, “List of  central SOEs,” 
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2963340/n2971121/n4956567/4956583.html, accessed 05/2013. 
‘Influence’ is here understood as requiring evidence that SOEs’ “action and intent” were “sufficiently 
effective to have plausibly caused an appreciable part” of  the respective outcome under scrutiny. See 
Daniel Carpenter and David A. Moss, “Introduction,” pp. 10-12 and Daniel Carpenter, “Detecting and 
Measuring Capture,”, p. 60, both in Preventing Regulatory Capture. Special Interest Influence and How to Limit It, 
edited by Daniel Carpenter and David A. Moss (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
‘Sectoral policy’ is defined here as policy which is targeted at industry-specific issues and which only applies 
within the confines of  a specific industry. It can be published either by the State Council, comprehensive 
economic commissions, or by industry-level authorities. 
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downstream markets vs. non-competitive downstream monopoly/oligopoly). They 
therefore represent precisely the kind of fundamental policy choices the drivers of 
which the broader literature has theorised about. This setting provides an opportunity 
to deductively compare the explanatory power of the two basic approaches throughout 
phases of policy implementation and policy formulation and to thereby deepen our 
understanding of sectoral policy drivers in China’s strategic industries, which form the 
broader universe of cases that this study relates to.74 
While a single industry study only allows for a limited generalisability of findings across 
cases, the selection of a ‘most likely’ test case marks an attempt at combining empirical 
richness and analytical depth with maximal leverage regarding existing country-specific 
middle-range theory. The deliberately narrow empirical emphasis on mechanisms of 
administrative competition between central government and state firms in sectoral 
policy-making arguably contains considerable theoretical relevance as it directly 
addresses core premises underlying numerous influential accounts of the political 
economy of China’s industrial reforms. If the SOE-centred perspective can be shown to 
have explanatory merit in a ‘most likely’ case for government-centred explanations, this 
would pose a challenge to the latter accounts as they would have failed to fully explain 
an ‘easy’ test case for their largely shared postulate of active and effective central 
government guidance over fundamental development trajectories in China’s strategic 
industries. This type of finding could require adjustments to common government-
centred interpretations of policy output and outcomes in some of the most important 
parts of China’s economy, particularly to studies such as Hsueh (2011) with her 
insistence on exclusively government-driven ‘strategic value logic’ or Heilmann and Shih 
(2013) with their focus on ideas about economic governance within central government. 
Modifications could become necessary to these viewpoints regarding the role of central 
SOEs in China’s economic policy realm and the mechanisms through which they are 
able to influence central-level policy processes, and consequently also regarding the 
capacity of central government to steer the development of the country’s strategic 
industries according to its political and economic preferences. Simultaneously, such 
                                                
74 Other examples of ‘strategic’ industries include telecommunications, railway, airlines, banking, as well as 
energy and resource-related industries including electricity, oil, gas, and mining. See Mattlin, 2007. The 
deliberate restriction of the scope of this thesis to central-state politics in China’s ‘strategic’ industries is 
important to emphasise as very different types of state-industry interactions may be observed in other 
segments of the economy or at lower administrative levels. See e.g. Howell (2006) for a discussion of the 
polymorphous nature of the Chinese state or Pearson (2005) for a discussion of the country’s tiered 
economy. 
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findings would provide partial support to the SOE-centred approach and could yield 
inferences about the extent to which the hitherto largely unproven mechanisms for 
SOEs’ policy impact posited by this literature are actually significant, i.e. to see which of 
them apply, whether there are other mechanisms that apply and whether there is 
anything systematic about how they apply. On the other hand, if there is no evidence 
for the existence and effectiveness of such mechanisms in a test case where the 
arguments presented by the SOE-centred camp should equally be expected to apply, 
this would not only further solidify the already strong position of government-centred 
perspectives on economic governance in China’s strategic industries but also strongly 
weaken the argumentative reach of SOE-centred accounts. Finally, if neither of the two 
approaches are able to sufficiently explain policy shifts in the industry test case at hand, 
this would require more broadly revised claims about the determinants of sectoral 
policy and the political interplay of central government and central state firms in China’s 
strategic industries. 
 
1.2.3 Basic variable setting 
Outcome to be explained: Shifts in reform trajectories for sectoral policy in China’s 
electricity industry between 2002 and 2015. This overall dependent variable is further 
broken down in order to reflect different phases of this shift. Part A of the empirical 
sections attempts to explain the outcomes of central government’s attempts to develop 
unbundled competitive regional markets in electricity supply. Part B attempts to explain the 
subsequent emergence and partial installation of an integrated non-competitive nationally 
unified electricity supply system. 
Independent variables: The main line of inquiry in this dissertation will be to ask whether 
“action and intent” by large SOEs in pursuit of shifts in sectoral policy have been 
“sufficiently effective to have plausibly caused an appreciable part of the shift”75 that 
eventually occurred (Parts A and B of the empirical sections). In addition, the question 
of whether shifts in central government’s sectoral policy preferences (as a second 
                                                
75 This benchmark for assessing industry influence on policy-making have found application in the 
literature on ‘regulatory capture’ and will be borrowed for the purposes of this study. See Carpenter and 
Moss, 2014, pp. 10-12. 
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independent variable of theoretical relevance) may equally or better explain shifts in 
sectoral policy will be addressed.76 
 
1.2.4 Basic test hypotheses and indicators 
Two basic test hypotheses are used while deductively applying the stated research 
question to the selected industry case. In order to facilitate the inquiry in light of the 
differences between authors within the government-centred and SOE-centred parts of 
the literature, both hypotheses are phrased as simplified condensations of claims made 
in both loosely organised camps. Hsueh (2011) and Pearson (2005, 2007) are used as the 
main references for the government-centred null hypothesis while the SOE-centred 
alternative hypothesis is derived mainly in reference to claims made by Xu (2008) and 
Downs (2006, 2008a). 
‘Government-centred’ null hypothesis: ‘The way in which sectoral policy in China’s 
electricity industry has been formulated and applied is sufficiently explicable by central 
government’s policy preferences for that industry sector as well as by shifts over time 
regarding those preferences.’ 
Indicators for the null hypothesis: It should be found that central government policy 
preferences shifted, i.e. market building was no longer desired, while recentralisation 
and expansion of monopoly/oligopoly was now preferred. There also needs to be 
empirical evidence that central government has acted as a guiding force, orchestrating 
programmatic and structural change. There should be evidence that the initial impetus 
for change originated within government and that it was consistently pursued thereafter. 
As far as state industry is found to have been the origin of the new agenda and the main 
proponent of its application, there needs to be convincing evidence that central 
government supported this agenda from a sectoral guidance standpoint and was in full 
and conscious control of the way in which it was applied. As a very minimum, there 
should be no evidence of government opposition to the changes that occurred or, if 
there is evidence of distinct government opposition to industry action, government 
should be expected to prevail. 
                                                
76 This study remains agnostic towards the precise nature of a potential shift in government preferences. 
There will, for instance, be no conceptual differentiation between government’s interests and ideas as 
practised e.g. by Hsueh (2011) and Heilmann and Shih (2013). 
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‘SOE-centred’ alternative hypothesis: ‘Action and intent by large SOEs have had a 
dominant effect on the way in which sectoral policy in China’s electricity industry has 
been formulated and applied, while policy shifts in the industry are insufficiently 
explicable by shifts in central government’s sectoral policy preferences.’ 
Indicators for the alternative hypothesis: There should be evidence of state firms actively 
defending their dominant industry position when confronted with competitive market 
building policy, i.e. policy that challenges their organisational integrity and their 
scope/scale of business. State firms should display a very high success rate in their 
opposing endeavours. The origin of the new restructuring agenda should be traceable to 
state industry itself and there should be evidence that the shift between policy 
trajectories was both actively and knowingly driven by state industry and, if necessary, 
also against central government’s stated policy preferences. Any political and 
bureaucratic conflicts concerning these two agendas should be dominated by SOEs and 
subsequent decision-making should be in line with their stated policy preferences. 
Indicators of ‘intent’ by state industry may include, among others, evidence of attempts 
to lobby or place targeted pressure on regulators to change existing policy or its 
application or the shaping of the informational setting within which decision-making 
takes place.77  
 
1.2.5 Overview of the dissertation structure and of within-case 
methods for hypothesis testing 
Throughout the analytical narrative both process tracing and the congruence method 
will be applied in order to deductively test and compare the explanatory power of claims 
inherent to the two stated hypotheses.78 The associated findings will then be used to 
suggest and subsequently re-test a number of revised claims through a series of ‘before-
after’ comparisons. 79  This thesis therefore primarily follows a deductive logic but 
includes an inductive element. 
An empirical focus will be placed on the SOE-centred alternative hypothesis as the 
main research interest while also dedicating adequate consideration to the government-
centred perspective. While working with competing explanations during data analysis, 
                                                
77 For further discussion of the concept of ‘intent’ see Carpenter and Moss, 2014, p. 11; Carpenter, 2014, 
p. 60. 
78 George and Bennett, 2005, pp. 179-184, 205-223. 
79 Ibid., p. 219. 
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instances suited to conducting congruence tests will be sought for which the different 
perspectives either make distinctive predictions regarding the process under scrutiny or 
where, based on the logic of their argument, they should expect to find one type of 
process or mechanism at play but not another (specifications for such processes and 
mechanisms will be provided as part of the empirical chapters). These 
predictions/derived expectations will subsequently be compared to factual occurrences 
in order to judge the relative strength of the different explanatory approaches. 80 
Increasing the number of observations while combining congruence method and 
process-tracing is expected to simplify the assessment of whether posited relationships 
between the dependent variable and different independent variables are causal or 
spurious.81  
The empirical part of the dissertation is organised in three parts. After a brief historical 
overview of major structural and administrative developments in China’s electricity 
industry, Part A analyses the implementation processes underlying a far-reaching 
sectoral marketisation policy issued by the State Council in 2002. Particular scrutiny will 
be applied to the political role of the State Grid Corporation of China (SGCC) as the 
country’s third largest state firm and the infrastructural heart of the electricity industry, 
as well as to its interactions with central government following the publication of this 
policy. The questions of whether, under which conditions, how and to what effect 
SGCC has influenced the course of policy implementation will be approached 
predominantly by analysing its responses to a number of asset unbundling requirements 
inherent in the marketisation plan, the practical enforcement of which constituted a 
structural prerequisite for the emergence of sectoral competition as envisioned by the 
State Council. Associated processes and outcomes will furthermore be cross-checked 
against the government-centred explanation.  
Part B of the empirical sections will analyse the appearance in the mid-2000s of a new 
sectoral reform plan that contained a reform route that in many ways ran opposite to 
the original marketisation agenda. Emphasis will be placed on analysing SGCC’s role 
during the emergence and partial application of this new policy agenda. In particular, it 
will be assessed whether, under which conditions and through which mechanisms the 
grid company has been able to exert influence on associated political processes and 
                                                
80 Ibid., p. 117. 
81 Ibid., pp. 179, 208. 
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outcomes, while once more cross-checking findings against the government-centred 
explanation.  
The conclusions of Parts A and B will be presented in the form of a simple interactive 
model of state firm influence on central-level policy processes as derived from the 
industry case at hand, while furthermore discussing the limitations of both the main 
explanatory approaches scrutinised in this dissertation. As part of this model, the 
prevalence of a ‘synchronisation’ mechanism (briefly presented in the introductory 
section) will be suggested through which central state industrial actors in the electricity 
supply sector, based on both action and intent, can influence the formulation and 
implementation of sectoral policy, supplemented by claims regarding the conditions 
under which they are able to do so.  
To ensure the validity of Parts A and B’s findings, they will be re-tested in Part C 
against additional empirical material from the same industry case using a sequence of 
targeted ‘before-after’ comparisons 82  in which the presence/absence of said 
‘synchronisation’ mechanism (the independent variable for Part C) during policy-related 
confrontations between SGCC and central government will be used to explain variance 
in outcomes regarding the grid company’s ability to shape sectoral decision-making 
according to its preferences (dependent variable for Part C). The study concludes by 
discussing findings regarding state firm influence on crucial sectoral policy in the 
electricity supply sector both in its emergence and implementation, the logic of 
interactions between state firms and central government over contentious central-level 
policy and the limits of influence on both sides. In a final step, the relevance and 
consequences of these findings for the existing literature will be considered. 
 
1.2.6 Overview of sources used 
The empirical sections of this dissertation rely heavily on primary sources published in 
Chinese. While the secondary literature on China’s electricity industry has been widely 
surveyed, to the author’s best knowledge no publications existed at the time of writing 
that analysed political shifts and the role of central state firms during those shifts to the 
level of detail required for the particular project at hand, a reservation which also 
appeared to apply to China’s other strategic industries. Numerous sector-specific studies 
                                                
82 Ibid., p. 219. 
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exist, but none of them systematically and with empirical depth consider the policy 
influence of central SOEs.83 
In addition to publicly available central government policy documents as the 
foundations for assessing the evolution of the sectoral policy realm, the most important 
sources of information were state-owned and privately-owned Chinese media outlets 
covering national-level economic and industry news. These media outlets ranged from 
government publications such as the People’s Daily to partially more liberal newspapers 
such as Caixin or Caijing, while cited newspapers also include the 21st Century Business 
Herald, the Economic Observer and the China Securities Journal, among numerous others.84 A 
considerable number of industry-specific news articles were obtained via the North Star 
Electric Power News Network, a Chinese website that functions as an industry news 
aggregator.85 Some empirical sections also draw heavily on articles published by industry 
experts and former government officials who participated in industry-level project 
assessments and evaluations organised by the National Energy Administration and who 
gave account of these procedures.86 While engaging with these sources, a general focus 
was placed on extracting fact-based statements that could be triangulated against or 
placed into the context of other sources. Personal statements and opinion pieces were 
generally approached with careful attention to the authors’ organisational affiliation and 
political leanings, wherever possible.  
The available written empirical material was supplemented with semi-structured 
interviews held in Beijing between 2011 and 2014 with employees of the National 
Energy Administration (NEA), the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC) and the State Grid Corporation of China (SGCC). During all 
interviews, the ‘LSE Research Ethics Policy and Procedures’ and the ‘ESRC Framework 
                                                
83 Examples of  recent secondary literature: Yi-chong Xu, Powering China (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002); Chi 
Zhang and Thomas C. Heller, “Reform of the Chinese electric power market: economics and 
institutions,” in The Political Economy of Power Sector Reform: the Experiences of Five Major Developing Countries, 
edited by David G. Victor and Thomas C. Heller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); 
Edward A. Cunningham, “A Portfolio Approach to Energy Governance: State Management of  China’s 
Coal and Electric Power Supply Industries” (Ph.D. diss., Massachusetts Institute of  Technology, 2009); 
Michael Meidan, Philip Andrews-Speed and Ma Xin, “Shaping China’s Energy Policy: actors and 
processes”, Journal of  Contemporary China 18, no. 61 (2009): 591-616; Ngan, H. W., “Electricity regulation 
and electricity market reforms in China,” Energy Policy 38 (2010): 2142-2148; Chen, 2010; Xu, 2012; Kun-
Chin Lin and Mike M. Purra, “Transforming China’s Electricity Sector: Institutional Change and 
Regulation in the Reform Era,” Centre for Rising Powers, Department of  Politics and International 
Studies, University of  Cambridge, CRP Working Paper #8 (November 2012); Tsai, 2014; Zhang, 2015. 
84 Due to the large number of Chinese online news sources used and in order to enhance footnote 
readability, URLs for online news articles are only listed in the bibliography. 
85 ‘North Star Electric Power News Network’ (北极星电⼒新闻⺴), http://www.bjx.com.cn. 
86 See in particular Zeng Dewen’s Electricity Industry Blog (曾德⽂的博客), 
http://eee001.blog.caixin.com/. 
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for research ethics’ were followed. 87  The interviewer identified himself to all 
interviewees as an LSE doctoral researcher, explained the purpose of the study and 
clarified that information provided during interviews would be used for research 
purposes and for eventual publication. All interviewees made an informed and free 
decision to participate and gave their consent for the use of their information. They 
were also provided with the researcher’s contact information to enable them to retract 
information or withdraw their consent should they wish to do so at a later point. To 
protect interviewees from personal or career-related risks as possible consequences of 
their participation in the study or the nature of their statements, their anonymity was 
secured through the removal of personal identifiers.  
                                                
87 London School of Economics and Political Science, Research Ethics Policy and Procedures, November 2014, 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/intranet/LSEServices/policies/pdfs/school/resEthPolPro.pdf, accessed 12/2014; 
Economic and Social Research Council, ESRC framework for research ethics, January 2015, 
http://www.esrc.ac.uk/files/funding/guidance-for-applicants/esrc-framework-for-research-ethics-2015/, 
accessed 12/2015. 
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2 China’s electricity sector reforms and the evolving 
institutional linkages between central government 
and state industry 
This chapter will give a brief overview of structural and administrative developments in 
China’s electricity industry in order to provide the relevant context for the following 
empirical analyses of both the attempted implementation of market building policy (Part 
A) and the subsequent emergence and partial application of a new sectoral reform 
agenda (Parts B and C). These analyses focus on the role of state industry in shaping the 
underlying policy processes and their interaction with central government bodies. 
The first section of this chapter will briefly discuss major policy reform steps in China’s 
electricity industry over the past decades. As a foundation, the pre-reform history of the 
previously government-operated industry will be outlined in order to then review early 
reforms geared towards a separation of the state’s administrative and entrepreneurial 
functions in the 1990s. Against this background, the 2002 marketisation reforms to 
China’s electricity industry will be discussed through an analysis of the main guiding 
policy document, the No. 5 Document (2002), as well as a brief summary of the 
discrepancies between reform goals and outcomes. It will be shown that (a) China’s 
electricity sector has been confronted with major reforms through which central 
government aimed to introduce regionalised market competition into a hitherto 
vertically integrated monopoly and (b) the structural outcomes of these reforms have 
diverged significantly from stated goals. 
The second section will discuss the administrative structure as it has developed via and 
since the introduction of the marketisation agenda. First, an overview of the regulatory 
setting at the industry level will be provided before then outlining China’s system for 
the administration of state assets and the resulting incentive structures under which 
state firms operate. After introducing the State Grid Corporation of China (SGCC) as 
the primary empirical target while investigating mechanisms of state firm influence on 
sectoral policy in the electricity industry, the chapter will conclude with a brief 
discussion of variances between mandates among different government bodies and the 
political standing of central state firms. 
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2.1 Overview of major sectoral reform steps in China’s 
electricity industry 
2.1.1 The pre-reform history of China’s government-operated 
electricity supply industry 
Prior to the onset of economic reforms in 1978, the allocation and distribution of 
resources in China’s economy was based almost entirely on administrative measures, as 
prices, interest rates and wages were set within a centrally devised economic plan.88 
Accordingly, China’s electricity industry was structured as a vertically integrated utility 
where ownership, control and management functions within the industry were 
performed by government officials according to policies based on centrally negotiated 
political objectives. 89  Through its hierarchically organised arrangement of economic 
planning commissions, the Chinese government allocated investment and the supply of 
labour and raw materials. Electricity was produced and distributed by state-run plants 
and transmission systems according to quotas and prices set by the State Planning 
Commission (the highest-ranking central state economic planning body at the time); the 
quotas and prices were based on demand projections and political considerations, while 
industry revenues flowed directly into the government budget.90  
Over the decades, the electrical power industry was subject to various rounds of 
organisational restructuring conducted in order to alleviate ongoing problems with 
power shortages and inefficient power distribution, which were generally believed to 
result from the faulty arrangement of the government institutions responsible for 
devising and implementing economic policies.91 Throughout periods of decentralisation 
and recentralisation of government authority over the energy sector, organisational 
experiments regarding sectoral administration were carried out in an attempt to build a 
framework within which it would be possible to establish a coherent national energy 
strategy.92  During these different phases, administration over the electricity industry 
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shifted between different ministries with varying scopes of authority, including a 
Ministry of Fossil Fuels (until 1955) and a Ministry of Water Resources and Electric 
Power (MWREP) which was repeatedly dissolved and reinstated throughout the 1960s 
and 1970s, interrupted by brief periods in which a separate Ministry of Electric Power 
existed.93 In 1988, following years of fast economic growth and substantial increases in 
energy demand, an all-encompassing Ministry of Energy (MoE) was created which 
merged the MWREP, the Ministry of Coal and the Ministry of Petroleum.94 The MoE 
was a short-lived government department because the different industry sectors it had 
to supervise proved to be very heterogeneous and an overlap of administrative duties 
with the State Planning Commission (SPC) led to conflicts that constrained its 
effectiveness.  
The disintegration of the MoE in 1993 was followed by the re-emergence of a separate 
Ministry of Electric Power (MEP).95 The MEP, subordinate to the SPC, which in turn 
reported to the State Council, administered and operated the electricity sector in a dual 
role of government department and commercial enterprise. In these two functions, it 
was responsible for policy-making and supervision but also for managing 
microeconomic operations, while the SPC retained control of macro-levers such as 
investment approvals and price setting.96 Below the MEP, provincial electrical power 
bureaus acted as vertically integrated regional monopolists operating power generation, 
dispatch, transmission and power distribution, while a number of these bureaus were 
also merged into regional power groups to promote cross-provincial electricity 
transmission.97  
 
2.1.2 The separation of the state’s administrative and 
entrepreneurial functions in the 1990s 
Throughout the 1990s, industrial reforms throughout China’s state sector aimed to 
increase the efficiency of both government administration and industry operations. At 
the centre of these reforms stood the cleaner separation of government and industry 
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functions in the form of identifying and clarifying property rights, transforming 
operational parts of industrial ministries into state companies and further 
commercialising those SOEs that already existed.98 An important reform trigger was 
that government funds alone were not sufficient to satisfy industrial investment needs 
and the corporatisation of state firms was viewed as a first step towards solving this 
problem, as it meant that the enterprises could try to gain access to other sources of 
investment.99 Consequently, direct government funding for SOEs was slowly reduced 
which altered incentives and drove SOEs toward a stronger profit orientation.100 With 
almost half of China’s SOEs still sustaining losses during the middle of the 1990s, the 
majority of smaller state firms were ultimately privatised. By ‘grasping the large and 
releasing the small’, government authorities from this point on shifted their attention 
toward revitalising a limited number of the most profitable and strategically relevant 
large and medium-sized SOEs in different industries.101  
This overall reform agenda found entry into the electricity industry via the 1997 
Electricity Law, according to which the enterprise management functions of the 
Ministry of Electric Power were transferred to a newly created State Power Corporation 
of China (SPCC) which was to manage its own operations while the electric power 
bureaus at lower administrative levels were converted into subsidiary firms. 102  The 
SPCC as a holding company from here on owned and operated most of China’s 
transmission and distribution infrastructure and about half of the country’s generating 
capacity. The asset transfers to the SPCC also included a large variety of construction, 
manufacturing, and service companies, and different research institutions. 103  In the 
following year, the MEP was ultimately abolished together with a number of other 
industrial ministries, and its regulatory and policy-making functions were assigned to the 
Electric Power Department of the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC),104 
which was instructed to step back from directly administering enterprise operations and 
to take up a function that emphasised industrial management from a macro-
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perspective.105 While the separation of governmental and entrepreneurial functions had 
formally been accomplished, in practise the SETC maintained a close relationship with 
the State Power Corporation and so struggled to exercise its regulatory functions. The 
SETC’s authority deteriorated further due to continued competition between 
government departments regarding energy sector oversight. In particular, the 
organisational successor to the State Planning Commission, the State Development 
Planning Commission (SDPC), successfully challenged the SETC for its dominance in 
long-term energy policy-making.106  
 
2.1.3 The 2002 marketisation reforms in China’s electricity industry 
In February 2002, following a lengthy phase of political debates, the State Council 
published a policy document outlining an extensive marketisation agenda for the 
electricity industry. 107  In line with market-building attempts in other sectors of the 
Chinese economy and partially influenced by a worldwide trend in the 1990s towards 
market liberalisation in network industries, 108  this ‘No. 5 Document’ represented a 
radical break with past practises of power sector administration and management in 
China and laid out a road map for a large-scale reorganisation of industry assets and the 
policy framework within which they were operated.  
The reasons behind orchestrating such a shift towards market building were manifold.109 
According to former prime minister Li Peng, who at the time was still a member of the 
CCP’s Politburo Standing Committee and known for his close ties to the electricity 
industry, the reforms were meant to increase the efficiency of state-owned electricity 
companies by urging them to cut costs and to improve the quality of service via the 
introduction of competition, thereby lowering retail prices for consumers and 
stimulating broader industrial development.110 As specified by Wang Jun, the then head 
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of the Electric Power Division in the State Development Planning Commission’s 
(SDPC) Department of Basic Industries111 and who led the SDPC’s ‘Leading Group’ 
which drew up a draft for the new industry reform plan,112 the introduction of market 
competition was also meant to address protectionist tendencies among provinces under 
the all-encompassing State Power Corporation, as well as curtail the vertically integrated 
power companies’ large above-quota profits while achieving tariff reductions for 
consumers.113 
The following section will provide an introduction to the No. 5 Document as the heart 
of the 2002 marketisation agenda, followed by a brief summary of the discrepancies 
between reform goals and reforms outcomes. 
 
Industry restructuring according to the marketisation agenda of the No. 5 Document (2002) 
While the guiding ideas behind the reform as stated in the No. 5 Document were to 
support the growth and development of the entire power sector, increase the security 
and reliability of supply, mitigate the impact of power generation on the environment 
and satisfy growing power demand,114 it is the more specific organisational objectives 
listed in the policy document which give tangible meaning to the 2002 reforms and 
indicate the sweeping changes they were meant to trigger. As part of an unbundled 
competitive regional market building agenda, and much to the dismay of the State Power 
Corporation and its general manager Gao Yan (⾼严),115 the State Council under prime 
minister Zhu Rongji demanded the break-up of the SPCC’s vertically integrated 
monopoly via a number of clauses that were aimed at the unbundling of potentially 
competitive industry segments from naturally monopolistic segments and subjecting 
them to market competition, which together with the establishment of a mechanism for 
competitive wholesale pricing were meant to lead to a more efficient allocation of 
resources.116 
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The most consequential unbundling step was the separation of power generation assets 
from the grid with respect to both ownership and operation in order to lay the 
foundation for the development of wholesale competition in electricity supply.117 The 
SPCC’s assets in the area of power generation were divided up and allocated to five 
newly created power generation firms which remained under full central state 
ownership and which were each granted a 20% share in regional markets.118 These five 
companies were the China Datang Corporation, China Huadian Corporation, China 
Guodian Corporation, China Power Investment Corporation and the China Huaneng 
Group (see Figure 2.1).119  
 
 
Figure 2.1 The 2002 restructuring of the State Power Corporation of China 
Source: Chun Chun Ni, “The Xinfeng Power Plant Incident and Challenges for China’s Electric 
Power Industry,” The Institute of Energy Economics, Japan, Working Paper (February 2007), 
p. 12. 
 
A second unbundling step concerned the separation of the overall grid structure into 
clearly defined regional grids as the basis for separate regional electricity markets. 
Following this approach, the majority of the SPCC’s grid assets were brought together 
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in the newly established state-owned State Grid Corporation of China (SGCC) under 
which the State Council formally established five regional grid companies (the North, 
North-East, North-West, East and Central China Grids) either in the form of limited 
liability or joint-stock companies. A sixth regional grid company, the China Southern 
Grid Corporation (CSGC), was split off from the former SPCC structure and set up as a 
separate state-owned entity (see Figure 2.2).120  
 
 
Figure 2.2 China's regional grids 
Source: Author’s visualisation of material presented in this section. 
 
All six of these regional grid companies were to cover a number of provinces, in each of 
which a provincial subsidiary was established to operate intra-provincial power 
transmission and distribution. 121  SGCC as the mother company was given a 
coordination function between the five regional grids and made responsible for all 
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facets of cross-regional power transmission.122 The regional grid companies on the other 
hand were charged with autonomously operating and managing their respective regional 
networks, cultivating regional power markets, and managing dispatch centres 
“according to market rules”,123  making them the most relevant grid entities of the 
envisioned regional market system. 
As a third unbundling step, the No. 5 Document called for the separation of the grid 
companies’ transmission and distribution assets124 to lay the foundation for the creation 
of retail competition in the electricity industry125 in which consumers would eventually 
be able to choose between suppliers based on the parameters of price and service 
quality.126 By the end of 2005, the grid companies were expected to have introduced 
separate internal accounting for their distribution business in order to then gradually 
progress with asset separation which was to leave them in charge of only the 
transmission segment.127 In a fourth and final unbundling step, all auxiliary businesses 
related to design, construction or maintenance of grid infrastructure were to be split off 
from the newly formed grid companies and to enter market competition.128 The grid 
firms were supposed to engage solely in grid operations and beyond that were only 
allowed to retain their own research institutions and a small amount of installed 
generation capacity, the timely sale of which was supposed to assist in financing the 
reform transitions.129 
 
A brief overview of market building outcomes  
Despite several attempts to apply the different unbundling steps, reform progress 
markedly slowed down in the years after 2003. Only the separation of generation assets 
from grid assets proceeded largely as planned, although little factual wholesale 
competition has developed. Correspondingly, since SGCC’s and CSGC’s integrated 
transmission and distribution monopolies stayed intact, the retail segment remains 
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almost completely closed to competition, while the establishment of autonomous 
regional grid companies as the envisioned backbone of regional market building has 
also stalled by most accounts.130  
Overall, the marketisation agenda set out by the No. 5 Document has been deemed a 
failure by many observers as monopoly structures have remained in place and levels of 
competition in the industry have remained negligible. Wu Zhonghu, a former high-
ranking official in the National Development and Reform Commission’s (NDRC) 
Energy Research Institute, stated in 2009 that the general direction of the No. 5 
Document had not been called into question, but that it had become impossible to 
progress with further reform steps.131 Ding Gongyang, former department head in the 
Electric Power Planning & Engineering Institute (EPPEI), summarised the state of 
affairs more bluntly by stating that “many people think very highly of the No. 5 
Document, but its implementation just cannot be achieved. [...] The plan is set, but its 
implementation is not.”132 
 
 
2.2 Overview of the administrative setting in China’s 
electricity industry 
2.2.1 Adjustments to government functions and organisation via and 
since the No. 5 Document (2002) 
The following overview of administrative developments via and since the publication of 
the No. 5 Document shows the complex regulatory structure in China’s electricity 
industry. Reminiscent of the fragmented outlook given by the SOE-centred literature 
referred to in the introductory chapter, the reform process has brought about the 
coexistence of several government bodies with partially complementing and partially 
overlapping mandates pertinent to both sector-specific and cross-sectoral policy issues 
applicable to the industry. In the following section, the most frequently encountered 
government bodies will be briefly introduced in the context of two important 
administrative reform steps that took place in 2002/2003 and in 2008. 
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The 2002/2003 administrative reforms 
The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC, since 2003) 
The ministerial-level National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), 
established in 2003 as the successor to the State Development Planning Commission, is 
responsible for long-term macroeconomic guidance and adjustments across China’s 
industrial landscape.133 The NDRC’s most important levers of macro-control over the 
electricity industry include its final authority over wholesale and retail price setting 
which is exercised by the Electric Power Division within the NDRC’s Pricing 
Department (发改委价格司电⼒处). While applied pricing mechanisms were supposed to 
be gradually shifted towards reflecting the level of competition within industry, 
manifold obstacles to successful asset unbundling and, particularly, the persistence of 
downstream monopoly structures have stood in the way of progressing with market-
based pricing reforms despite numerous attempts (discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 3). 134  As a further important lever over industry development, the NDRC 
retains approval powers for large-scale investment projects. Other energy-related policy 
functions were initially bundled in the NDRC Energy Bureau (2003-2008); however, 
due to its bureau-level administrative rank it was not in a position to coordinate directly 
between ministries and state-owned energy companies.135 
 
The State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC, 2003-2013) 
The No. 5 Document, besides laying out a pattern for the reform of industry structures, 
also embodied an attempt to adapt government’s industrial management through the 
creation of the State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC) subordinate to the 
State Council as an ‘independent’ addition to the existing array of ministries and 
commissions participating in sectoral policy processes.136 Established in 2003, SERC’s 
task was to formulate market regulations, maintain fair competition among market 
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actors and make proposals for price adjustments.137 A particular challenge for SERC’s 
administrative standing, however, was that it lacked its own sources of funding and 
therefore ultimately remained dependent on the State Council. Most importantly, the 
fact that full unbundling of industry segments as the most basic foundation for the 
emergence of competition as envisaged by the No. 5 Document did not occur 
(discussed in detail in the following chapter) left SERC without a competitive setting to 
monitor.138 With final pricing and investment approval authorities resting with other 
bodies, SERC’s activities ultimately concentrated on conducting industry research and 
inspecting the quality of service provision across the industry.139 As will be shown in 
following chapters, SERC did participate in heated debates during the attempted 
implementation of industry unbundling, but as it was de facto lacking a meaningful 
assignment the Commission was eventually abolished in 2013 and merged with other 
parts of the energy administration.140 
 
Macro-level sectoral guidance institutions under the State Council 
Aside from institutions charged with sector-specific policy-making and supervision, a 
series of bodies assigned with macro-level guidance roles for sectoral reform were set 
up under the State Council. Based on the No. 5 Document, the Electricity System 
Reform Working Group (国家电⼒体制改⾰⼯作⼩组) was created in 2002 with a broad 
mandate to supervise the implementation of the marketisation agenda.141 Headed by the 
NDRC chairman and consisting of high-ranking delegates from numerous 
administrative and industrial entities, the Working Group itself only convened 
sporadically; it was assisted by a subordinate Working Group Office as a standing body 
which by itself, however, had no real decision-making power and whose responsibilities 
were transferred to SERC in 2003.142  
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In 2005, the State Council created the National Energy Leading Group (NELG, 国家能
源领导⼩组, 2005-2008) in order to synchronise overall energy policy trajectories and to 
receive ‘suggestions’ pertaining to China’s energy development strategies. Formally 
subordinate to the State Council, the NELG was headed by Wen Jiabao as the prime 
minister at the time and further consisted of two vice-premiers and thirteen high-
ranking officials from China’s most important ministries and commissions.143 Below the 
NELG, a vice-ministerial standing body was created to manage its daily affairs.144 The 
State Energy Office (SEO) with its 24 members of staff was nominally responsible for 
supervising the implementation of the NELG’s suggestions, observing energy markets, 
and advising the NELG on energy policy, which appears to have been a rather heavy 
workload for such a small workforce and calls into question its operational capacities.145 
The SEO’s functions furthermore strongly overlapped with those of the NDRC Energy 
Bureau which led to complications with the NDRC.146  
 
 
Figure 2.3 Restructuring steps in China's electricity industry (1980-2010) 
Source: Todd J. Edwards, “China’s Power Sector Restructuring and Electricity Price Reforms,” 
BICCS Asia Papers vol. 6, no. 2 (2012), p. 11. 
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The 2008 administrative reforms 
The State Energy Commission (SEC, since 2008) 
In 2008, a new round of administrative reforms took place as both the National Energy 
Leading Group and its subordinate State Energy Office were dissolved.147 They were 
replaced in 2010 by a very similar body referred to as the State Energy Commission 
(SEC, 国家能源委员会) which also comprises a number of high profile bureaucrats from 
different ministries and commissions and is led by the prime minister. It is designed as a 
high-level coordination body charged broadly with devising overarching strategies for 
national energy development and energy security.148 Like its predecessor, the SEC’s role 
seems to be less operational and more of a guiding and symbolic nature, as it hardly 
ever participates in specific policy processes. It appears to mainly provide a forum for 
top-leaders to exchange energy policy-related perspectives, but it seems to matter 
mostly because of those top-leaders’ own political standing rather than its own 
institutional mandate.  
 
The National Energy Administration (NEA, since 2008) 
In 2008, the NDRC Energy Bureau was also replaced by a larger and more highly 
ranked new governance body named the National Energy Administration (NEA, 国家能
源局). The NEA was set up as a semi-independent department within the NDRC to 
ensure that its approaches to energy sector management matched the central 
government’s overarching economic development agendas.149 The NEA’s core mandate 
encompasses policy-making, project planning and project approvals for electricity, coal, 
petroleum, nuclear power and alternative energy.150 Unlike its predecessor, the NEA is 
ranked at vice-ministerial level and therefore stands on an equal footing with large state 
firms. However, while it devises binding policies, it is not in a position to fully enforce 
them or to issue fines for policy breaches, for which ministry-level authorities such as 
the NDRC are required. The NEA’s main lever over industry development therefore 
remains its investment approval authority grounded in China’s investment law which it 
                                                
147 “China announces overhaul of energy agencies, management,” People’s Daily Online, 11.03.2008; 
“China to form National Energy Bureau”, Interfax China, 12.03.2008. 
148 “China to Establish New National Energy Commission,” Economic Observer Online, 15.12.2009; 
“China Unveils New National Energy Commission,” Beijing Review, 27.01.2010. 
149 “China announces overhaul of energy agencies, management,” People’s Daily Online, 11.03.2008. 
150 “China Establishes New Energy Authority,” ChinaStakes, 27.06.2008; “Energy management reshuffle 
starts,” China Daily, 07.07.2008; “NDRC to focus on balanced growth,” China Daily, 22.08.2008. 
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exercises together with the NDRC. For smaller and medium-sized projects, the NEA 
decides independently, while decisions regarding larger projects are made by the NDRC 
based on (and usually following) suggestions made by the NEA with its more industry-
specific expertise. 151  After the State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC) was 
abolished in 2013, its functions were merged with those of the NEA.152 
Overall, the most influential government body at the sectoral level has arguably been 
the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) due to its pricing 
authority and its project approval power that it exercises in cooperation with the 
National Energy Administration (NEA). The NDRC Energy Bureau as the NEA’s 
predecessor, and the State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC), on the other 
hand, both struggled to develop real sectoral authority, as will become evident in the 
following chapters. The Electricity Reform Working Group, the National Energy 
Leading Group (2005-2008) and the National Energy Commission (since 2010) have 
mainly functioned as macro-level coordination and guidance bodies which rarely 
participate in everyday sectoral decision-making. Other government entities that 
occasionally participate in sectoral policy matters are the Ministries of Commerce 
(MOFCOM), Finance (MoF), Science and Technology (MOST), Environmental 
Protection, and the Ministry of Land and Resources, all within the confines of their 
respective scopes of authority.  
 
                                                
151 Interview with an official at the National Energy Administration. Beijing, 25.07.2013. 
152 “Former SERC Head Takes Reins at New NEA,” Caixin Online, 26.03.2013; “China promotes 
governor of troubles Xinjiang to top energy post,” Reuters, 31.12.2014. 
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Figure 2.4 The administrative structure in China’s electricity industry (2010-2013) 
Source: Tsai, 2014, p. 467.153 
 
2.2.2 The administration of state ownership and the incentive 
structures for state firms 
Adding to the complex sectoral regulatory structure, the system for administering state-
owned assets needs to be considered. The most relevant body in this realm is the State-
owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), which exercises 
the state’s ownership rights to all major state-owned enterprises in China’s electricity 
industry, including the State Grid Corporation (SGCC), China Southern Grid 
Corporation (CSGC) and all of the ‘Big Five’ power producers.154  The relationship 
                                                
153 This figure remains accurate in 2016 with the single exception that the SERC was abolished and 
merged with the NEA in 2013, resulting in a supervisory role over industry for the NEA which is more 
direct than indicated in this figure. Furthermore, ‘MEP’ in this figure refers to the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection and not to the Ministry of Electric Power which was introduced earlier under 
the same abbreviation. Other relevant abbreviations are SGC: State Grid Corporation, CSPG: China 
Southern Power Grid Corporation, CGDC: China Guodian Corporation, CHDC: China Huadian 
Corporation, CPIC: China Power Investment Corporation. 
154 State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, “List of central SOEs,” 
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2963340/n2971121/n4956567/4956583.html, accessed 31.05.2013. 
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between SASAC and the central SOEs is very important for understanding state sector 
reform politics in the electricity industry as well as the incentive structures under which 
state firms operate, and it will therefore be introduced in slightly more detail. 
 
SASAC’s scope of authority vis-à-vis SOEs and the resulting incentive structures for state firms 
Established in 2003 to further institutionalise the division between government and 
firm management as well as to support the restructuring of state firms, SASAC acts as 
an investor, supervising and managing assets held by central state enterprises. 155 
SASAC’s primary responsibility is to protect and increase the value of state assets and to 
“maintain and improve the controlling power and competitive power of the state 
economy in areas which have a vital bearing on the lifeline of the national economy and 
state security”.156 As a ministerial-level special ‘public service unit’ (事业单位), SASAC is 
directly subordinate to the State Council but formally positioned outside the 
bureaucratic chain of command, while its members are appointed by the CCP’s Central 
Organisation Department (中组部).157  
In its position as state investor, SASAC is nominally barred from intervening directly in 
SOEs’ management decisions as State Council regulations specify that SASAC shall 
“respect and safeguard the operational autonomy of [SOEs]”. 158  The Commission’s 
scope of authority does, however, include a number of important oversight and control 
mechanisms that can have a profound impact on SOE decision-making. SASAC’s 
arguably most influential instrument is its authority over personnel appointments 
coupled with its system of performance evaluation. 159  Appointments of executive 
management personnel are made by SASAC based on suggestions by the CCP’s 
Organisation Department. The positions in question include those of the general 
manager and his deputy, as well as the entire board of directors. SASAC also partakes in 
the nomination of the board of supervisors of central SOEs.160 However, it remains 
unclear exactly how SASAC and the Organisation Department collaborate in this 
regard. While in the early years appointment procedures were dominated by the 
                                                
155 State Council, “Interim Regulations on Supervision and Management of State-owned Assets of 
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Organisation Department and merely executed by SASAC, a number of interviewees 
have indicated that over time a more consensual system of alternation has evolved and 
that SASAC has developed a powerful voice of its own during the appointment 
procedures, partly based on the higher level of industry expertise within the 
Commission.161 
Within this context, SASAC specifies incentives for managers and sets benchmarks for 
their evaluation using its own performance measurement system (绩效考核系统), the 
score in which is tremendously important for managers’ career development.162 Under 
this system, managers are evaluated through a comparison between the performance of 
the SOE that they are leading and SASAC’s broad annual performance objectives.163 
The factors that SASAC pays particular attention to are the development of SOE 
revenue, profit, and economic value added. At the end of each year results and 
compliance are then evaluated on a scale between A (highest score) and E (lowest 
score), based on which managerial income and bonuses are adjusted up- or downward. 
If deemed necessary, SASAC may also replace key management personnel on the basis 
of their performance score.164 The associated compliance pressure extends well beyond 
top management, as salaries and bonuses across the entire company are adjusted 
downward if SASAC regards an enterprise’s general performance as inadequate. 165 
Given SASAC’s appointment and evaluation procedures, top managers in central SOEs 
have a clear personal stake in the performance of their companies and are incentivised 
to prove their managerial capabilities to SASAC through sound enterprise 
performance.166  
The financial ties between both sides are of particular relevance for understanding 
SASAC’s mandate and SOEs’ incentive structure. At the time of writing, SASAC 
                                                
161 Interview with a senior engineer/top-level advisor, State Grid Energy Research Institute, Beijing, 
08.11.2012; Interview with official from the Planning Bureau 计划司 within the former Ministry of Energy 
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  60 
receives between 5-15% of its companies’ annual net profits in the form of dividends 
which it accumulates into a ‘state capital management budget’ (国有资本经营预算) drawn 
up by SASAC and overseen by the Ministry of Finance (MoF). The MoF itself also 
receives a share of SOE dividends for the general state budget, in addition to corporate 
income taxes which have been fixed at a rate of 25%.167 SASAC’s capital management 
budget is meant to be employed for capital outlays, restructuring outlays and reform 
costs, which means that dividends are essentially used for the benefit of the SOEs 
themselves, while what is deemed beneficial for the SOEs is formally determined by 
SASAC and approved by the MoF.168 While SASAC is officially not allowed to provide 
direct financial assistance to central SOEs, it does occasionally step in if external factors 
create ongoing financial distress for its companies. Under such circumstances, SASAC 
will ask the Ministry of Finance for approval to use part of its dividends to reinvest in 
affected companies in the form of ‘reimbursements’.169 To safeguard the value of state 
assets, SASAC also possesses approval authority over state firm investments and 
acquisitions, giving the Commission back-door leverage over the significant ratio of net 
profits that remains within the SOEs. Important managerial decisions regarding 
mergers, large acquisitions, capital increases or decreases, the issuing of bonds or 
transfers of equity all need to be reviewed and approved by SASAC.170   
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SASAC ‘ownership’ role in practise 
The different aspects of SASAC’s formal oversight functions indicate that its role 
differs markedly from other institutions in the regulatory sphere of China’s state sector 
generally and the electricity industry more specifically. Where the NDRC, NEA and 
SERC tend to examine policy challenges on a national or industrial level, SASAC 
conducts its “shareholder management” on an individual firm level where the most 
important consideration is how the value of state assets has developed together with 
company performance, while industry-level considerations are of secondary relevance.171 
There has been considerable controversy over SASAC’s utilisation of the different 
levers at its disposal; observers have criticised it for regularly interfering with enterprise 
operations and “viewing itself as the boss” despite its formally absent ‘right of 
speech’. 172  As the State Council assesses SASAC’s own performance based on its 
success in raising the competitiveness of state firms and the value of state assets,173 
some observers from the regulatory sphere have furthermore argued that SASAC’s 
position regarding investment strategies tends to generally coincide with the position of 
central SOEs. 174  The People’s Daily even addressed what it interpreted as “SASAC’s 
functional shift from being the controller of, to being a service provider for, central 
SOEs”175, while an interviewee from the National Energy Administration asserted that 
SASAC and central SOEs shared a common vision which he summarised as “the more 
[assets] the better, the bigger [the enterprise] the better”.176 An interviewee from SASAC 
itself firmly disagreed with this interpretation, insisting that “SASAC does not think ‘the 
bigger an enterprise the better’. We rather want strong, highly competitive 
enterprises.”177 
Driven by central government’s ‘large enterprise strategy’ (做⼤做强), which has been 
pursued since the 1980s and which today is championed largely by SASAC, the 
Commission’s work agenda has mainly circled around the question of how to 
                                                
171 Interview with an official at the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, 
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restructure the large SOEs under its auspices so as to “impel [them] to strengthen their 
competitive power” 178  and to eventually turn them into both domestic and global 
industry leaders. 179  As part of an ongoing consolidation process the number of 
companies supervised by SASAC has decreased from 196 (2003) to 117 (2013), while 
their size and profitability has increased dramatically.180 Many of the companies held by 
SASAC combined their highest quality assets into subsidiary firms that were 
subsequently listed on domestic and international stock exchanges to raise capital 
(although majority ownership of the subsidiaries, and full ownership of the mother 
companies remained with SASAC).181 In the electricity industry, this applies to all of the 
‘Big Five’ power generation companies, but not to the two grid companies, which have 
remained under full SASAC ownership. 
The following section will give a brief introduction to the State Grid Corporation 
which, due to its crucial function as China’s main grid operator and ‘bottleneck’ 
between the generation segment and the majority of China’s power consumers, will 
serve as the principal empirical target while investigating the influence of state industry 
on the course of sectoral policy in the electricity industry. 
 
 
2.3 A brief introduction to the State Grid Corporation of 
China 
The State Grid Corporation of China (SGCC), successor to both the integrated power 
sector monopolist, the State Power Corporation of China, and its governmental 
predecessor, the Ministry of Electric Power, was founded on 29 December 2002. 
Between 2004 and 2013, the bulk of the timeframe under scrutiny in this study, SGCC’s 
CEO was Liu Zhenya (刘振亚) who has also acted as an alternate member of the CCP’s 
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central committee (2007-2012) and who continues to be ranked as a vice minister.182 In 
May 2013, when SGCC formally established a board of directors, Liu was appointed to 
the position of board chairman, and Shu Yinbiao (舒印彪) became CEO in his place.183 
Headquartered in Beijing, SGCC’s grid network covers 26 of China’s 31 provinces, 
autonomous regions and central-government administered municipalities, constituting 5 
out of China’s 6 regional grids, representing 88% of the country’s territory, and serving 
more than 1 billion customers. SGCC is also one of China’s largest domestic employers 
with 1.87 million employees as well as China’s third largest company in terms of 
revenue, surpassed only by the two state-owned oil firms Sinopec Group and the China 
National Petroleum Corporation.184 
Since its establishment, SGCC has grown tremendously. In 2005, when SGCC was first 
listed in the Fortune Global 500, it was ranked 40th as the world’s largest utility firm 
with assets worth US$134 billion and revenues of US$71 billion. 185  By 2015, the 
company had climbed to seventh (after BP and before Volkswagen), its asset value 
having more than tripled to US$466 billion. In the same time frame, revenue had nearly 
quintupled to US$340 billion, while net profits had reached US$10 billion, equalling a 
profit margin of 2.9% (2.1% if calculated against total asset value) (see Figure 2.5, 
Figure 2.6, Figure 2.7 and Figure 2.8 below for financial performance indicators in 
RMB, also in comparison to international electricity utilities).186 As a fully central state-
owned enterprise, the ownership rights to the assets maintained by SGCC are exercised 
by SASAC. Dividends paid to SASAC are fixed at 15% of net profits, but are expected 
to rise to 20-25% in the near future.187  
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Figure 2.5 State Grid Corporation assets, revenue, and profits (2005-2015) 
Sources: State Grid Corporation, Corporate Social Responsibility Report 2014, Beijing, 2014, p. 
86; Fortune Magazine, Fortune Global 500 Lists (2005-2015), http://fortune.com/global500/ 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6 SGCC’s financial performance (2010-2014) 
Source: State Grid Corporation, Corporate Social Responsibility Report 2014, Beijing, 2014, p. 
86. 
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Figure 2.7 SGCC’s revenue growth rate in international comparison (2009-2013) 
Source: State Grid Corporation, Corporate Social Responsibility Report 2014, Beijing, 2014, p. 
90. 
 
SGCC’s steep revenue growth has gone hand-in-hand with tremendous annual 
investment sums. 
 
 
Figure 2.8 State Grid Corporation annual investment (2006-2014) 
Source: Morgan Stanley, Morgan Stanley Research Asia-Pacific, 08.01.2014 
 
In concluding this overview chapter, the following section will briefly discuss the 
fragmented administrative setting in China’s electricity industry, the variances in 
mandates among government bodies and the political standing of central state firms, 
before then transitioning to the empirical analysis of SGCC’s responses to the State 
Council’s market building and asset unbundling requirements. 
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2.4 Concluding discussion: Fragmented administrative 
settings, variances in mandates, and the political 
standing of central state firms 
The institutional structure that has emerged from the reform process laid out in this 
overview chapter has been highly consequential for the state firms operating the 
electricity industry as they have had to respond to political and economic pressures 
applied from different directions and reflecting different mandates. At the sectoral 
policy level, the No. 5 Document challenged existing enterprise structures by 
compelling state industry to unbundle historically grown monopolistic asset 
arrangements while setting in motion a transition from a system still grounded in central 
planning to a setting that was eventually to be characterised by upstream and 
downstream market competition between various state-owned actors. Based on 
‘shareholder management’ considerations, central SOEs were furthermore expected to 
deliver substantial economic results and develop as successful business entities, while 
SOE management was incentivised to primarily consider their firm’s business 
performance as a means for furthering their own career prospects. Although these 
requirements do not contradict each other, it is not difficult to imagine that corporate 
decision-making in accordance with one of these requirements may occasionally run 
counter to the other. Furthermore, the way in which administrative mandates have been 
assigned gives the impression that the government commission primarily charged with 
assessing state firms’ performance and asset value (SASAC) is not overly observant of 
industry-level reform considerations, while the government bodies mandated with 
overseeing industry developments (i.e. NDRC, NEA, SERC) are only secondarily 
concerned with companies’ business performance and the value of state assets.  
In addition to the diversity of the administrative sphere, the role of China’s state firms 
as politically relevant actors needs to be considered. Regardless of the formal separation 
of government and enterprise functions, central SOEs such as SGCC have retained 
vice-ministerial ranks as remnants of their institutional history as industrial ministries 
under central planning, thereby enabling their management to engage on an equal level 
with some of the government bodies that supervise them.188 Even after corporatisation 
occurred, many of the old personnel structures remained in place, allowing for 
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persistent participation in administrative matters. 189  Furthermore, despite SASAC’s 
broad authority over state asset-related matters and the sectoral regulatory sphere built 
around the NDRC, NEA, and SERC, central SOEs de facto possess considerable 
operational autonomy. As a former board member of one of China’s state-owned oil 
firms conveyed, their interaction with political superiors often has “less to do with rigid 
top-down control than with mixed signals, ambiguity and even outright silence”.190 The 
fact that many central SOEs have been able to greatly enhance their revenues and 
furthermore retain large shares of their profits due to comparatively low dividend rates 
has allowed many of them to develop considerable financial autonomy which has also 
enhanced their political standing.191 
As will emerge more clearly over the following empirical chapters, the discrepancies 
between cross-sectoral, sectoral, and firm-level mandates among government bodies, 
coupled with central state firms’ own political relevance, are of considerable importance 
for the ways in which sectoral reforms have evolved. State industry, it will be argued, 
has been able to make use of the partially uncoordinated overlaps and variances in 
mandates between administrative bodies, and of the varying policy priorities at different 
administrative levels within central government, to effectively further its own sectoral 
development preferences. The following ‘Part A’ of this dissertation’s empirical core 
consists of one long chapter which analyses the attempted implementation of the No. 5 
Document’s (2002) market building agenda and examines state industry’s responses to 
market reform and unbundling requirements. 
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PART A: Analysis of  SGCC’s influence 
on sectoral policy implementation 
 
3 The No. 5 Document (2002) and the State Grid 
Corporation’s responses to market building and 
asset unbundling requirements 
Part A of the empirical sections in this dissertation investigates obstructive or modifying 
influences by state industry during phases of policy implementation. Particularly 
contentious parts of the central government’s 2002 ‘unbundled competitive regional market 
building’ agenda, introduced into China’s hitherto vertically integrated monopolistic 
electricity industry, are analysed to see how state industry reacted to them, whether it 
attempted to block or modify them, and if so how and to what effect. Due to its vital 
function as the country’s main grid operator and the electricity industry’s infrastructural 
core, and its position as the corporate successor to the vertically integrated State Power 
Corporation (SPCC), the role played by the State Grid Corporation (SGCC) will be 
particularly emphasised. Empirical focus is furthermore placed on the application of a 
set of important clauses in the No. 5 Document that demanded the successive 
unbundling of industry segments as a basis for the marketisation of non-naturally 
monopolistic and therefore potentially competitive upstream and downstream business 
areas; the success of these particular unbundling processes can be viewed as a 
prerequisite for the success of most, if not all of the marketisation goals laid out in the 
No. 5 Document. If the clear separation of grid and generation assets fails, competitive 
wholesale markets as envisioned by the policy are very unlikely to emerge because direct 
links between generators and grid operator can lead to preferential grid access 
agreements that are not necessarily based on price and that may distort competition. 
For similar reasons, retail competition as set out in the policy cannot emerge without 
the separation of transmission and distribution assets, just as any hypothetical progress 
in wholesale competition is unlikely to benefit consumers without corresponding retail 
competition while instead giving further leverage to grid operators as the single 
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wholesale buyers and retailers of electricity. Furthermore, as long as the grid operator – 
as the most important customer of grid engineering and construction services – remains 
invested in these comparatively profitable auxiliary industries it can distort competition 
by entering into preferential procurement contracts with its own subsidiaries, and 
finally, without assigning at least a minimum of autonomy to regional grid companies it 
is very difficult to promote regional market development. Thus, the behaviour of the 
State Grid Corporation as the main grid operator in response to these unbundling 
requirements must be viewed as highly consequential for the original reform plan as a 
whole, and therefore stands at the centre of the empirical analysis. If it emerges that 
SGCC’s actions and intents have had an effect on the process of implementing crucial 
parts of the market building agenda, for example by causally contributing to the failure 
of these particular unbundling steps, and that the failure of these steps cannot be more 
readily attributed to shifts in the central government’s policy preferences, it may become 
possible to extend the causal claim regarding state firm influence on the fate of the 
whole marketisation agenda as such.  
The empirical focus of the following chapters is also important from a methodological 
perspective as the application of unbundling procedures and SGCC’s reaction to them 
translate into clearly defined processes in which conflicts over the content and 
application of policy become visible and can be traced over time. Moreover, these 
processes provide the opportunity to ask the same guiding questions in a number of 
different industry segments in which the same government and industry actors interact 
over comparable policy issues. Findings from one field can then be reapplied to the 
empirics of other fields to check their validity.192 The congruence method is used to test 
whether the specific way in which the marketisation agenda was ultimately applied may 
also – or better – be explained by changes in government preferences, i.e. whether there 
is evidence for active and explicit government guidance and support or rather 
opposition to factual developments. If similar mechanisms reflective of the different 
perspectives on the drivers of sectoral policy shifts are found to operate in different 
sub-cases, this would strengthen claims regarding these hypotheses’ respective overall 
explanatory power.  
Part A is organised in the form of one long chapter divided into four sections which 
will investigate the grid company’s interaction with the State Council’s four different 
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unbundling requirements. Firstly, the development of SGCC’s links with the electricity 
generation segment will be scrutinised, followed by an analysis of the evolution of grid 
regionalisation envisioned by the No. 5 Document. Subsequently, findings will be 
presented regarding the attempted separation of grid assets between the transmission 
and distribution segments, as well as between primary and auxiliary grid businesses. It 
will be demonstrated that in all four fields SGCC strongly interfered with attempts to 
implement State Council-initiated market building policy and that its obstructive actions 
coincided with distinct slowdowns in implementation progress. Furthermore, evidence 
of ongoing and credible, yet not very successful government opposition to the grid 
company’s obstructive actions will be presented, illustrating that the market building 
agenda was consistently pursued by central government and that no substantial changes 
in its sectoral policy preferences had occurred. Overall, it will be argued that under 
clashing policy preferences central government was unable to implement the 
marketisation plan against SGCC’s will and that the grid company’s opposition to the 
establishment of regionalised upstream and downstream competition resulted in lengthy 
phases of policy gridlock in which neither side was able to progress with its agenda. 
 
 
3.1 The unbundling of grid and generation assets and the 
grid companies’ responses 
Of the four crucial unbundling steps included in the market building policy, the 
separation of grid and generation assets is the only one that actually materialised to a 
considerable extent as the majority of the integrated State Power Corporation’s 
generation assets were distributed among five newly created state-owned electricity 
generation companies often referred to as the ‘Big Five’ (the Huaneng, Huadian, 
Guodian, Datang and China Power Investment Corporations). 193  According to 
interview sources, an important reason for the relative success in implementing this 
unbundling step was that it did not challenge the core interests of the industry 
(maintaining unified control over the grid segment) as strongly as the planned 
separation of transmission and distribution assets or the division along regional lines, 
despite the fact that the generation segment contributed a much larger share to the 
SPCC’s profits (ca. 70%) than the grid operation and construction segments (ca. 30%). 
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Secondly, the separation of grid and generation assets created a large number of new 
leadership positions in the five new electricity generation SOEs, thereby providing new 
opportunities for many people in the industry.194 However, there were multiple attempts 
by both the State Grid Corporation and the China Southern Grid Corporation to 
circumvent this unbundling requirement and to remain invested in the generation 
segment, despite central government opposition to these attempts which violated the 
unbundling requirements of the No. 5 Document. The following section gives an 
account of the methods that were used by the grid companies to maintain direct 
linkages with the generation segment, obstruct the emergence of wholesale competition 
in different grid regions, and utilise their leverage as single buyers to shape wholesale 
‘markets’ in their own favour. 
 
3.1.1 The circumvention of generation asset unbundling via 
employee stock ownership plans 
An important method used by the grid companies to circumvent power generation 
unbundling was the perpetuation and expansion of employee stock ownership plans 
(ESOPs). ESOPs began to be used in the 1980s as a means of addressing widespread 
electricity shortages by incentivising integrated electricity companies across the country 
to independently raise funds in order to build additional electricity plants. As part of this 
push for enhanced sectoral investment, electricity company employees were induced to 
pool capital and purchase stakes in those generation assets, which then entered 
independent operation and negotiated electricity prices directly with the grids.195 While 
most ESOP ventures were initially rather small and dispersed, some grew into highly 
profitable electricity producers in leading positions at the provincial level. When the 
separation of grid and generation was initiated in 2002, the number and capacity of 
ESOP ventures grew even further as the hitherto integrated electricity companies were 
forced to rid themselves of generation assets and in many cases sold them cheaply to 
existing ESOP firms owned by their very own employees. Despite the unbundling 
requirements, SGCC’s and CSGC’s provincial branches continued to expand ESOPs as 
a way of retaining ownership linkages between the grid and generation segments, 
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allowing them to partially continue their pre-reform style of integrated business and at 
the same time creating serious obstacles to the development of competitive wholesale 
markets.196 
One example of how the newly established and nominally unbundled grid companies, in 
this case the China Southern Grid Corporation (CSGC), utilised ESOP-based 
approaches to circumvent the separation of grid and generation assets is provided by 
the case of the Jinyuan Power Investment Company, an electricity generation firm 
based in Guizhou Province. Referring to itself as the “the largest publicly-owned, non-
state-controlled enterprise in Guizhou”,197 Jinyuan achieved spectacular growth rates 
throughout the early 2000s and by 2004 had become the province’s largest electricity 
producer, accounting for a third of its total installed generation capacity. Media 
investigations eventually revealed that a large majority of Jinyuan’s shares were in fact 
held by employees of the Guizhou Electric Power Company, CSGC’s provincial grid 
subsidiary.198  It also emerged that both companies had even shared the same chief 
executive, Xiang Dehong, who a few years later was sentenced to prison for his role in 
the disappearance of state assets.199 The intimate relationship between Jinyuan and the 
provincial grid company had noticeable repercussions on the provincial wholesale 
‘market’. Jinyuan’s competitors, especially those belonging to the recently established 
‘Big Five’ state-owned electricity generation companies, repeatedly complained about 
preferential investment rights granted to Jinyuan for a number of projects.200 Further 
irritation was caused by Jinyuan’s privileged treatment regarding the allocation of 
generating hours by the grid company’s dispatch centre and the higher prices paid for 
its electricity.201 By distorting competition in this way, the provincial grid company was 
able to ensure that a significant part of the profits from Guizhou’s electricity generation 
business remained within the provincial grid company, although this may have mainly 
benefitted company management through their personal shareholdings rather than the 
grid company at large.  
The Jinyuan case does not appear to have been an isolated one. Another prominent 
incident in which ESOP structures were used to avoid asset unbundling involved the 
Luneng Group from Shandong Province; founded in the late 1980s under the provincial 
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branch of the vertically integrated State Power Corporation (SPCC), over the following 
two decades Luneng grew into one of China’s largest corporations.202 A central reason 
for its fast growth was that it was granted the monopoly over provincial grid operations 
and later also acquired generation assets from its parent company, leading to control 
over a significant share of Shandong’s electricity supply. In the wake of the 2002 
reforms and their push for the nationwide separation of grid and generation assets, 
Luneng quickly transferred the majority of its stock to its own employees, as the status 
of being employee-owned allowed the company to avoid a break-up of its assets. Not 
only was this a breach of the market building policy laid out by the No. 5 Document, it 
was also a violation of a State Council order from the year 2000 which prohibited any 
sale or transfer of electricity industry assets without central government’s prior consent. 
After years of profiting from this arrangement, in 2006 Luneng began to buy its shares 
back from its employees at a very low premium, only to subsequently sell them to two 
Beijing-based private investors. Both the state assets administrator, SASAC, and the 
industry regulator, SERC, announced that they had not received any notification of this 
stock transfer, which was interpreted by observers as a case of illegal privatisation of 
state assets. 203  The uncovering of Luneng’s company background and its secret 
privatisation attracted much media attention as it became evident that shareholding in 
power generation companies by employees of grid operators had resulted in dubious 
deals over electricity dispatch that were deeply rooted in vested industry interests. Not 
only did this practise guarantee the generation companies preferential treatment during 
competition for supply contracts, it also opened the door to the illicit sale of state assets 
at deflated prices.204  
Several other provincial grid companies under SGCC, including its provincial branches 
in Jiangsu, Sichuan, Hunan and Ningxia, were also reported to have applied similar 
strategies of shifting ownership of generation assets to their employees in order to 
prevent unbundling and profit from preferential grid access.205 As a reaction to this 
trend, in March 2008, six years after the beginning of market building, SASAC, NDRC, 
the Ministry of Finance and SERC jointly issued a new piece of regulation specifying 
that managers in state-owned grid companies were prohibited from owning shares in 
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electricity generators operating in the region served by the grid company in question.206 
This was followed by widespread ‘clean-ups’207 of ESOP structures at SGCC and CSGC 
during which the grid companies’ ESOP generation assets were auctioned off, mainly to 
the ‘Big Five’ state-owned electricity generation firms.208  
 
3.1.2 SGCC’s continued investment in electricity generation assets 
via the renewables segment 
The campaign against ESOP structures amongst power generation companies affiliated 
with SGCC and CSGC did not prevent the grid companies from continuing their 
engagement in the power generation industry. During the 2002 reforms, SGCC had 
been permitted to retain installed thermal power generation capacity of 6.47 million kW 
on a provisional basis and on the condition that it would be sold off immediately in 
order to cover restructuring costs. Instead of trading in these assets, in March 2005 
SGCC merged them with three other electricity generation projects to create an 
electricity generation subsidiary, Xinyuan Holding.209 While SERC reportedly objected 
to the company’s establishment due to the breach of reform policy, 210  the NDRC 
initially gave its approval because SGCC argued that it required emergency backup 
generation capacity for peak adjustments and load balancing so as to guarantee grid 
security.211 In its approval request to SASAC, on the other hand, SGCC adapted its 
justification to match SASAC’s mandate by arguing that the Xinyuan venture would 
enable it to develop potentially highly profitable technology for renewable energy 
storage facilities.212 After the approvals were granted, Xinyuan became an important 
component of SGCC’s strategy to invest in alternative energy in order to regain 
commercial opportunities lost during the 2002 reforms. In 2007, for instance, Xinyuan 
initiated a 200,000kW wind power project in Inner Mongolia, while other investments 
were made in wind farms in Xinjiang and Gansu Provinces, as well as in a 100,000kW 
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wind-solar project in Hebei Province. Other SGCC subsidiaries also pursued 
acquisitions in the renewables segment. The Shanghai Green Energy Company, a 
subsidiary of the SGCC-controlled Shanghai Municipal Electric Power Company, for 
instance, invested heavily in offshore wind power, while in 2005 SGCC’s Shenzhen 
Energy Development Group ventured into biomass electricity generation by acting as a 
co-investor in the National Bio Energy Holdings Ltd.213 
While all of these investments clearly ran counter to the idea of separating grid and 
generation assets, SGCC and CSGC defended their renewed involvement in electricity 
generation by arguing that the existing marketisation policies only referred to thermal 
power generation as being off-limits for the grid companies but that they said nothing 
about alternative energy production. 214  It was not until early 2012, ten years after 
unbundling reforms were initiated, that SGCC finally withdrew from the power 
generation business. SGCC’s remaining generation assets, worth around US$8 billion, 
were sold to the Shenhua Group, a large state-owned coal company.215  
 
3.1.3 Section conclusion 
This section provided empirical evidence of SGCC’s and CSGC’s attempts to 
circumvent the unbundling of grid and generation assets, and that this contributed to 
the obstruction of the electricity wholesale market development in various parts of the 
country. Across China, employee stock ownership structures set up by the grid 
companies were equipped with large amounts of installed generation capacity and given 
preferential access to provincial grids, which in a number of cases allowed them to 
become regionally dominant industry players. At the same time, grid company 
personnel continued to hold significant stakes in these highly profitable ESOP 
companies while using the grid companies’ status as single buyers to shape wholesale 
‘markets’ in their own favour. Furthermore, evidence of ongoing government 
opposition to these attempts was presented, showing that central government’s overall 
preference for unbundled and marketised industry structures remained consistent after 
the introduction of the No. 5 Document in 2002. Despite government interference, 
SGCC found other ways of remaining invested in the generation section, namely via 
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significant investments in renewable energy. While seeking formal approval for these 
investments, SGCC engaged in venue-shopping216 by tactically synchronising its illicit 
investment plans with different approval bodies’ respective mandates. As such, the 
investment plans were pitched to the NDRC as part of an attempt to improve grid 
security, while SASAC was told that they would allow the development of potentially 
highly profitable energy storage technology. After initially approving SGCC’s 
investment plans based on these tailored arguments, central government eventually 
reversed its decisions and by 2012, ten years after the introduction of the No. 5 
Document, managed to induce SGCC to sell its generation assets. However, even 
though central government ultimately managed to achieve formal unbundling, market-
based wholesale competition as envisioned by the No. 5 Document is yet to emerge. 
Given opposing policy preferences regarding sectoral reforms, neither central 
government nor SGCC were able to fully achieve their goals as they repeatedly 
cancelled out each other’s efforts. 
 
 
3.2 The State Council’s grid regionalisation attempt and 
SGCC’s push for reunification 
This section explores the attempted implementation of the State Council’s goal to 
structurally separate China’s grid infrastructure into independent regional grid entities so 
as to provide the infrastructural foundations for the establishment of separate regional 
electricity markets. After a brief introduction to the policy debate surrounding the issue 
of grid regionalisation, the factual separation of China’s grid assets into the State Grid 
Corporation and the China Southern Grid Corporation will be outlined, as will be the 
formal restructuring of assets under SGCC along regional and provincial lines. 
Subsequently, evidence will be presented that demonstrates SGCC’s repeated and 
generally successful attempts to obstruct further regionalisation by structurally 
weakening the regional grid companies in order to regain control over the assets it had 
lost in the aftermath of the 2002 reforms, and central government’s engagement with 
these attempts. 
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3.2.1 Grid regionalisation as a matter of contention between central 
government and state industry 
In the lead-up to the publication of the No. 5 Document, the establishment of 
independent regional grid companies together with the transfer of supervisory 
responsibility from the centre to the regions was viewed by the State Council as 
indispensable for industry marketisation as such.217 An important rationale underlying 
the regionalisation push was to address monopolistic rents, inefficiencies and the lack of 
transparency within the grid segment by improving the comparability of transmission 
costs across regional grids.218 It was also hoped that decentralisation would facilitate 
external investment, which in turn was also meant to improve overall sectoral 
transparency under more diverse ownership structures. Finally, it was asserted that 
China’s grid network under the integrated SPCC had already been administered along 
distinct regional lines and that these six administratively separate entities should now 
also be made independent in terms of their assets.219  
However, while there had been a general consensus within government and at least 
partial tolerance within industry regarding the question of separating grid assets from 
generation assets, the State Power Corporation (SPCC) was resolutely opposed to 
breaking up the grid itself. The SPCC’s leader at the time, Gao Yan, strongly advocated 
the establishment of a nationally unified electricity grid under the roof of a single state-
owned grid company instead of organising grid assets and operations in multiple firms 
along regional lines.220 According to Zhang Guobao (张国宝), who participated in the 
drafting of the 2002 reforms as the State Development Planning Commission’s (SDPC, 
predecessor of the NDRC) deputy director, the ongoing clashes with state industry over 
the regionalisation issue became a major obstacle to the final drafting of the entire 
No. 5 Document. This eventually led Jiang Zemin, CCP secretary general and state 
president at the time, to get personally involved and demand a compromise to solve the 
deadlock.221 This compromise ultimately consisted of the establishment of the China 
Southern Grid Corporation (CSGC) as a separate pilot project for regional market 
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development, while the State Grid Corporation as the SPCC’s successor was to 
transitionally retain the remaining grid assets. The premise behind this step was that 
once experience with regional grid management had been built in the case of CSGC, 
further reform steps could be taken to strengthen the other five regional grids that for 
the time being remained with SGCC.222 Although the establishment of CSGC entailed 
the provincial grids of Yunnan, Guizhou and Guangxi being split off from SGCC and 
subsequently merged with the provincial grids in Guangdong and Hainan, this solution 
was still agreeable to regionalisation opponents within the industry because it 
momentarily prevented the grid’s further dissolution into a system with six completely 
independent grid companies.223 
Subsequently, in addition to the establishment of the China Southern Grid Corporation, 
SGCC’s grid assets were divided up along regional and provincial lines, as legally 
separate grid companies were established in five grid regions, creating the North, 
North-East, East, Central, and North-West China grids, as well as in each of the 
provinces comprising these different grid regions. While full ownership of all of these 
assets remained with SGCC for the time being, SGCC’s operational relationship with 
the five regional grid companies was defined via its responsibility to manage “exchange 
and dispatch between the regional grids, and solve coordination problems between 
regional grids in daily production”224. This explicitly limited SGCC’s mandate to inter-
regional grid management while giving substantial autonomy to the regional companies 
in managing the provincial grids underneath them, thus demonstrating the State 
Council’s clear prioritisation of further grid regionalisation over the persistence of a 
unified grid.225 
 
3.2.2 SGCC’s attempts to obstruct and reverse grid regionalisation 
Having already succeeded in watering down the original regionalisation plans, SGCC 
continued its efforts to obstruct the development of functional and independent 
regional grid companies. Going well beyond the mandate provided by the No. 5 
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Document, in 2005 SGCC began to pursue a recentralisation of operational control 
over transmission and distribution within the separate grid regions.226 In an attempt to 
bypass and essentially hollow out the regional grid companies, SGCC, according to an 
official from the Electric Power Division of the Hebei Province Economic Committee, 
demanded that all provincial grid companies “hand over” their “backbone transmission 
grid assets” directly to SGCC as the parent company.227 In December 2005, having 
become aware of SGCC’s recentralisation attempt, the State Electricity Regulatory 
Commission (SERC) intervened; it did not, however, penalise SGCC but rather 
petitioned the State Council, thereby demonstrating its weak authority vis-à-vis the 
state-owned grid company. In this petition, SERC department head Yang Mingzhou 
argued that SGCC had already mostly undermined the purpose of having separate 
regional grid entities by arranging that the regional and provincial grid companies except 
for CSGC remained its direct subsidiaries. In both his 2005 petition and an open letter 
published in 2006, Yang called for a full bottom-up reorganisation of SGCC in favour 
of the regional grid companies. He advocated a decentralisation plan under which 
provincial grid companies within each region would combine their transmission assets 
and establish independent regional joint-stock grid companies, which would then jointly 
establish a national-level superstructure solely responsible for cross-regional electricity 
transfers and the related infrastructure investment. Following this suggestion, SGCC as 
the top of the grid asset pyramid would essentially cease to exist, while all ownership 
rights to the national grid company would be held by the regional grid companies.228  
 
The 2006 China Southern Grid Corporation takeover battle 
Undeterred by the SERC’s counter-initiative, SGCC argued that it was a matter of 
national security to keep China’s grid unified and that only a united national grid 
company would be able to safeguard China from large-scale supply disturbances.229 It 
also continued its attempts to regain control over the assets it had lost during the 2002 
reforms.  
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A particularly telling example of this dynamic occurred in 2006, when SGCC began to 
pursue a formal reunification with the China Southern Grid Corporation. This 
reunification attempt resulted in an administrative battle over CSGC’s ownership, 
originally established in 2002 as divided between Guangdong Province (70.4% – 
reflecting the share of assets the province had contributed while forming the new grid 
entity), Hainan Province (3.2%), and the State Grid Corporation (26.4%).230 SGCC’s 
share was originally supposed to be quickly transferred to the national-level state-owned 
asset commission (SASAC), but this did not occur until 2013.231 After the NDRC had 
decided in 2003 that important personnel decisions within China Southern Grid should 
be approved by central government, CSGC management was no longer accountable to 
the Guangdong provincial state-asset commission despite the province’s majority stake, 
but rather to central SASAC which also exercised state ownership of SGCC. Having 
lost most of its personnel and financial control over CSGC, in September 2006 the 
Guangdong provincial government announced that it would sell its share in order to 
alleviate financial difficulties at the provincial level. As soon as the announcement was 
made, the State Grid Corporation placed a bid for Guangdong Province’s majority 
share and entered negotiations with the provincial authorities.232 In immediate response 
to SGCC’s unilateral acquisition attempt – a drastic violation of the No. 5 Document 
which would have nullified all grid regionalisation progress – a meeting was held at the 
State Council during which representatives from SERC, SASAC, NDRC and the 
Ministry of Finance discussed the issue. SASAC alone voted in favour of the 
acquisition, while SERC and NDRC both objected on the basis of the existing sectoral 
regionalisation policy. Following this impasse between ministerial actors, the State 
Council required SASAC to draw up a more detailed asset restructuring plan that was to 
ensure that Guangdong Province remained the majority shareholder and that CSGC’s 
‘management direction’ would not change due to the share transfer. Soon after, SASAC 
proposed an investment by the China Huaneng Group, either alone or in conjunction 
with SGCC and the China Life Insurance Group, a suggestion which also violated the 
No. 5 Document as Huaneng Group was one of the ‘Big Five’ state-owned electricity 
producers and therefore barred from holding grid assets. 233  As SASAC’s second 
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suggestion again led to differing standpoints among government departments, SASAC 
finally withdrew the plan for a joint investment in late November 2006.234 In early 
December it was announced that the China Life Insurance Group had ‘won’ the 
bidding process for 32% of shares in CSGC: Guangdong SASAC remained the largest 
shareholder with 38.4%.235 SERC officials were recorded as applauding this solution, 
calling it conducive to the success of sectoral reforms.236 
This sequence of events clearly demonstrates SGCC’s pursuit of a recentralisation of 
grid infrastructure in violation of existing sectoral policy, and sheds light on the nature 
of central government’s responses. While NDRC and SERC were ultimately able to 
prevent State Grid from acquiring China Southern Grid based on sectoral reform 
considerations, SASAC acted in a very supportive way. SASAC’s rationale for 
supporting SGCC’s bid, however, was not linked to industry restructuring 
considerations but was rather informed by state asset management requirements. After 
the supervision of CSGC’s operations had been recentralised under SASAC in 2003, 
CSGC was legally still majority-owned by Guangdong’s provincial state asset 
commission, but SASAC at the time lacked the funds to finance the internal transfers 
from the provincial to the central level (SOE dividends as its main source of funds were 
only introduced later in 2006). Building on suggestions made by the energy companies, 
SASAC agreed to have SGCC and Huaneng use their own funds to buy the shares as 
substitutes and to then transfer them to SASAC “at a later point”, as explained by a 
SASAC employee during an interview.237 Viewed through this lens, the CSGC takeover 
battle demonstrates how SGCC attempted to utilise differences in mandates and 
priorities among government departments, particularly between NDRC/SERC with 
their sectorally informed standpoints and SASAC with its focus on state asset 
management, in order to counter the regional break-up of its asset structure. The 
presentation of its acquisition plans as a solution to SASAC’s difficulties in organising 
internal asset transfers allowed SGCC to temporarily play off different parts of the 
central government administration, even though the acquisition was ultimately blocked. 
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Further attempts at weakening regional grid companies 
Having failed to reintegrate the southern provinces into its grid system, SGCC 
continued its efforts to undermine the status of the five regional grid companies within 
its own corporate sphere, as they were perceived as obstacles to its influence over the 
different provincial grids. Not having progressed far with earlier recentralisation 
attempts, in mid-2011 SGCC shifted its approach by inducing an internal restructuring 
plan whereby the assets held by four of the five regional grid companies were turned 
over to their own provincial subsidiaries. As a consequence, all regional grid companies 
with the exception of the North China Grid, which is headquartered in Beijing and 
deemed comparatively influential, essentially became empty shells as their legal status 
was maintained while the basis of their existence was withdrawn. 238  In early 2012, 
former SERC vice chairman Shao Bingren confirmed this overall dynamic by stating 
that the “interests of the electricity transmission companies” had blocked further 
progress towards regional market development and had severely weakened the 
previously strong influence of regional firms within the SGCC system.239 In July 2012, 
SGCC then stripped the already hollowed out regional grid companies of all their 
administrative and operative functions. All responsibilities related to electricity 
transmission and sales, planning, construction and personnel were shifted either to 
SGCC headquarters or to the provincial grid companies, while the respective 
departments within the regional companies were shut down, leaving them with little 
more than a number of security supervision and auditing functions. The provincial grid 
companies, on the other hand, were forced to submit all their profits to the central firm, 
where they have since been used for centrally steered investment. After this internal 
restructuring, regional and provincial grid companies were de facto treated as 
subsidiaries at the same administrative level.240  
 
                                                
238 “‘State Grid Empire’ ‘cut apart’: How four large regional grid companies became hollow shells 
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Figure 3.1 SGCC’s provincial grid subsidiaries 
Source: State Grid Corporation, Corporate Social Responsibility Report 2014, Beijing, 2014, p. 7. 
 
3.2.3 Section conclusion 
This section provided evidence of  SGCC’s opposition to the regionalisation of  China’s 
grid structure in the aftermath of  the 2002 reforms. Over the years, SGCC engaged in 
numerous attempts to reverse and obstruct regionalisation steps and weaken the initially 
strong position of  regional grid companies within the SGCC system. Notable instances 
were the ultimately unsuccessful attempt to achieve a reunification with the China 
Southern Grid Corporation and the internal restructuring plan through which SGCC 
effectively hollowed out the regional grid companies as intermediaries and strongly 
enhanced its direct operational influence on provincial grid companies. While the No. 5 
Document had only granted it the mandate to manage electricity transfers between 
regional grids, SGCC successfully undermined further regionalisation progress while 
moving very close to achieving a horizontal reintegration of  grid assets across a 
majority of  regions and provinces. 
This development did not coincide with any noticeable shift in central government’s 
policy preferences regarding the organisation of the grid segment. In particular, the 
sectoral regulators’ obstruction of State Grid’s attempted reunification with China 
Southern Grid due to breaches of the regionalisation principle inherent in the No. 5 
Document demonstrated that within government there was a stable preference for grid 
regionalisation and that a recentralisation of grid assets was neither preferred nor 
supported.241  Although the state asset regulator SASAC had temporarily granted its 
unilateral approval for this otherwise very consequential acquisition attempt, its support 
was explicitly not grounded in sectoral policy considerations but rather based on state 
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asset management necessities which SGCC had tactically engaged with for the purpose 
of venue-shopping. Further proof of the State Council’s continued support of the 
regionalisation principle was provided by a 2007 policy document which criticised the 
lagging regionalisation progress and called for an “acceleration of regional electricity 
market establishment” and a “strengthening of regional grid structures”.242 
In summary, central government was unable to implement grid regionalisation against 
the will of SGCC, as State Grid successfully obstructed the development of functional 
regional grid companies via its internal restructuring plan. At the same time, SGCC 
failed to fully reverse regionalisation by acquiring China Southern Grid as central 
government blocked its investment. Given opposing sectoral policy preferences among 
central government and SGCC, neither side was able to fully realise their goals. 
 
 
3.3 Attempts at separating electricity transmission and 
distribution grid assets 
In addition to the separation of the electricity grid and generation segments and division 
of the grid into regionalised entities, the State Council’s No. 5 Document also aimed to 
create retail competition following a separation of assets and operations between 
electricity transmission (the transfer of electricity from power generation plants to high-
voltage substations close to demand centres) and electricity distribution (the local 
distribution of electricity from substations to end users). This section first delineates the 
State Council’s agenda for transmission and distribution (T&D) unbundling before then 
analysing central government’s practical pursuit of this objective via a series of pilot 
projects and SGCC’s responses to these projects. Outlining formal counter-proposals 
for T&D reforms made by SGCC, it will furthermore demonstrate that the grid 
company actively pursued its own policy solutions which, however, were incompatible 
with central government’s sectoral preferences and therefore coincided with more than 
a decade of deadlock in retail market reforms. It will be argued that SGCC’s general 
refusal to cooperate during pilot projects and its insistence on altering the chosen 
reform approach were important obstacles to both unbundling and the establishment of 
                                                
242 Electricity System Reform Working Group (电⼒体制改⾰⼯作⼩组), “Opinions on carrying out a 
deepening of electricity system reforms during the 11th Five-Year Plan period” (关于“⼗⼀五”深化电⼒体制
改⾰的实施意⻅), State Council General Office Document No. 19 [2007], 06.04.2007, Preamble and 
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retail competition. Neither side was able to fully achieve its goals against the opposition 
of the other: central government was unable to restructure the grid segments and 
establish retail competition against SGCC’s will, and SGCC could not fully avoid 
government interference with its monopoly position in the retail segment. 
 
3.3.1 The No. 5 Document’s ‘roadmap’ to transmission and 
distribution unbundling and SGCC’s counter-positions 
While all of the unbundling requirements listed in the No. 5 Document were perceived 
as threats by the grid company, the planned separation of the transmission and 
distribution segments was arguably feared the most because it would sever the grid 
companies’ direct ties between generators and consumers while limiting their business 
scope to the mere operation of transmission lines. According to the No. 5 Document, 
only transmission assets and operations were to remain with the regional grid 
companies (which never really developed, as explained in the previous section), while as 
the superstructure, SGCC’s responsibilities were formally curtailed to solely that of 
cross-regional transmission.243 Distribution assets, on the other hand, were eventually to 
be split off from the grid companies and allocated to separate distribution entities.244 
The State Council viewed the clear separation of the transmission and distribution 
(T&D) segments as a crucial step towards breaking up the grid companies’ position as 
both wholesale buyer and retail seller, and a precondition for the emergence of retail 
competition under which consumers would eventually be able to choose between 
different suppliers based on service quality and price.245  As former State Electricity 
Regulatory Commission (SERC) vice-chairman Shao Bingren summarised: “The 
separation of transmission and distribution is a key step towards marketisation”.246  
A particular concern underlying this reform step had been to “curb unfair pricing by 
monopolists abusing their dominant market position”. 247  The unbundling of  
downstream grid assets in order to create retail competition was therefore to be 
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supported by reformed electricity pricing mechanisms. Accordingly, on-grid prices paid 
to electricity generators were to be set by combining a wholesale market competition-
based price component and a government-set component. Transmission and 
distribution prices paid to the respective grid operators were to be set separately by the 
NDRC’s Pricing Department based on operators’ cost structures and retail prices set on 
the basis of  the different upstream prices, thereby establishing a direct linkage between 
retail prices and partially competitive on-grid prices.248 The separation of  transmission 
and distribution assets as part of  this setting was seen as essential for clarifying grid 
companies’ cost structure as the basis for the administration of  separate T&D prices, 
which after the envisioned opening of  the distribution segment were to have a strong 
bearing on the evolution of  retail competition, as well as on end-user electricity prices 
which are of  paramount importance for the economy as a whole.249 
On the way to a full unbundling of transmission and distribution assets and the 
introduction of retail competition, the No. 5 Document provided a number of 
intermediary steps. It determined that the regional grid companies first needed to 
successfully introduce the technology necessary for implementing price-based wholesale 
competition. Also, it conceded that the newly created electricity generation firms needed 
time to be able to actually enter into price competition with each other.250 Given these 
mitigating upstream circumstances, it specified that T&D assets would temporarily be 
kept unified until the end of the 10th Five-Year Plan period (2005), by when the grid 
companies were to have separated their accounting for both segments in preparation 
for the following separation of assets.251  
While the No. 5 Document clearly defined the separation of T&D assets as part of the 
chosen reform path, it left open how and to whom exactly distribution assets were to be 
allocated after unbundling, as well as how distribution entities should be organised. 
Given this lack of specificity, there was ample scope for the grid companies, and 
particularly for SGCC as the grid superstructure for most of China, to argue over the 
form and purpose of this unbundling step. Unsurprisingly, SGCC firmly objected to a 
separation of T&D assets. Splitting up T&D, it argued, would decrease levels of 
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coordination across the industry and increase the likelihood of supply disruptions.252 As 
SGCC’s chairman Liu Zhenya asserted, it was “primarily because of the advantages of 
integrated power transmission and distribution” that China’s grids were operating so 
safely, especially in contrast to other countries that endured frequent blackouts.253 Liu 
furthermore raised doubts that this planned unbundling step would lead to efficiency 
improvements, citing studies that had reportedly shown efficiency losses in supply 
systems with separated grid assets;254 an SGCC employee in an interview also insisted 
that unbundling would lead to considerable increases in operational costs and end-user 
prices because economies of scale would be lost if T&D were separated into small 
units.255 In response to the reform objective of enhancing cost transparency, SGCC 
asserted that levels of transparency did not correlate with company size and that it 
ultimately made no difference how many large or small companies were present in the 
distribution segment as long as policy-makers failed to devise and implement suitable 
accounting standards. 256  Li Ying ( 李 英 ), chief economist at SGCC’s State Power 
Economic Research Institute (SPERI), similarly insisted that separate T&D auditing and 
pricing was entirely possible without breaking up assets.257 What was needed, an SGCC 
employee argued, was proper regulation which primarily necessitated a reform of 
government functions rather than a separation of transmission and distribution assets.258 
In the future, a high-level advisor at the State Grid Energy Research Institute conceded, 
it might be possible to trigger retail competition by introducing new parties into the 
segment, but it was neither necessary nor advisable to split up assets to achieve this.259 
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3.3.2 Government’s attempts at inducing retail competition – and 
SGCC’s opposition to these attempts 
In the face of SGCC’s open opposition, a number of attempts were made to gradually 
introduce a separation of the transmission and distribution segments, both through 
State Council policy specifications and a series of pilot projects. All were rendered 
ineffective during the implementation phase by SGCC’s refusal to cooperate and were 
also challenged at the policy level by the grid company’s own counter-proposals for 
restructuring the retail segment. 
 
Pilot projects for gradual T&D unbundling 
With slight delays to the unbundling timetable included in the No. 5 Document, in mid-
2006 SERC and NDRC introduced trial runs that required the regional grid companies 
to conduct separate auditing for their transmission and distribution operations so that 
pricing reforms could progress. SGCC openly disputed the plan stating that price 
reforms were an issue of their own, utilising the T&D unbundling issue to push-start 
lagging pricing reforms was to confuse cause and effect, and the separation of T&D 
should not be contemplated until broader questions regarding administrative price 
setting were solved first.260 As the auditing reforms did not lead to the desired outcomes 
and overall progress in market building was lagging, in 2007 the State Council General 
Office published a grand reaffirmation of the “reform direction and overall targets set 
by the No. 5 Document”, acknowledging that reform assignments had not been 
completed as new challenges had arisen. Outlined by the Electricity System Reform 
Working Group, the document criticised the “insufficient role of the market in 
electricity allocation” and called for the steady implementation of pilot projects for the 
separation of transmission and distribution in order to “change the current single buyer 
system”, thereby directly targeting SGCC’s persisting downstream monopoly. It went 
on to explicitly demand separate internal auditing for the T&D segments, direct power 
purchases for large end-users and a general deepening of competition-based pricing 
reforms.261 
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Consequently, a pilot scheme was introduced in 2009 that encouraged large industrial 
consumers to purchase electricity directly from generation companies. The aim was to 
eventually open 20% of China’s electricity exchanges to bilateral trade, thereby 
bypassing the wholesale market and challenging the grid companies’ role as the sole 
retailers.262 Based on a policy originally issued by SERC as early as 2004,263 retail prices 
in these pilot schemes were to be directly negotiated between industrial end-users and 
power generators, allowing electricity purchases at lower prices. Grid companies were to 
add a grid access fee to this figure but were otherwise not to participate in these 
exchanges as retailers.264 Fifteen large industrial firms were eventually admitted to the 
pilot projects, but the trials soon began to stagnate as dissent between participating 
parties mounted.265 According to a former SERC official, the main point of contention 
was that the calculation of the price component for grid access lacked transparency. 
Even if generators and consumers agreed on direct sales they still needed to access 
transmission lines, but neither SGCC nor China Southern Grid in the southern 
provinces were willing to fully disclose their cost calculations, much to the dismay of 
the China Electricity Council which represents the interests of generation companies. 
Given the grid companies’ refusal to cooperate, direct electricity sales proved very 
difficult to implement.266 
Despite central government’s commitment to gradually opening the retail market to 
competition and various implementation initiatives, transmission and distribution assets 
remained integrated while SGCC and China Southern Grid continued to act as the 
single retailers in their respective regions. As no separate distribution entities existed 
that could have entered into competition with each other, retail price competition 
stalled while transmission and distribution prices continued to be set as a combined 
figure based on the NDRC Pricing Department’s interpretation of SGCC’s statements 
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regarding its combined T&D costs, and these, according to the industry regulator 
SERC, have been notoriously difficult to verify.267  
 
SGCC’s own suggestions for retail market development and a subsequent compromise 
Obstructing all progress on T&D unbundling, SGCC also began to advocate to central 
government its own suggestions for retail market development which were primarily 
geared towards keeping its asset structure as well as its role as the sole, or at least the 
dominant, intermediary between generators and end-users intact. The first system that 
SGCC advocated was referred to as the ‘separation of  distribution and retail’ (配售分开) 
under which distribution assets were to remain with the grid companies while the retail 
function was to be taken over by newly created retail firms which would act as brokers 
between generators and consumers without actually owning or operating distribution 
networks. SGCC subsequently experimented with the transfer of  its retail business to 
private firms at the local level, although it later became clear that the managers in these 
firms had all been appointed by SGCC’s local subsidiaries and that large shares in these 
private retailers were held by SGCC employees. Local SGCC-owned suppliers on 
various occasions furthermore reorganised their assets in a way to create separate retail 
centres that were then operated by other companies which, however, also belonged to 
the SGCC structure.268 While creating the impression of  willingness to cooperate with 
government’s reform requirements, both approaches to ‘separating’ business segments 
entirely defeated the purpose of  the original reform idea as ownership structures 
effectively remained untouched and local SGCC subsidiaries additionally distorted retail 
competition with the motive of  privatising profits. 
The grid company subsequently introduced a further suggestion for retail market 
reforms referred to as the ‘opening of  a side retail market’ (售电侧市场放开). This model 
was again based on the idea of  maintaining the integrity of  T&D assets while creating 
competition between different retailers. The catch in this scenario was that SGCC itself  
would formally participate in the retail market through a separate subsidiary entity.269 
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Two SGCC employees who commented on this model in interviews argued that under 
this system the preferences of  all relevant industry and government actors would be 
brought together for mutual benefit. For SGCC, the proposed adjustment would 
prevent a separation of  assets and was therefore preferable to the solution postulated in 
the No. 5 Document, although “the later such a new model is implemented, the 
better”. 270  For the NDRC, NEA, and Ministry of  Finance, the model was also 
acceptable since it did involve forms of  competition in both generation and retail. Both 
interviewees also predicted that this approach would probably enable SGCC to distort 
the retail market in its favour by charging its affiliated retailer lower grid fees at the 
expense of  its competitors. They contended, however, that if  suitable regulation was in 
place the participation of  the grid company in the retail business should not be an 
obstacle to market competition.271 
After more than a decade of unsuccessful pilot project attempts and SGCC-driven 
counter-proposals, a compromise between central government and SGCC finally began 
to take shape. Having vowed in its 2014 Energy Work Guide to “actively push forward 
direct power purchases and the reform of the retail sector”, as well as to “advance the 
reform of [...] separate T&D auditing”, 272  in late 2015 the National Energy 
Administration in cooperation with the NDRC presented a new approach to retail 
market building which combined separate administrative price setting for transmission 
and distribution with a partial opening of the distribution segment to external 
investment. However, while the setting of separate prices for T&D was to go hand in 
hand with additional auditing by the government, few actual changes for the grid 
companies should be expected from this step. As demanded by SGCC, all existing 
distribution grids remained firmly in the hands of the grid companies which were 
furthermore formally allowed to continuously participate in the retail segment, while 
only the construction of new distribution infrastructure entailed the possibility of 
drawing in ‘societal capital’ (社会资本).273  Presented as a large step forward for the 
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marketisation of China’s electricity industry, the 2015 policy alterations should rather be 
understood as a skewed compromise by which government accomplished the 
introduction of separate T&D pricing and achieved a rather limited possibility for 
external actors to enter the retail business, while SGCC on the other hand not only 
maintained all of its existing distribution assets but also formally secured its dominant 
market position in the retail business, which new entrants will find very difficult to 
challenge. Finally, SGCC may even end up benefitting from the partial opening of the 
retail segment to external investors as it may enhance its access to external capital. 
 
3.3.3 Section conclusion 
This section analysed central government’s attempts to gradually unbundle the grid 
companies’ transmission and distribution grid assets as a way to introduce competition 
to the electricity retail segment. Empirical evidence was provided that demonstrated 
SGCC’s rhetorical and practical opposition to this unbundling step, including its 
consistent interference with pilot projects for separate T&D auditing and with trials 
aimed at the widespread introduction of direct power transfers which threatened to 
dissolve its monopoly position for the supply of industrial end-users. The manifold 
SGCC-initiated counter-proposals for the retail segment furthermore demonstrated that 
the grid company continuously pursued its own reform preferences while feigning a 
willingness to cooperate with sectoral regulators. Presented as strategies to introduce 
retail competition without needing to break up assets, SGCC’s voluntary experiments 
with a ‘separation’ of the distribution and retail segments were more akin to attempts at 
consolidating its position as the dominant retailer while additionally allowing for a 
partial privatisation of profits, showing similarities to earlier findings from SGCC’s 
continued involvement in the power generation business. Taken together, the grid 
company’s behaviour presented a major obstacle to the emergence of retail competition 
as set out in the State Council’s No. 5 Document.  
While SGCC persistently countered the attempts at implementing T&D unbundling, 
central government’s policy preferences in this regard remained stable, as demonstrated 
by its consistent pursuit of pilot projects and the 2007 reaffirmation of the State 
Council’s commitment to the No. 5 Document’s market building agenda and the 
continued validity of all unbundling requirements. Following a decade-long deadlock 
between SGCC and central government over this issue, the NDRC and NEA eventually 
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engaged with one of SGCC’s counter-proposals to formulate a compromise that 
entailed a very limited opening of the distribution segment while, for the time being, 
assuring SGCC its dominant participation in the retail segment.  
Taken together, these findings once more show that under opposing policy preferences 
both sides were unable to fully realise their goals. Central government could not 
conduct market building in the retail segment against the will of SGCC, and SGCC was 
unable to rid itself of the ongoing pilot project-based attacks on its retail monopoly. 
This ultimately necessitated a late compromise prior to which very little progress in any 
direction appeared achievable.  
 
 
3.4 Unbundling primary and auxiliary grid assets 
A final unbundling step included in the No. 5 Document as part of the State Council’s 
plan to marketise the electricity industry required a separation of grid operations as the 
primary grid business from all ‘auxiliary’ grid businesses related to the design, 
construction, and maintenance of network equipment and infrastructure, which were to 
be converted into separate entities engaging in market competition. 274  While one 
purpose of splitting up primary and auxiliary assets was to enhance overall efficiency in 
the auxiliary segment, another core aspiration was to further clarify the cost structure 
underlying grid operation, where the lack of transparency had been a continuing 
obstacle to industry oversight.275 Consequently, grid companies were supposed to solely 
act as network operators and were only allowed to retain their own research institutes as 
additional support.276  
This section will analyse the State Council-initiated attempts to implement this 
unbundling step, as well as SGCC’s counter-approach which allowed it not only to 
avoid a separation of assets but also to expand its market position in the grid equipment 
segment. Particular emphasis will be placed on examining SGCC’s strategy of acquiring 
independent equipment suppliers and engaging in venue-shopping among different 
central government bodies, utilising uncoordinated variances among mandates to 
                                                
274 No. 5 Document (2002), Part 3, §13. 
275 Interview with a senior engineer/top-level advisor, State Grid Energy Research Institute, Beijing, 
08.11.2012; Wang, Qiang (⺩强), “State Grid Empire” (国⺴帝国), Business Watch Magazine (商务周刊) 10, no. 
5 (05.03.2010): 53. 
276 No. 5 Document (2002), Part 3, §13. 
  94 
subvert unbundling requirements and interfere with the emergence of a level 
competitive playing field. 
 
3.4.1 Slow implementation progress and SGCC’s expansion in the 
grid equipment manufacturing segment 
The early years after the 2002 reform saw little progress in auxiliary asset unbundling 
despite several reiterations of the decision by the State Council, notably as part of the 
previously mentioned 2007 document which explicitly reaffirmed the No. 5 
Document’s reform agenda for the 11th Five-Year Plan period.277 While numerous new 
private and state-owned entrants appeared in grid equipment manufacturing, the State 
Grid Corporation refused to withdraw from the auxiliary grid segment as its direct 
participation allowed it, as the largest buyer of grid-related equipment and construction 
services, to retain the related profits – which unlike the core grid segments were not 
affected by administrative pricing controls – within its own enterprise group.278 In late 
2007, following the most recent demands voiced by the State Council, several ministries 
initiated a new unbundling attempt that even included a financing plan through which 
the grid companies were ensured that they would be compensated for costs incurred 
during the separation of assets.279 Instead of following orders to retreat from auxiliary 
fields, SGCC asserted that a centralised and unified handling of equipment maintenance 
was essential for the stability and security of the electricity supply, especially during 
emergencies, and that China needed a strong unified grid equipment manufacturer that 
would be able to compete on an equal footing with leading foreign suppliers so as to 
break the “monopolistic position of foreign oligarchs”.280  
Over the years, the grid company further strengthened its position in the grid 
equipment manufacturing segment by using subsidiary firms to acquire a multitude of 
independent engineering companies which had entered the segment in the wake of the 
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No. 5 Document. 281  In mid-2009, the State Grid Equipment Co. ( 国 ⺴ 设 备 公 司 ) 
purchased the Pinggao Group (平⾼集团), a leading state-owned producer of high-
voltage electrical switches, from a municipal state asset commission in Henan Province. 
Soon after, the SGCC-owned China Electric Power Research Institute (CEPRI, 中国电
⼒科学研究院) acquired a controlling stake in the Henan-based Xuji Group (许继集团), a 
leading manufacturer of power transmission and relay protection instruments.282 The 
Henan provincial government willingly agreed to both takeovers as it correctly 
anticipated that the two companies would be able to sell vast amounts of grid 
equipment directly to their new parent firm while strengthening the provincial economy 
and increasing tax revenues.283 By 2010, after several other acquisitions CEPRI alone 
owned a controlling stake in 17 of the 37 industry-relevant science and technology firms 
at the time.284 
A second SGCC-owned research centre used for expansionary purposes was the 
Nanjing-based State Grid Electric Power Research Institute (SGEPRI, 国⺴电⼒科学研
究院). By 2009, SGEPRI, in conjunction with its subsidiary Nari Group Corporation (南
瑞集团), had acquired over ten equipment suppliers in the provinces of Jiangsu and 
Anhui, turning the city of Nanjing into an SGCC-dominated hub for grid equipment 
manufacturing. 285  The vast ambition of SGCC’s research institutes, as well as their 
importance for SGCC’s expansion plans, was demonstrated by figures given during a 
2009 interview by a CEPRI executive, who stated that his institute’s revenue target for 
2009 was RMB10 billion and that the institute was aiming for a five-fold increase by 
2014. SGEPRI’s chairman similarly proclaimed that within the same timeframe his 
institute aimed to become an internationally leading centre for industry research and a 
world-class producer of high-tech products.286 While the research institutes were the 
only ‘non-core’ assets that SGCC had been formally allowed to retain, it is not without 
irony that they were now transformed into huge holding companies for all sorts of 
assets in business areas that were nominally off-limits to the grid company. From 
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SERC’s perspective, it had been a core mistake at the beginning of the reform process 
to allow the grid company to keep these research institutes which was compounded by 
not monitoring closely enough what exactly they were used for.287 
This series of acquisitions, in particular the takeovers of the Xuji and Pinggao Groups, 
stirred up considerable debate and led many observers and industry experts to condemn 
SGCC’s investments as violations of the State Council’s marketisation plan as they 
undermined emerging competition in the grid equipment manufacturing industry. The 
China Machinery Industry Federation criticised SGCC as the most important purchaser 
of grid equipment (>70% of the market) for moving towards establishing its own 
internal manufacturing system in which SGCC-owned suppliers won contracts despite 
having a poorer track record or less expertise than their competitors and, in some cases, 
were awarded contracts directly with no public tendering taking place.288 Independent 
manufacturers, on the other hand, found it more and more difficult to compete and as 
the dynamics of the whole auxiliary business shifted many of the smaller companies in 
the market eventually even wanted to be absorbed into the SGCC system as this had 
become much more profitable than staying independent.289 
 
3.4.2 Political processes accompanying SGCC’s acquisitions 
The bureaucratic processes preceding and accompanying SGCC’s acquisitions 
demonstrate how the grid company once more engaged in targeted venue-shopping 
among various central government bodies as soon as it was confronted with sectoral 
authorities’ resistance.  
Direct opposition, particularly to the crucial Xuji and Pinggao deals, was voiced by the 
electricity regulator SERC after the regulator had initially – and mistakenly – viewed the 
market share of the two newly acquired firms as too low to significantly impact the 
wider market for grid equipment manufacturing.290 Disagreement with SGCC’s Xuji and 
Pinggao acquisitions was also voiced by Zhang Guobao, at the time director of the 
National Energy Administration (NEA) and deputy director of the NDRC. Testifying 
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that he had not authorised the deals and that he had argued with SGCC executives that 
their investment strategy violated a core principle of sectoral reforms, Zhang stated that 
“as soon as SGCC recognised that [he] would not approve the purchase, they went and 
obtained the approval through other ministries and commissions.”291 Another NEA 
employee, referring to the acquisitions as “gross violations of the No. 5 Document”,292 
further specified that in the face of the NEA’s hesitancy SGCC had requested support 
from the state asset administrator SASAC and the NDRC’s Foreign Investment 
Department ( 发 改 委 外 资 司 ), both of which looked favourably upon State Grid’s 
acquisition plans and eventually outvoted the NEA’s opposition.293 
During an interview, a SASAC official gave a detailed explanation of their internal 
reasoning regarding the Pinggao and Xuji approvals. According to him, these two 
acquisitions – and only these – were authorised specifically in order to help SGCC 
develop a new ‘ultra-high voltage’ (UHV) transmission technology which the grid 
company had presented to SASAC as entailing opportunities for corporate growth and 
enhancing its international competitiveness294 (this transmission technology would later 
stand at the centre of a major grid restructuring plan pursued by SGCC which will be 
discussed in detail in the following chapters). SASAC thought that the development of 
this grid technology needed industrial support and therefore decided to initiate an 
“incubation period” to help SGCC stimulate further technological development and 
build capacity “until the market is ready” to sustain such a function.295 The approvals 
were also viewed as necessary to help SGCC advance with the standardisation of UHV 
technology, as the official specified that “we need to develop our own industrial 
standards [...] and if we don’t give SGCC this special privilege it would become much 
more difficult for it to acquire the technology”. 296  SGCC employees gave similar 
assessments of the logic behind SASAC’s acquisition approvals which, as they 
explained, were also intended to help the grid company gain manufacturing capacity and 
support it during its attempt to develop the new technology into a marketable and 
exportable product that could be turned into one of the pillars of SGCC’s corporate 
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strategy of developing its manufacturing arm into a counterpart to world market leaders 
like Siemens or ABB. Although the Pinggao and Xuji acquisitions objectively violated 
the No. 5 Document, they explained, SASAC had approved them because it considered 
this would enhance SGCC’s international competitiveness and strengthen its asset 
portfolio. Mostly concerning itself with issues of individual enterprise performance, they 
contended, SASAC failed to fully consider the potential impact of this decision on 
broader market reforms. 297  While SGCC made use of SASAC’s narrowly defined 
perspective on enterprise competitiveness in order to further its own goals, the asset 
regulator’s unawareness of broader reform procedures led to considerable frustration 
among sectoral authorities; an official from SERC remarked that the state asset 
administrator “does not have a deep enough understanding of the direction of power 
reform programs” and demanded that SASAC “should listen to and respect” the views 
of other regulators.298  
In reaction to SGCC’s renewed and heavily debated expansion into auxiliary business 
areas, in September 2010 the Electricity System Reform Working Group under the State 
Council drafted a new plan in which it once more required the spin-off of auxiliary 
assets.299 After being ratified by the State Council in 2011, two new state-owned firms 
were established, the Power Construction Corporation of China (中国电⼒建设集团公司) 
and the China Energy Engineering Corporation (中国能源建设集团公司), which merged 
together a number of auxiliary firms hitherto owned by SGCC and China Southern 
Grid. 300  According to a SERC official, the restructuring represented a compromise 
allowing SGCC to keep a number of important subsidiaries while requiring a limited 
restructuring of its research institutes.301 In the case of SGERI, it continued to define its 
core mission as “becoming a world-class solution provider in electrical equipment”,302 
demonstrating once more just how reluctant the grid company has been to reduce its 
participation in this profitable business area. As SGCC maintained subsidiaries in 
various ‘non-core’ fields (see Figure 3.2) including highly market-relevant equipment 
manufacturers such as Xuji and Pinggao, the 2011 restructuring changed little with 
regard to the grid company’s strong engagement in the auxiliary segment. 
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Figure 3.2 SGCC’s subsidiaries 
Source: State Grid Corporation, Corporate Social Responsibility Report 2014, Beijing, 2014, p. 7. 
 
3.4.3 Section conclusion 
In line with the preceding sections on the attempted implementation of unbundling 
steps inherent in the State Council’s market building plan, this section demonstrated 
how SGCC circumvented the repeatedly reiterated requirement to withdraw from the 
auxiliary grid segment, thereby disrupting the emergence of level competition between 
manufacturers while simultaneously sustaining its own dominant market position. This 
was predominantly achieved by transforming affiliated research institutes into holding 
companies for newly acquired equipment suppliers. Posing as covers for SGCC’s re-
expansion into various affiliated business areas, these institutes have maintained strong 
industry positions even after the compromise restructuring of 2011. 
While the majority of SGCC’s purchases were made unilaterally and without any 
government approval, the two most consequential takeovers, namely those of Pinggao 
and Xuji, were formally approved following targeted venue-shopping by the grid 
company. Similar to instances analysed in preceding sections, SGCC deliberately 
engaged with variances in institutional mandates among central government bodies and 
sought investment support from the state asset administrator SASAC and the NDRC 
Foreign Investment Department by presenting its expansion plans as reflections of 
those institutions’ non-sector-specific mandates to enhance state asset value and the 
international competitiveness of Chinese industry. By securing the support of these two 
bodies based on rationales that bore no relation to otherwise contentious industry-
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specific market building considerations, SGCC managed to overcome the opposition of 
sectoral authorities which had refused to approve the grid company’s attempts to 
circumvent unbundling requirements. 
In summary, the State Council was unable to force SGCC out of the auxiliary segment 
while the grid company not only managed to avoid full asset unbundling but also to re-
develop a dominant market position in grid equipment manufacturing. Given clashing 
reform preferences, SGCC ultimately agreed to a compromise whereby it had to give up 
some of its auxiliary assets but at the same time successfully secured its dominance in 
the manufacturing segment at the expense of independent competitors. 
 
 
3.5 SGCC’s vision of maintaining large integrated energy 
groups  
Given the context of a gridlocked marketisation campaign, SGCC’s vision of its own 
future corporate development differed markedly from the requirements set by the State 
Council as it revolved mainly around the concept of sustained corporate unity while 
calling for enhanced government support for large integrated energy groups in China, 
according to the grid company’s former CEO and current chairman, Liu Zhenya. 
Liu contended that large energy groups such as SGCC served a function as protectors 
of national interests and enforcers of national energy strategies.303 They were needed, he 
maintained, to function as China’s vanguard in international competition and that the 
“international competitiveness of enterprises is [...] linked to the nation’s power; it is an 
important manifestation of national strength and prosperity.” 304  To assist large 
enterprise groups in fulfilling this role, Liu called on government to support domestic 
mergers in order to increase levels of industry concentration and economies of scale.305 
Increased vertical integration with upstream and downstream industry segments, he 
declared, were suitable ways to “reduc[e] costs, improv[e] the operational efficiency of 
the whole industry chain, and improv[e] [...] enterprise management standards and 
competitive advantages”. Additionally, Liu advocated energy companies’ diversification 
of business endeavours and expansions into related industry sectors such as financial 
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services so as to ensure “business stability”.306 Declaring that monopoly was a “factual 
phenomenon” in the energy industry and that “only a monopolistic operation is suitable 
for a business with natural monopoly characteristics”,307 Liu insisted that in times of 
economic globalisation China should not overly focus on domestic challenges with 
monopolies but rather consider the situation of Chinese companies as they compete in 
international energy markets for the benefit of their country: 
Perhaps from the perspective of  the domestic market, a particular 
energy group has a monopoly position and strong market influence, 
but from the perspective of  the international energy market, it is just 
one of  many market players participating in the international 
competition for energy. In order to enhance our competitiveness in 
the international energy market, and better protect our national 
energy security, we must accelerate the development of  China’s large 
energy groups, and never ignore international competitive factors and 
never limit them on account of  their domestic monopoly positions.308  
Instead, Liu called on the administration to devise “innovative regulatory systems” in 
order to “target monopolistic behaviour rather than the monopolistic market position 
of the enterprises”. 309  Bypassing all of the criticism that had been levelled against 
SGCC’s dominant domestic industry position and its circumvention of unbundling 
requirements, Liu placed domestic reform quarrels in an international context, 
attempting to utilise sentiments of economic nationalism to seek endorsement for his 
argument that it was in the interest of the Chinese nation as a whole to support large 
energy groups like SGCC during their domestic expansion in order to ensure greater 
international competitiveness. Most importantly, however, Liu’s line of argument turned 
the entire rationale that originally formed the foundation of the attempted marketisation 
reforms on its head. Whereas the motives underlying the No. 5 Document were to 
increase efficiency, competitiveness and the ability of government to target 
monopolistic behaviour by eroding the monopolistic market position of SGCC’s 
predecessor, the SPCC, Liu argued that the only viable option to make the industry 
efficient and competitive was to expand and further deepen SGCC’s monopolistic 
market position.310 Liu thereby used some of the very same arguments inherent to the 
No. 5 Document in order to make diametrically opposite reform suggestions, 
suggestions which will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter.  
                                                
306 Ibid., pp. 362-363. 
307 Ibid., p. 366. 
308 Ibid., pp. 366-367. 
309 Ibid., p. 367. 
310 Ibid., p. 363. 
  102 
3.6 Chapter conclusions 
Discussion of empirical findings 
As ‘Part A’ of the empirical sections in this dissertation, this chapter investigated the 
State Grid Corporation’s influence on the implementation of sectoral policy in the 
electricity industry. Focusing on implementation processes following the State Council’s 
2002 market building agenda, SGCC’s responses to four different asset unbundling 
requirements were analysed by (a) scrutinising its attempts to maintain an engagement in 
the unbundled electricity generation sector, (b) investigating its struggles against grid 
regionalisation and (c) the separation of its transmission and distribution assets, and (d) 
examining its strategies to retain a dominant position in auxiliary grid businesses. In all 
these surveyed settings SGCC was found to have engaged in decisive and autonomous 
attempts to block or reverse vertical and horizontal asset break-up which coincided with 
marked slowdowns or lengthy/permanent interruptions of the implementation process. 
Overall, the State Council encountered great difficulty in trying to implement policy 
against SGCC’s will, as its ability to steer sectoral reforms was severely limited by the 
grid company’s ability to counteract its moves. 
Having originated from a vertically integrated industry environment, the primary goal 
pursued by the grid company was to as far as possible maintain its monopolistic status 
across the different industry segments. This became particularly evident through its 
obstruction of attempts to challenge its unified control over the transmission, 
distribution and retail segments as well as its subversion of grid regionalisation 
endeavours, which resulted in the grid company managing to sustain its position as the 
sole connection between power generators and end users across most of the country. 
Additionally, SGCC worked towards market dominance in adjacent settings which had 
been formally subjected to competition. This was observable during both SGCC’s 
unauthorised explorations into the power generation segment where it utilised its 
position as transmission monopolist in order to ‘outcompete’ other power generation 
companies, and its ventures into the highly profitable grid equipment manufacturing 
segment where it eventually dominated competition after acquiring a critical mass of 
previously independent manufacturers and concealing them within the structures of its 
affiliated research institutes.  
Overall, given the impossibility of sustaining a fully integrated industry monopoly, the 
findings presented in this chapter suggest that SGCC’s persistent interference with the 
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implementation of sectoral policy was mainly aimed at combining the perpetuation of 
monopoly across the different grid segments with market dominance or at least a form 
of preferential engagement in adjacent nominally competitive segments. Mechanisms of 
resistance applied by the grid company to achieve these goals can be summarised under 
the following headings. 
• ‘Obstruction and/or strategic misuse of pilot projects’, i.e. openly refusing to cooperate 
with unbundling pilot projects or utilising pilot projects to feign cooperation 
while pursuing market dominance in adjacent competitive segments; 
• ‘Distorting investment behaviour’, i.e. conducting autonomous and often unapproved 
investments across industry sub-segments which distorted emerging competition 
in the grid company’s own favour; and 
• ‘Manipulation of internal asset structures’, i.e. unilaterally reshaping the structure of 
assets that it was allowed to ‘temporarily’ retain, with the purpose of preventing 
further unbundling or reversing asset losses that had already occurred. 
Simultaneously, there was evidence of notable albeit overall not very successful 
government opposition to SGCC’s behaviour and continued programmatic support of 
the No. 5 Document’s sectoral market building agenda by the State Council which 
consistently pushed for the application of the different unbundling steps while trying to 
induce the development of regionalised wholesale and retail competition. In response to 
SGCC’s stalling of the marketisation process, in 2007 the State Council issued a policy 
document which fully confirmed the original reform path and vowed to “unswervingly 
push forward” the goals inherent in the original market building plan.311 Furthermore, in 
2012 Prime Minister Wen Jiabao once more publicly emphasised the need to break up 
monopoly structures in the electricity industry.312 In 2013 and 2014, interviewees from 
both the NEA and SASAC insisted that the No. 5 Document still had legal character, 
that market reforms were still viewed as necessary, and that the final objective was still 
the establishment of market competition in the wholesale, retail, and auxiliary segments. 
Both interviewees stated that a core reason why reforms had not progressed as intended 
was that the State Grid Corporation was very powerful and refused to be split up. The 
NEA interviewee emphasised that it was very difficult to progress with new policies 
against SGCC’s interests because even the top levels of government found it hard to 
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persuade the grid company to change its behaviour and it was equally difficult to seize 
its existing power and authority. As “national priorities were hijacked by commercial 
priorities”, he noted, striking a functional balance of interests had become more and 
more difficult which formed an “obstacle to the implementation of policies which most 
people think are the right ones”.313 
While sectoral policy preferences within central government remained stable over time, 
there were also a number of instances in which central government bodies granted their 
support to grid company investment attempts that violated existing unbundling 
requirements. Notable examples were the NDRC’s and SASAC’s approvals of the grid 
company’s continued presence in the electricity generation segment via the ownership 
of the Xinyuan Holding, the state asset administrator’s support for a reintegration of 
China’s grid assets via SGCC’s attempted reacquisition of the China Southern Grid 
Corporation, and SASAC’s and the NDRC Foreign Investment Department’s approval 
of the grid company’s purchase of highly market relevant grid equipment 
manufacturers. All of these instances of government support were preceded by targeted 
venue-shopping during which the grid company presented its acquisition plans as 
furthering the specialised agencies’ non-sector-specific mandates, most importantly 
SASAC’s mandate to enhance the value of state assets and to further the international 
competitiveness of state firms. There was little evidence to suggest that SASAC 
opposed sectoral marketisation or that it consciously aimed to assist SGCC to re-
integrate and re-monopolise the electricity industry. Rather, SGCC intentionally played 
on SASAC’s cross-sectorally applicable institutional mandate and successfully persuaded 
the state asset administrator to grant support to projects presented as supporting 
SASAC’s mandates but primarily designed to circumvent the sectoral marketisation 
policy that the grid company disagreed with. 
While SGCC’s own sectoral objectives and the logic of their pursuit as summarised 
above were comparatively unambiguous, the drivers underlying these objectives remain 
less clear. Although going beyond the scope of the research question addressed in this 
thesis, a number of observations were made that may facilitate further research in this 
regard. One important factor, as discussed in Chapter 2, is the formal incentive 
structure under which central SOEs such as SGCC operate, especially the guidelines 
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according to which SASAC assesses SOE executives’ managerial ability and determines 
both their salary levels and further career prospects: the primary benchmark for all of 
these is commercial success. It is therefore not inconceivable that SGCC’s behaviour 
was at least partially driven by its top executives’ concerns regarding their own career 
development which may have induced them to counteract sectoral policy that they 
perceived as threatening to their firm’s performance.  
Another important factor concerns the more direct private gains which corporate 
executives may make by opposing monopoly break-up and maximising both market 
dominance and firm revenue in partially marketised industry segments. The evidence 
presented demonstrates that SGCC’s actions in response to market building involved 
distinct attempts at illegal privatisation both in the power generation and retail 
segments, while the eventually established dominance over the grid equipment 
manufacturing segments allowed the grid company to legally privatise profits via 
procurement contracts with its own partially stock market-listed manufacturing 
subsidiaries. However, as these subsidiaries’ precise ownership structures are rather 
opaque, the extent to which grid company executives might have personally profited 
from these arrangements remains speculative.  
A third possible explanatory factor to consider revolves around the grid company’s 
historical legacy, i.e. its successorship to a fully integrated industrial and administrative 
monopoly which until 1997 had combined both industry operation and administration. 
Although the corporatisation steps discussed in Chapter 2 formally separated both sets 
of functions, in many cases administrative ranks and personnel structures survived the 
structural reorganisation which probably at least partially explains the grid company’s 
tendency to involve itself in administrative matters and to interfere with government 
decisions while primarily following its own corporate goals. 
 
Concluding remarks 
As a result of the political struggle between state industry and central government over 
the application of the State Council’s market building agenda, reform-related structural 
change in the industry almost came to a standstill during the first half of the 2000s. 
However, although the grid company’s opposition to policy preferences showed its 
ability to frustrate the implementation of central government’s sectoral policy initiatives 
and prevent the desired outcomes of each unbundling requirement, it failed to achieve 
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substantial formal changes to those initiatives as it was neither able to fully reverse 
already taken unbundling steps nor to permanently disperse the pressure to unbundle. 
Also, while the grid company more or less openly opposed sectoral market building 
endeavours, it was never in a position to openly attack the principle of marketisation as 
such. On several occasions SGCC manoeuvred central government into compromises 
that temporarily enabled the grid company to maintain its controlling position over 
large parts of the industry, but the basic tenets of the No. 5 Document remained on the 
State Council’s reform agenda.  
As for the realm of policy implementation, the results of Part A tentatively call into 
question perspectives that presuppose active and effective policy guidance by central 
government over China’s strategic industries. Findings from the electricity supply sector 
suggest that central government needs to be acutely aware of the policy preferences of 
large central SOEs such as SGCC in order to successfully implement major policy 
changes, as these firms possess the ability to critically interfere with the implementation 
of policy that they disagree with. While generally supporting the SOE-centred 
literature’s emphasis on the policy influence of large state firms – particularly the 
hitherto only tentatively demonstrated observation that SOEs can ‘play off’ different 
government bodies against each other as reported, for example, by Xu (2012) or Tsai 
(2014) – the findings of Part A also show that there are distinct limits to this influence, 
which these authors tend to overlook. SGCC’s opposition led sectoral reforms into a 
state of general gridlock, but its obstructive behaviour alone was not enough to bring 
about substantial alterations in the overall reform trajectory.  
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PART B: Analysis of  SGCC’s influence 
on sectoral policy-making 
 
Complementing the analysis of the State Grid Corporation’s influence during the 
implementation of sectoral policy in Part A, Part B of this dissertation (consisting of 
Chapters 4 to 6) will examine the grid company’s influence during phases of sectoral 
policy formulation and decision-making. It will do so by following the emergence and 
gradual application of a new sectoral reform agenda which appeared in the mid-2000s 
when marketisation reforms had lost much of their initial vigour and which, contrary to 
the 2002 regional market building agenda, aimed at the development of an integrated non-
competitive nationally unified electricity supply system. Driven entirely by the State Grid 
Corporation, as will be argued, this new agenda was centred on proposed large-scale 
infrastructure developments in the form of an ultra-high voltage (UHV) transmission 
grid. It suggested technological solutions to many of the same problems that the market 
building agenda had aimed to solve through the introduction of regionalised 
competition (i.e. regarding industrial efficiency, environmental impact, price, service 
quality etc.), albeit following a reform logic that instead strongly furthered the grid 
company’s sectoral goals of solidifying its cross-regional monopoly over the different 
grid segments and permanently combining it with sustained market dominance in the 
nominally competitive and comparatively profitable grid equipment manufacturing 
segment. A strong empirical focus will be placed on the State Grid Corporation’s 
actions (as observed) and intent (whenever it was clearly stated or possible to infer with 
reasonable confidence) during processes that were crucial to this new agenda’s 
development and application. In order to avoid confirmation bias and spurious 
conclusions, congruence tests were applied by repeatedly inquiring about the presence 
or absence of government leadership or support underlying these development steps.  
Chapter 4 will examine the logic inherent to the new sectoral agenda as well as its 
relationship to existing sectoral policy. Chapters 5 and 6 will subsequently trace a series 
of specific implementation attempts and related political conflicts in order to 
understand both the drivers behind this agenda and the dynamics of government-state 
firm interplay accompanying it. Chapter 5, more specifically, will demonstrate how 
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SGCC gained government approval for crucial groundwork related to its contentious 
sectoral restructuring agenda by presenting it as a contribution to cross-sectoral policy 
on ‘indigenous innovation’ and industrial competitiveness championed by the State 
Council. This ‘synchronisation’ tactic, i.e. argumentatively matching the portrayal of 
pursued sectoral policy and corporate development plans with more abstract policy 
objectives pursued by central government, will be presented as an important mechanism 
via which SGCC, as a central SOE, has been able to influence sectoral policy according 
to its own preferences.  
Chapter 6 will then trace a number of UHV-related project evaluation procedures in 
which the grid company, based on sector-specific lines of argument and via engagement 
with the relevant sectoral authorities, attempted to achieve a broader practical 
application of its restructuring plan. It will be shown that, in a setting in which the 
previous ‘synchronisation’ with cross-sectoral policy no longer applied, the grid 
company now encountered substantial resistance from sectoral authorities to the same 
types of projects that had previously been looked upon favourably by the State Council 
based on ‘synchronised’ reasoning. In conclusion, it will be suggested that the presence 
or absence of ‘synchronisation’ with stated central government macro-goals in SGCC’s 
portrayal of its sectoral restructuring plan was an important determinant of the level of 
success of the grid company’s practical implementation attempts. It will be argued that 
SGCC applied this ‘synchronisation’ strategy deliberately in order to play off different 
levels of policy against each other, circumvent critical sectoral reform debates and by-
pass sectoral policy requirements by gathering support based on different policy 
pretexts. 
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4 The emergence of a new sectoral reform agenda – 
SGCC’s ultra-high voltage (UHV) grid 
development plan as an attempted reversal of 
regionalised electricity marketisation 
4.1 Introduction 
As marketisation reforms came almost to a standstill by the mid-2000s, the State Grid 
Corporation responded to the emerging political void in the sectoral policy sphere by 
gradually introducing its own plans for sectoral development in an attempt to 
proactively shape the policy environment it operated in. Building on the State Council’s 
regionalised marketisation and unbundling endeavours, the grid company devised a 
reform agenda that suggested technological and infrastructure-based solutions to very 
similar issues that the No. 5 Document had targeted through the introduction of market 
incentives. These included increases in industrial efficiency and service quality, as well as 
decreases in economic and environmental costs. However, whereas the State Council’s 
reform plan had been built around asset break-up and regionalised competition, 
SGCC’s proposal contrarily aimed at the creation of an integrated non-competitive nationally 
unified electricity supply system, emphasising sectoral and regional integration while largely 
negating the necessity of enhancing levels of competition in order to arrive at the stated 
reform goals. 
At the centre of SGCC’s sectoral restructuring ideas, which will be introduced in this 
chapter, stood the proposed nationwide construction of an ultra-high voltage (UHV) 
electricity transmission infrastructure in the form of a grid ‘superstructure’ that was to 
synchronise provincial and regional grids in the most industrialised and developed parts 
of China into a single cross-regional synchronous grid operated centrally by SGCC 
itself. After explaining the functional logic of this restructuring plan, the basic 
economic, environmental and grid security-related arguments used to advocate it in 
political debates will be presented. In a further step, SGCC’s early attempts to introduce 
its UHV-based reform plan into the policy arena will be traced, followed by an overview 
of critical counter-perspectives expressed by industry experts who contradicted the grid 
company’s claims regarding the alleged benefits of UHV construction for China’s 
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electricity supply system. 314  The voicing of opposition, it will be shown, led to 
immediate retaliation by the grid company which tried to keep these experts’ opinions 
out of official deliberations. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the 
inferences that the nature of SGCC’s reform plan and the pursuit of its practical 
application allow for our understanding of the grid company’s engagement with central 
government over sectoral policy matters. 
 
 
4.2 SGCC’s ‘1 Ultra, 4 Large’ plan and the ‘Three China’ 
Grid 
SGCC’s UHV-based strategy for a “transformation of China’s energy mode”315 has been 
commonly referred to as the ‘1 Ultra, 4 Large’ (1U4L; ⼀特四⼤) plan as it combined the 
proposed construction of a nationally integrated ultra-high voltage electricity grid (the 
“1 Ultra”) with the envisioned establishment of a number of large regional bases 
focusing on coal, hydro, nuclear or renewable based electricity generation (the “4 
Large”). The core idea of 1U4L was to concentrate China’s generation capacity in the 
country’s periphery, far away from the overpopulated and increasingly polluted load 
centres in central and eastern China, and to create regional power generation hubs 
according to the naturally determined spread of resource endowments. The electricity 
generated in these hubs was then to be transmitted to China’s demand centres via ultra-
high voltage electricity transmission lines, which were argued to be necessary for 
transferring very high loads over such long distances.316 
According to SGCC’s plan, coal-fired power generation, which supplies the large 
majority of China’s electricity demand (63% in 2013),317 was to be clustered in the north 
and west of the country where coal resources abound, thereby alleviating the necessity 
                                                
314 It should be noted that it is not the aim of this or the following chapters to judge the relative suitability 
of the different reform approaches for addressing China’s broader energy challenges. 
315 “State Grid: ‘2012 China Energy Man of the Year’ Liu Zhenya Speaks at the Award Ceremony & 
China Electric Power and Energy Symposium,” Hong Kong Government News, 17.05.2012. 
316 “Liu Zhenya: UHV transmission is the only way for China’s electricity development” (刘振亚：特⾼压输
电是中国电⼒发展的必由之路), People’s Daily Online (⼈民⺴), 28.11.2006. Other relevant publications by 
Liu Zhenya on the topic of UHV include: Liu Zhenya (刘振亚), The Ultra-high voltage electricity grid (特⾼压电
⺴), (Beijing: China Electric Power Publishing House, 2005); Liu Zhenya, ed., Q&A regarding knowledge on 
ultra-high voltage transmission (特⾼压输电知识问答), (Beijing: China Electric Power Publishing House, 2006); 
Liu Zhenya, ed., A collection of research results on UHV-AC transmission technology (特⾼压交流输电技术研究成果
专辑), (Beijing: China Electric Power Publishing House, 2009). 
317 The data on China’s installed electricity capacity in this paragraph was taken from U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, “China. International energy data and analysis,” 14.05.2015, p. 29. 
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of physically transporting coal across China to power plants located in the vicinity of 
load centres.318 SGCC furthermore advocated the large-scale expansion of hydropower 
generation in China’s water-rich south-west (currently the second most important 
power source, supplying 22% of China’s electricity demand), as well as the development 
of nuclear power bases (1%) along the eastern coastline which lacked the resources of 
other areas.319 The generation of electricity from renewable energy sources (wind, solar 
and biomass, excluding hydropower) currently at 8% was also to be expanded and 
concentrated in large wind power bases in the plains of northern China and coastal 
regions, while solar power bases were suggested to be built in the Gobi desert and in 
more central/northern provinces such as Inner Mongolia and Shanxi.320 By transmitting 
the electricity produced along the periphery to the main centres of power demand a 
centrally coordinated pattern of large-scale electricity flows from north to south and 
from west to east China was to emerge (see Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2).321 
 
Figure 4.1 China’s installed electricity capacity share by fuel (late 2013) 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, “China. International energy data and 
analysis,” 14.05.2015, p. 29. 
 
                                                
318 Liu, 2013, p. 67. 
319 Ibid., pp. 67, 105. 
320 Ibid., pp. 110, 115. 
321 Ibid., pp. 166, 169. 
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Figure 4.2 Map of China’s future electricity flows as envisioned by SGCC 
Source: Liu, 2013, p. 166. 
 
Both Liu Zhenya and Shu Yinbiao, SGCC’s vice president at the time, argued that new 
ultra-high voltage transmission infrastructure needed to be built to fulfil this task as the 
existing grids were not capable of handling this kind of large-scale electricity transfer.322 
More precisely, Liu and Shu advocated the application of two separate types of UHV 
transmission. Due to their technical nature, direct current 800kV UHV (UHV-DC; 直流
特⾼压) transmission lines were to be used to supply electricity at high capacity over 
thousands of kilometres into China’s regional grid networks in the receiving areas 
without, however, being synchronous parts of those networks.323 Citing grid security 
necessities, SGCC asserted that in order to safely receive electricity at such high capacity 
and then disperse it across larger areas to load centres in the east and centre of the 
country an alternating current 1000kV UHV (UHV-AC; 交流特⾼压) transmission grid 
needed to be constructed, which unlike the UHV-DC lines feeding into it was to be 
characterised by flexible grid access and would accommodate flexible consumption 
                                                
322 “China to launch experimental project of UHV grids,” Xinhua News Agency, 19.06.2006; “Liu 
Zhenya: UHV transmission is the only way for China’s electricity development” (刘振亚：特⾼压输电是中
国电⼒发展的必由之路), People’s Daily Online (⼈民⺴), 28.11.2006. 
323 Lantau Group, “China’s UHV Highway Revisited,” China Focus Newsletter (April 2013), p. 4; Liu 
Zhenya, 2013, pp. 169, 178. 
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patterns. 324  According to SGCC’s plan, three of the receiving hitherto independent 
regional grids, namely the Central China (华中), East China (华东) and North China 
Grids (华北; together referred to as 三华 or the “Three China” grid) which extend across 
the most industrialised and economically most important areas under SGCC operation, 
were to be unified into one huge synchronous grid by constructing a 1000kV UHV-AC 
network as a superstructure on top of the existing high-voltage grid infrastructure (see 
Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4).325  
 
Figure 4.3 The “Three China” synchronous UHV-AC grid region envisioned by SGCC 
Source: Author’s visualisation of material presented in this section. 
 
In this scheme, UHV-AC was envisioned as the main grid framework which would be 
supplied with electricity from distant power generation bases via UHV-DC lines, 
including the possibility of eventually initiating large-scale electricity imports from 
neighbouring countries.326  
 
                                                
324 Ibid. 
325 Liu, 2013, p. 169. 
326 Ibid., p. 178. 
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Figure 4.4 UHV-AC interconnection and UHV-DC transmission among China’s 
regional grids as planned by SGCC 
Source: Liu, 2013, p. 169. 
 
Furthermore, SGCC argued that both UHV-AC and UHV-DC were inseparable and 
indispensable to creating a “structurally and functionally sound and intelligent platform 
for energy allocation”.327 After first emphasising via its ‘Strong UHV-AC, strong UHV-
DC’ (强交强直) slogan that both types of UHV technology needed to be developed 
simultaneously, SGCC began to argumentatively tie them together even more 
aggressively by arguing that without UHV-AC, UHV-DC could not be constructed at 
all (不交不直).328 In this way, all core aspects of the 1U4L initiative were argumentatively 
fused together by creating the idea of an unquestionable conceptual and technological 
interdependence. SGCC claimed to be able to vastly improve China’s energy allocation 
system by means of these new technological capabilities, but only if central government 
agreed to completely overhaul the structure of the electricity industry in favour of a 
centralisation of grid infrastructure as laid out by the grid company. This was 
                                                
327 Ibid., p. 66. 
328 “Liu Zhenya Gives Mid-Year Working Report: SGCC Focuses on Eight Aspects in Second Half Year” 
(SGCC press release), China Business News, 25.07.2011; “‘State Grid Empire’ ‘cut apart’: How four large 
regional grid companies became hollow shells overnight” (“国⺴帝国” “削藩”：四⼤区域电⺴公司⼀夜间成为
空壳公司), Sina Blog, 14.05.2011, http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_667242870100qus0.html, accessed 
03/2016. 
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summarised by an SGCC employee during an interview: “If you have UHV you have a 
connected grid; and under these circumstances you need united SGCC management.”329 
 
 
4.3 Introduction to SGCC’s pro-UHV arguments 
SGCC promoted its UHV strategy along several lines of reasoning, asserting that it 
could “effectively resolve the Chinese energy sector’s glaring problems in terms of 
supply security, utilisation efficiency, resource allocation, environmental constraints and 
technological innovation”. 330  As such, SGCC’s argumentative presentation of its 
restructuring plan showed considerable overlap with the goals that had also been 
pursued via the State Council’s No. 5 Document, such as a more efficient resource 
allocation at lower economic and environmental costs. SGCC’s approach, however, 
emphasised an entirely different route to arrive at those goals, one that involved 
centralisation instead of regionalisation and integration across industry segments instead 
of asset unbundling.  
 
4.3.1 Economic and environmental arguments 
Economic arguments made by SGCC in favour of its UHV plan concerned both the 
methods and costs of resource allocation in the electricity industry given the uneven 
regional distribution of energy resources and electricity demand in China. In order to 
bridge the existing mismatch, China’s electricity supply system has for a long time relied 
on large-scale coal transports via railway from coal-mining areas to power plants within 
the reach of the regional grids in the centre and east of the country. SGCC pointed out 
that an ‘over-reliance’ on coal transports had intensified China’s struggle to meet the 
constantly rising demand for electricity.331 The company’s chairman, Liu Zhenya, argued 
that coal transport accounted for half of China’s domestic cargo transports and that 
railway bottlenecks repeatedly caused coal supply shortfalls in inland power plants, 
ultimately causing or further intensifying power supply shortages in parts of the country. 
Inter-relatedly, Liu stated that the long-distance transmission capacity under China’s 
                                                
329 Interview with a smart grid researcher at the State Grid Energy Research Institute, Beijing, 08.11.2012. 
330 Liu Zhenya, 2013, p. 66. 
331 “State Grid outlines plans,” Power in Asia, 07.12.2006. 
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current grid structure was insufficient to meet current demand and therefore unable to 
ease the pressure placed on the electricity supply industry through its reliance on long-
distance coal transports. Increasing the scope of long-distance electricity allocation via 
UHV transmission was consequently presented as the most promising way to counter 
this “structural irrationality of energy transportation.”332 
A second set of economic arguments employed by SGCC centred on the claim that 
UHV transmission would ease cost pressure on thermal coal and subsequently on 
electricity retail prices; according to SGCC figures roughly 50% of the cost of thermal 
coal used in power generation in East China was attributable to transport costs.333 
Similarly, 1000kV UHV-AC lines were argued to possess a much more favourable cost 
structure than conventional 500kV high-voltage lines and to require only three-quarters 
of the investment costs, while their transmission capacity was claimed to be four to five 
times higher. 334  Lu Yanchang, the director-general of the SGCC-affiliated Chinese 
Society for Electrical Engineering,335 further argued that UHV-AC lines were able to 
cover three times the distance while incurring only 25 to 40% of the electricity losses 
usually associated with 500kV lines and required 60% less land.336 Liu Xinfang (刘⼼放) 
of SGCC’s External Affairs Division even considered a 75% decrease in transmission 
losses as compared to 500kV lines possible. 337  With regard to electricity price 
developments, SGCC argued that “UHV will not only not lead to higher electricity 
consumer prices, it is on the contrary beneficial for lowering electricity prices”, as 
transmitting thermal and hydro power from the periphery to the centre and the east 
would be even cheaper than the local on-grid prices for thermal power in load 
centres. 338  The investment sums required for UHV development, as explained by 
                                                
332 Liu, 2013, pp. 36, 50, 58, 67. 
333 Liu, 2013, p. 141; Interview with a senior engineer/top-level advisor, State Grid Energy Research 
Institute, Beijing, 08.11.2012; “China moves ahead with economical ultra-high voltage transmission lines,” 
Xinhua News Agency China Economic Information Service, 09.02.2009. 
334 “Liu Zhenya: UHV transmission is the only way for China’s electricity development” (刘振亚：特⾼压输
电是中国电⼒发展的必由之路), People’s Daily Online (⼈民⺴), 28.11.2006; Liu Zhenya, 2013, p. 140. 
335 “China moves ahead with economical ultra-high voltage transmission lines,” Xinhua News Agency 
China Economic Information Service, 09.02.2009; CSEE website: 
http://www.csee.net.cn/home.aspx?PageId=7f4c9667-74da-430b-89e8-e04e01feed27 (03.04.2014). 
336 Ibid. 
337 “SGCC’s 600 billion Yuan UHV project referred to as strengthening monopoly” (国家电⺴ 6 千亿元特⾼
压项⺫被指巩固垄断), Nanfang Web (南⽅报⺴), 07.07.2009. 
338 “SGCC: The UHV-AC network can maintain nuclear safety in the East China grid” (国家电⺴：特⾼压
交流电⺴可保华东核电安全), People’s Daily Online, 14.05.2013. 
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SGCC’s vice-chairman Shu Yinbiao, would originate from state bank loans and bond 
sales, as well as the grid company’s own capital.339  
Finally, from an environmental standpoint, SGCC emphasised 1U4L’s potential benefits 
regarding pollution control. Beginning around 2006, Liu Zhenya asserted that by 
following the 1U4L plan, clean energy from the periphery could be supplied to eastern 
China and the pollution associated with long-distance coal transport could be reduced. 
Furthermore, by locally concentrating power generation, the pollution emitted from 
power plants (thermal, in particular) could be moved out of urban centres in densely 
populated parts of the country and curbed overall through a more concentrated 
management.340  
In an attempt to increase the grid company’s argumentative leverage and gain additional 
political legitimacy, Liu Zhenya furthermore argued that the expansion of in situ power 
generation would have the positive economic side effect of “boosting the economic and 
social development in the western region” and helping to implement China’s Western 
Development Programme, 341  a regional development agenda headed by the State 
Council that aimed to narrow the wealth gap between China’s less developed western 
provinces and the more developed coastal provinces.342 
 
4.3.2 Safety/security arguments 
A second type of argument used by SGCC portrayed UHV transmission as an 
opportunity for grid safety improvements or, alternatively, in terms of a threat to supply 
security in case of non-approval by central government. As part of an early outline of 
the company’s UHV plans, in November 2006 Liu Zhenya stated that, due to a lack of 
long-term investment in previous years grid development had not reached the level 
required to match increases in electricity demand at the time. This, he insisted, had 
brought about a “very weak grid structure”, making the “risk of blackouts covering 
                                                
339 “State Grid to spend RMB 600 bln on UHV power lines by 2020,” China Knowledge Press, 
25.05.2009. 
340 “Liu Zhenya: UHV transmission is the only way for China’s electricity development” (刘振亚：特⾼压输
电是中国电⼒发展的必由之路), People’s Daily Online (⼈民⺴), 28.11.2006. 
341 Liu Zhenya, 2013, pp. 82, 154; “Liu Zhenya: UHV transmission is the only way for China’s electricity 
development” (刘振亚：特⾼压输电是中国电⼒发展的必由之路), People’s Daily Online (⼈民⺴), 28.11.2006. 
342 State Council, “Circular of the State Council Concerning Several Policies on Carrying out the 
Development of China’s Vast Western Regions,” Document No. 33 [2000], 26.10.2000. 
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large areas [...] very real”.343 Furthermore, only a UHV infrastructure would be able to 
cope with the huge expected increases in installed generation capacity planned until 
2020. 344  Resorting to similarly alarmist arguments, in the summer of 2011 SGCC’s 
deputy general manager, Shuai Junqing, warned against looming supply shortages in 
central and coastal areas and predicted that shortages would grow considerably in the 
coming years “if planned high-capacity long-distance power transmission lines can’t be 
completed on time”. He pointed out that China’s north-eastern and north-western 
regions were likely to produce a power supply surplus which would suffice to almost 
entirely mitigate shortages in the centre and along the coast, but for this exchange to 
take place the construction of UHV infrastructure was required.345 Messages indicating 
the urgency of swift UHV development were also spread by the general managers of 
some of SGCC’s provincial subsidiaries. Meng Qingqiang (孟庆强), general manager of 
SGCC’s Chongqing Electric Power Company claimed in the national media that 
speeding up the construction of Chongqing’s UHV link was a “necessity for reversing 
the city’s chronic power shortage situation and a guarantee for the sustainable 
development of Chongqing’s power industry”. 346  The general manager of SGCC’s 
Shanghai Electric Power Company, Feng Jun (冯军), on the other hand was quoted 
emphasising the importance of constructing a “stable East China backbone grid 
structure in order to meet the future development needs of Shanghai’s power grid, [...] 
to strengthen power supply capabilities and to prevent the possibility of large 
accidents”.347  
Finally, SGCC emphasised UHV technology’s declared potential to mitigate the impact 
of disruptive external factors on China’s power supply, particularly due to the supply 
route diversification inherent in the 1U4L strategy which would “effectively enhance the 
ability of the energy transport system to withstand the impact of natural disasters, with 
significant implications for improving the safety and security of electricity supply in the 
eastern and central regions”348. It also pointed out that a higher interconnectedness of 
                                                
343 “State Grid outlines plans,” Power in Asia, 07.12.2006. 
344 “Liu Zhenya: UHV transmission is the only way for China’s electricity development” (刘振亚：特⾼压输
电是中国电⼒发展的必由之路), People’s Daily Online (⼈民⺴), 28.11.2006. 
345 “Power play just drama?,” South China Morning Post, 14.06.2011. 
346 “General Manager of Chongqing Electric Power Co. proposes to speed up the construction of UHV 
lines to Chongqing” (重庆电⼒总经理：建议加快⼊渝特⾼压建设), Caijing, 04.03.2014. 
347 “SGCC representative recommends to quickly approve Huainan-Shanghai UHV line” (国⺴代表：建议
尽快核准淮南-上海特⾼压), Caijing, 04.03.2014. 
348 “SGCC: The UHV-AC network can maintain nuclear safety in the East China grid” (国家电⺴：特⾼压
交流电⺴可保华东核电安全), People’s Daily Online, 14.05.2013; Liu Zhenya, 2013, p. 152. 
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the grid would allow regional and local grids to assist each other in times of need and 
would therefore help to prevent widespread electricity outages.349 
Employing these different arguments, SGCC attempted to feed its 1U4L agenda into 
the political arena, as will be discussed in the following section. 
 
 
4.4 The origin of the UHV agenda and its introduction into 
the political arena 
Research and development efforts in the field of high-voltage technology had been 
conducted in China since 1986, supported by the seventh, eighth and tenth Five-Year 
Plans.350 UHV technology as such was therefore not entirely new and had already been 
experimented with in other countries in the second half of the 20th century. The idea of 
a widespread commercial application, however, was unprecedented, as was SGCC’s idea 
of utilising UHV and its technical characteristics to formulate a response to the 
unbundling requirements of the No. 5 Document. According to Wu Jingru (吴敬儒), an 
engineer with a background in UHV research who in 2003 participated in early 
consultations with SGCC about the possibility of UHV development in China, both of 
these ideas were intimately linked to the figure of Liu Zhenya. While SGCC’s CEO at 
the time, Zhao Xizheng (赵希正), displayed a fairly neutral attitude towards UHV, Liu as 
second-in-command showed a very strong interest in the technology and ordered the 
drafting of a plan for a nationally unified UHV-AC grid as soon as he assumed the 
position of SGCC’s CEO in 2004.351 
In late 2004 then, UHV in its modern configuration for the first time officially appeared 
in the field of vision of national policy makers when Liu Zhenya suggested to NDRC 
leaders during a field visit that UHV transmission would be the best way to solve 
bottlenecks in China’s power supply. The director of the NDRC at the time, Ma Kai (⻢
凯), was quoted in news reports as stating that the technology “should be researched 
                                                
349 “Four questions regarding UHV: Safety and economic feasibility are still being called into doubt” (四问
特⾼压：安全性与经济性仍遭质疑), People’s Daily Online (⼈民⺴), 29.04.2014. 
350 “High-Voltage Grids May Revive Power Monopoly,” Caijing, 19.09.2005. 
351 “Many old experts oppose the “Three China Interconnected Grid” UHV-AC plan” (多位⽼专家反对交
流特⾼压“三华联⺴”规划), Century Weekly (新世纪), 25.04.2011. 
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and considered within the electricity plan”.352 Subsequently, during a November 2004 
SGCC Party Leadership Group meeting Liu Zhenya demanded that national-level grid 
planning research and construction should be “actively carried forward”. 353  The 
following month SGCC made its first public suggestions to interconnect and 
synchronise the North and Central China regional grids to speed up a country-wide 
interconnection of regional grids through UHV-AC and UHV-DC technology, a 
concept that would soon after also include the East China grid to complete SGCC’s 
vision of a synchronous “Three China” UHV-AC grid. Around the same time, SGCC 
established an internal UHV Electricity Grid Construction Leading Group (特⾼压电⺴
⼯程领导⼩组) and reported to Vice-Prime Minister Huang Ju (⻩菊) the “necessity, 
urgency and feasibility” of building a UHV grid.354 In January and February 2005, SGCC 
then supplied the main supervisory bodies NDRC, SERC and SASAC with its first 
internally conducted “Technical and economic feasibility study on UHV power 
transmission”, in which it concluded that due to the country’s vastness, fast economic 
development and rapidly rising electricity demand, China needed to regroup its 
electricity supply structure around UHV-AC technology by following the principles of 
“sending electricity from West to East, interconnecting supply in the North and the 
South, and establishing a nationwide integrated grid” (⻄电东送、南北互供、全国联⺴).355 
This series of events demonstrates that the idea of forming a nationally unified 
electricity grid by connecting regional grids through UHV technology originated within 
SGCC, and that the grid company sought government approval for early stage research 
work on UHV technology with the intention of applying it in such a way so as to 
permanently bind together and synchronise China’s most important regional grids. In its 
pursuit of approvals for further UHV development work, SGCC received the support 
of Vice-Prime Minister Zeng Peiyan (曾培炎), who prior to joining the State Council 
(2003-2008) had acted as the deputy director of the construction committee (1998-
2000) overseeing the famous ‘Three Gorges’ project, the previous mega-construction 
project in China’s electricity industry. 356  On various occasions from March 2005 
                                                
352 “UHV: A historical choice - A record of events surrounding the development of China’s UHV 
electricity grid” (特⾼压：历史的抉择--我国发展特⾼压电⺴纪实), People’s Daily Online (⼈民⺴), 16.01.2007. 
353 “Record of major events surrounding UHV (2004-2007) (特⾼压⼤事记盘点(2004 年-2007 年)), North 
Star Electric Power News Network (北极星电⼒新闻⺴), 26.02.2009. 
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onwards, Zeng recommended the launch of UHV pilot projects as soon as possible357 in 
order to “actively explore” UHV transmission technology and it is evident that he has 
assisted SGCC in introducing its grid development agenda into the central-level policy 
arena.358 Supportive statements regarding the construction of pilot projects were also 
made by Vice-Prime Minister Huang Ju.359 
SGCC’s efforts were rewarded by the eventual granting of approval for further research 
work by the NDRC, the primary approval body for large state investment projects. 
However, while SGCC from the very beginning pushed for the eventual nationwide 
construction of UHV infrastructure, official government support for SGCC’s plans was 
exclusively limited to encouraging technological development and did not include any 
mention of a wider application of UHV technology within China’s grid system.360 This 
difference in outlook is supported by a subtle but important semantic issue in 
communications between SGCC and the State Council which first appeared in 2005 and 
gave insight into the dynamic of both sides’ approach to UHV development. While 
State Council documents officially referred to the SGCC’s planned pilot projects as 
“test projects” (试验⼯程), which in government terms means open-ended experiments, 
the grid company consistently used the term “demonstration projects” (⽰范⼯程) which 
is used for undertakings which have already been designated for an extended and 
continuous application. As both sides insisted on their respective labels, a compromise 
emerged whereby the term “test demonstration project” (试验⽰范⼯程) was agreed.361 
This little quarrel over the exact nomenclature of the pilot project made it very clear 
that SGCC pushed for a swift and far-reaching application of the technology while the 
State Council at the time viewed it as nothing more than a technological experiment. 
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4.5 The emergence of opposition against the 1U4L strategy 
among industry experts and former officials  
In May 2005, SGCC began drawing up plans for the construction of a UHV-AC pilot 
project.362 As the plans for this project were made public, opposition to SGCC’s grid 
development strategy began to form. Contrary to the grid company’s own position, a 
number of outspoken current and former government officials and industry experts 
characterised UHV technology as highly uneconomical and a significant threat to grid 
stability. Importantly, given the structural nature of the 1U4L strategy, they considered 
the development of UHV infrastructure and particularly the planned synchronous inter-
regional UHV-AC grid to be a major political challenge by which SGCC aimed to 
strengthen its centralised control at the expense of regional grids and regional electricity 
markets. The following paragraphs will briefly discuss these economic, technological 
and political counter arguments in order to shed light on the ways in which both SGCC 
and its opponents attempted to establish a dominant position in political debate. 
 
4.5.1 Political/structural counter-arguments against UHV 
Responding to the centralised outlook on industry management, the planned 
synchronisation of regional grids and the strengthened integration across all grid levels 
inherent to SGCC’s 1U4L plan, a number of industry experts proclaimed that SGCC’s 
main goal was to weaken the foundation of the original marketisation plan contained in 
the No. 5 Document. One of the first figures in public discourse to emphasise this 
point was Yang Mingzhou (杨 名 ⾈ ), an official at the State Electricity Regulatory 
Commission. Yang warned that the application of UHV technology as envisaged by 
SGCC violated the spirit of the No. 5 Document and posed an imminent threat to the 
structure of China’s regional grid networks. While regional market building pilot 
projects had strongly encouraged electricity transfers between the different provinces 
within regional grids, he argued, SGCC from the outset focused mainly on increasing 
power transfers among regional grids themselves so as to increase their mutual reliance 
on each other instead of fostering their autonomy, UHV being the pinnacle of this 
endeavour. Yang predicted that if UHV – synchronous UHV-AC in particular – were 
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granted approval and a nationwide unified grid was to come into existence, the 
development of independent regional grids as the foundation for the emergence of 
regionalised retail competition as envisioned by the No. 5 Document would be 
permanently blocked, both structurally and technologically. 363  A UHV-AC grid, he 
maintained, would add a “technological protective layer” to SGCC’s grid monopoly, 
largely shifting the task of power transmission to the UHV system while essentially 
altering the purpose of regional grids from transmission among provinces to a form of 
intermediary distribution. As such, Yang argued, constructing a UHV-AC 
superstructure would not only make regional market building impossible but also add an 
additional layer of complexity to the idea of separating the grid company’s transmission 
and distribution assets, which had been another prominent item on the agenda of the 
No. 5 Document and an equally threatening prospect for SGCC (see Chapter 3).364 
UHV would therefore strengthen both SGCC’s role as a centralised grid operator across 
grid regions and its “dual monopoly” in purchasing and selling electricity.365 
SGCC responded to this interpretation of its agenda by stating that UHV construction 
was simply a matter of much-needed investment in grid infrastructure and had nothing 
to do with broader electricity reforms.366 Liu Xinfang (刘⼼放) of SGCC’s External 
Affairs Division even suggested that by connecting regional grids UHV would actually 
promote the development of regional markets, although he failed to explain how.367 
SGCC employees expressed in interviews that UHV development would weaken 
regional grid independence but, they argued, the increased interconnectivity ultimately 
offered greater reliability of supply for those regions.368  
Unconvinced by SGCC’s standpoint, critics insisted throughout the debate that the grid 
company’s goal was to cause regional grid companies to collapse and thus secure a 
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highly concentrated grid management system which would be very difficult to challenge 
again in the future. Industry experts claimed that “the driving force behind the push to 
unify China’s grid system is not the market, but SGC[C], which appears to be moving to 
strengthen its distribution monopoly.”369 Meng Dingzhong (蒙定中), a senior engineer at 
the former Ministry of Electric Power, concluded that SGCC’s pursuit of UHV-AC 
development was part of the grid company’s more general plan to exert control over the 
electric power system and to expand the boundaries of its business. Providing an 
interpretation of the structural rationale behind UHV, Meng explained that “if the grid 
is operated regionally in the future, there would be no reason for State Grid to exist. 
[But] if they connect the whole country and State Grid manages the national grid, then 
State Grid will always exist. This is a monopoly. It’s not about technology, and it’s not 
about science.”370  
 
4.5.2 Grid security-related counter-arguments 
A second criticism made by non-SGCC-affiliated industry experts concerned the issue 
of grid security under a UHV transmission system. A central figure in expert opposition 
on these grounds was Meng Dingzhong, the aforementioned senior engineer in the 
former Ministry of Electric Power and a member of the International Committee on 
Large Electric Systems (CIGRE) who is considered a leading authority on electricity 
transmission systems. Contrary to SGCC’s position that only a nationally unified grid 
would allow for a secure operation of China’s electricity supply, Meng argued that a 
UHV-AC based synchronisation of the Central, East and North China regional grids 
was an unnecessary – and even dangerous – intervention in China’s grid structure, as it 
created the risk that an accident in one regional grid could cause frequency or voltage 
problems that would immediately spread to all the others which, in the case of SGCC’s 
proposed pyramid-like ‘Three China’ grid structure, would involve most of the 
country’s centres of power demand. Meng pointed out that the most devastating 
blackouts across the world in the past decades had almost exclusively occurred in large 
and regionally interconnected AC-network structures and that China had not witnessed 
a single such incident in the past thirty years precisely because of its multi-layered and 
decentralised structure of distinct regional grids. Based on this rationale, Meng 
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advocated strengthening the existing grid structure by utilising regular high-voltage DC 
lines for both long-distance transmission and asynchronous interconnections between 
otherwise autonomous regional grids, as electricity flows between grids were much 
easier to control in this way.371 
SGCC’s CEO Liu Zhenya tended to respond to grid security-related doubts with 
further alarmism and by pointing towards underinvestment in China’s “weak” grid 
structure.372 A slightly different perspective, however, was given by an engineer from 
one of SGCC’s research institutes who did not see China’s grid structure at high risk of 
widespread blackouts, but rather emphasised the necessity of utilising UHV technology 
in order to enhance future grid security.  
Most people think in terms of  real-time security, but in 2020 there 
will be huge demand for long-distance power transfers and the 
current grid will not be able to support this. UHV is a strategic choice 
in the light of  future demand. The price for this is short-term 
insecurity. Currently the network is very secure and there are no big 
power outages, but if  you want to build a UHV system [to meet 
future demand], it is inevitable that you will have to disturb the 
current structure and to temporarily introduce higher risk. It is a 
choice that needs to be made: do we want long-term security through 
UHV in spite of  temporary insecurity, or do we want no temporary 
disturbances but long-term risks?373 
 
4.5.3 Economic counter-arguments 
From an economic perspective, critics of SGCC’s UHV agenda called into question the 
grid company’s assertion that employing UHV transmission technology was a more 
efficient and less costly mode of energy transportation compared to further developing 
China’s existing 500kV high-voltage grid structure and/or expanding long-distance 
transport of thermal coal. Contrary to SGCC’s claims, industry experts and former 
officials argued that 1000kV UHV-AC transmission was, in fact, much less economical 
than conventional transmission systems. 374  SERC’s Yang Mingzhou, for instance, 
pointed out in his 2005 petition to the State Council that in 2004 only about 5% of 
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nationally generated electricity was actually transferred across regional boundaries. 
Although the existing 500kV grids were in need of further investment he considered the 
conventional technology capable of sustaining the expected increases in regional 
transfers while referring to UHV infrastructure with its much higher investment 
necessities – which were to be funded to a large extent via state bank loans375 – as a 
huge waste of state funds.376 The critics furthermore warned that higher transmission 
costs under UHV in conjunction with SGCC’s “dual monopoly” in transmission and 
distribution would lead to a substantial increase in retail prices that would be very 
difficult to monitor and regulate.377  
Regarding the question of resource allocation methods, it was argued that an expansion 
of China’s railway system and of the existing 500kV grid would fully suffice to meet the 
demands in load centres located in southern and eastern provinces.378 Meng Dingzhong, 
a former official in the Ministry of Electric Power, and Wu Jingrui, former head of the 
planning department in the Ministry of Water Resources and former vice president of 
the Chinese State Energy Investment Corporation, both asserted that long-distance 
electricity transmission via UHV might end up costing three times as much as further 
developing the conventional rail-based system of transporting coal to power plants 
located near urban hubs.379 Finally, critics argued that international comparison also 
spoke against progressing with UHV technology. While China was the first country to 
consider UHV-AC transmission for commercial operation, during the second half of 
the 20th century other countries such as the former Soviet Union, Japan, Italy and the 
United States had already experimented with and subsequently abandoned the 
technology in favour of regular long-distance high-voltage DC transmission due to cost 
and safety considerations.380  
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4.5.4 Environmental counter-arguments 
While SGCC representatives tended to emphasise the potential environmental 
advantages of UHV technology with regard to efficiency gains, grid access for clean 
energy and general pollution control, industry experts voiced their doubts about some 
of the grid company’s assertions. Zeng Dewen (曾德⽂), a retired deputy director of the 
Electric Power Planning and Engineering Institute, asserted that the ‘1 Ultra, 4 Large’ 
strategy was predominantly aimed at realising the ‘1 Ultra’ in form of an interconnected 
UHV grid, and that the “unscientific and unsafe” idea of creating large energy bases was 
mainly used as an excuse to achieve just that.381 The different energy bases, he argued, 
contributed very little to solving environmental challenges and actually even intensified 
some of them. SGCC’s plan, for instance, to concentrate thermal power generation 
along the periphery would not solve China’s air pollution problem as it would only 
export the issue to the north-west of the country, meaning that the measure was not in 
accordance with the state’s policies on emissions reductions. Other critics, such as Chen 
Wangxiang (陈望祥), a former consultant to the Electricity System Reform Working 
Group, pointed to the problem that thermal power generation required tremendous 
amounts of water and China’s north-west was already suffering from drought and 
desertification.382 UHV development, he predicted, would cause further drought and 
environmental dismay in those regions.383  
Similarly, SGCC’s plans to construct large hydropower, nuclear and renewable energy 
bases were heavily criticised. Ding Gongyang, former head of the planning division at 
the Electric Power Planning & Engineering Institute (EPPEI), one of China’s most 
important assessment institutions of grid construction, stated that hydropower 
resources in the south-west were, in fact, limited and connecting those provinces to a 
‘Three China’ UHV-AC grid would lead to severe electricity shortages in the region.384 
Zeng Dewen further criticised SGCC’s focus on developing “priority areas for nuclear 
construction along the coast, while cautiously studying the prospects of inland nuclear 
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construction”, as he argued that if SGCC shifted its priority towards developing nuclear 
projects inland there would be much less need for inter-regional electricity transmission 
in the first place. Finally, with regard to SGCC’s claims that UHV was necessary to 
connect large renewable energy bases with distant load centres, Zeng pointed out that in 
most countries renewable energy was developed in a very distributed manner and that 
the generated electricity was consumed on the spot, which was much more economical, 
reliable and environmentally friendly than transmitting it over long distances.385 
 
4.5.5 Summary 
To demonstrate the contentious nature of SGCC’s ‘1U4L’ grid development plan, this 
section introduced the main counter-arguments expressed by a number of prominent 
industry experts and former government officials. According to these debate 
participants, UHV development had a number of significant drawbacks, especially 
regarding its economic feasibility, effect on grid stability and security, and 
environmental impact. The most heavily criticised issue, however, was that the 1U4L 
plan was built on the premise of deepening sectoral re-integration, both horizontally 
across grid regions and vertically across the different layers of grid infrastructure which, 
according to these experts, would not only undermine the State Council’s market 
building attempts but would also reinforce SGCC’s grip over industry workings. 
As will be discussed in the following section, these experts’ voices remained almost 
unheard during the early stages of UHV development, as they lacked formal 
participation in official policy debates and SGCC did everything in its power to keep 
their views out of official documentation. 
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4.6 SGCC’s silencing of criticism in official political 
consultations over UHV pilot projects 
Although the critical industry experts and retired officials were very vocal in their 
disapproval of SGCC’s 1U4L plan, they were not part of policy-making circles and were 
therefore confined to expressing their opinions through articles or petitions to 
government leaders. In late May 2005, Jiang Zhaozu (蒋兆祖), formerly a department 
head at the NDRC’s predecessor, the State Development Planning Commission, as well 
as a recent advisor to SGCC on UHV matters, wrote a report critical of both the 
technology and SGCC’s construction plans which he addressed to Prime Minister Wen 
Jiabao, requesting a meeting between grid technology experts and the government in 
order to “let the leaders understand the true situation”. His report argued that SGCC’s 
UHV plan had no foundation in China’s energy and electricity planning documents, had 
not undergone the legally required rigorous assessment by intermediary consulting 
institutions and that therefore no basis existed for an impartial government decision 
regarding the construction of the pilot projects which the grid company was pushing 
for.386  
In response to Jiang’s petition, the prime minister asked the NDRC to organise a 
discussion forum, which was held in June 2005 in the coastal town of Beidaihe. While 
the forum mainly consisted of SGCC presentations of its own positive evidence 
regarding UHV-AC’s feasibility,387 it also gave participants the opportunity to voice their 
opinions of the planned construction of a UHV-AC pilot project which was to connect 
the North and Central China regional grids. According to Jiang, there was a clear 
division of opinions between SGCC-affiliated supporters who fully endorsed the grid 
company’s arguments, a moderate group (members remained unspecified) who 
supported the construction of a pilot project on a much smaller scale to control 
expenses, and opponents, including the group of critical former officials and industry 
experts, who argued that building a UHV-AC network was wildly uneconomical and 
involved severe security threats.388 
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During and after the forum, SGCC made several attempts to silence any criticism of its 
UHV agenda. One speaker, grid technology expert Meng Dingzhong, reported in a 
news interview that he had been approached by one of SGCC’s vice general managers 
who had offered him a consultancy position at SGCC declaring that “the most urgent 
issue for us to solve at the moment is the nationwide UHV-AC network; it would be 
best if you supported this cause and no longer opposed it.” Meng stated that he rejected 
the offer and continued to deliver his planned critical speech which, he claimed, led to 
his repeated exclusion from later symposia due to SGCC’s intervention. Other opposing 
voices also found themselves gradually marginalised and pushed out of conferences and 
meetings related to UHV feasibility demonstrations.389 
The grid company’s attempts to silence critics also included interference with the 
discussion forum’s follow-up reports. The minutes in which the differences of opinion 
among participants were documented never reached their intended recipients at the 
State Council, and a feasibility report that SGCC submitted to the NDRC in September 
2005 as a basis for approval considerations regarding the UHV-AC pilot project only 
listed fully supportive opinions while excluding all others. 390  Emphasising the 
consistency with which SGCC tried to block the dissemination of critical information, 
Jiang Zhaozu described how he personally, with the support of Prime Minister Wen 
Jiabao, had held seminars on questions surrounding UHV-AC technology and how the 
subsequent reports to the central government were also either obstructed or altered by 
SGCC. Jiang furthermore asserted that the grid company had banned all critical debate 
on the UHV plan within its own company realm while pressuring industry publications 
(such as the China Power News Network (中国电⼒新闻⺴) which had a long pre-reform 
affiliation with SGCC’s organisational predecessor) to report in a supportive fashion.391 
The different episodes surrounding the 2005 Beidaihe forum showed that SGCC did 
everything within its power to prevent critical opinions and information from being 
recorded in official documentation and considered during approval procedures. This 
further demonstrates that SGCC itself was the main driver of the 1U4L agenda and that 
it was intent on swiftly gaining construction approvals, irrespective of increasingly 
critical opinions among external industry experts and former government officials with 
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a background in electricity sector administration and irrespective of warnings regarding 
the systemic risk to China’s electricity supply system associated with the restructuring 
plan. 
 
 
4.7 Chapter conclusions 
This chapter discussed the emergence in the mid-2000s of a grand restructuring plan for 
China’s electricity industry as suggested by the State Grid Corporation in response to 
the State Council’s marketisation and unbundling agenda. Referred to as the ‘1 Ultra, 4 
Large’ (1U4L) strategy, SGCC’s reform plan aimed for the construction of a nation-
wide ultra-high voltage (UHV) transmission grid, an infrastructural mega-project that 
was to alter the functional logic of China’s electricity supply by connecting large regional 
power generation hubs with load centres across the country and synchronising large 
parts of the country’s grid structure. 
The pursuit of the 1U4L agenda marked a distinct change in SGCC’s political strategy, 
which initially had been almost entirely based on defensive measures against the 
implementation of unbundling requirements listed in the No. 5 Document. Beginning 
in the mid-2000s, the grid company’s political strategy became more forward-looking as 
it attempted to shift the immediate focus of sectoral reform debates away from the 
politically charged topic of monopoly break-up while pulling the larger outcome-related 
issues which had also driven the introduction of the No. 5 Document back into the 
centre of attention, i.e. supporting the growth and development of the power sector, 
increasing supply security and reliability while satisfying growing power demand and 
enhancing the efficiency of resource allocation while lowering economic and 
environmental costs, among others.392  However, whereas the No. 5 Document had 
aimed to resolve these sectoral challenges in a more indirect fashion by relying on 
monopoly break-up and the introduction of market mechanisms, SGCC’s own plan 
claimed to offer immediately applicable technological solutions to many of the same issues. 
At the same time, all alleged outcome-related advantages of this restructuring plan were 
tied to increases in industry integration and centralisation. Without challenging the 
No. 5 Document directly, SGCC implicitly demoted the unbundling of industry 
                                                
392 No. 5 Document (2002), Part 2, §4. 
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segments and reliance on market competition to the status of one potential route 
among many, while making it pale in comparison with the spectacular sounding 
potential outcomes presented in the 1U4L plan.  
The argumentative ‘synchronisation’ 393  with the goals underlying the State Council’s 
No. 5 Document, i.e. the appeasement of government by emphasising overlap between 
its own policy suggestions and cherry-picked aspects of already existing policy, allowed 
SGCC to publish a sufficiently legitimate alternative reform plan that suggested a vastly 
different route towards those goals while further obstructing change that it viewed as 
unfavourable to its industry position. Unlike the constant head-on collisions over policy 
implementation witnessed in Part A, which in a ‘defensive’ way were very successful but 
failed to change the existing policy setting, argumentatively matching – i.e. 
‘synchronising’ – the portrayal of pursued sectoral development plans with more 
abstract policy objectives pursued by central government allowed SGCC to engage with 
the contents of existing sectoral policy while trying to push the overall sectoral reform 
trajectory in a direction that corresponded more closely with its own policy preferences. 
As SGCC ‘synchronised’ with central government by depicting its UHV-based reform 
plan as a catch-all solution to numerous national and sectoral policy challenges 
previously outlined by the State Council, a small number of retired officials and industry 
experts began to highlight economic and grid security risks, as well as the systemic 
threat to regional market building inherent in SGCC’s reform plan. These experts tried 
to draw central government’s attention to these matters, but due to their limited access 
to policy-making circles it was difficult for them to feed their critical opinions into the 
policy sphere. There is also evidence that SGCC tried to silence its critics and that it 
obstructed their participation in policy-relevant discussion forums, which further reveals 
the nature of SGCC’s role as the foremost advocate of this restructuring plan. In the 
light of growing criticism at industry level, SGCC continued to push for the 
construction of UHV pilot projects while trying to organise broader government 
support for its sectoral reform plan. As the following chapter will argue, the grid 
company primarily did so by once more relying on a ‘synchronisation’ approach during 
which it presented its sectoral restructuring plan as a corporate contribution to the State 
Council’s cross-sectoral policy in the field of science and technology, more specifically 
                                                
393 This argumentative ‘synchronisation’ stands in no relation to the technical synchronisation, i.e. 
synchronous interconnection, between regional grids pursued by SGCC as part of the ‘1U4L’ plan. 
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to its calls for independent R&D efforts, ‘indigenous innovation’, and enhanced 
international competitiveness among domestic industrial firms. 
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5 ‘Synchronisation’ over cross-sectoral R&D policy 
and early progress in UHV development  
Building on the previous chapter which gave an overview of SGCC’s ‘1 Ultra, 4 Large’ 
(1U4L) development agenda and analysed the logic underlying its introduction into the 
policy arena, this chapter will trace the first series of attempts by the grid company to 
practically apply this agenda in the electricity supply industry. In line with the 
conclusions of the previous chapter, it will argue that SGCC gained government 
approval for UHV pilot projects and several other development steps primarily through 
the application of ‘synchronisation’ tactics, in this case by presenting its technology-
based sectoral restructuring plan as a contribution to the implementation of new cross-
sectoral policies through which the State Council aimed to strengthen the innovative 
capacity and international competitiveness of Chinese industry.  
The first part of this chapter will examine the political proceedings surrounding these 
UHV construction pilot projects. It will contend that the State Council’s approval for 
these projects primarily resulted from government’s agreement to support the grid 
company in its research and development (R&D) endeavours based on cross-sectoral 
policy guidelines, while the ultimate impact of the 1U4L agenda on the existing sectoral 
policy framework appeared to have been left largely unconsidered. The ensuing debates 
between the grid company and industry experts regarding the interpretation of the semi-
successful pilot project outcomes will then be examined, showing the grid company’s 
attempts to further downplay the growing criticism and minimise its appearance in 
official deliberations while driving all attention towards the ‘synchrony’ between UHV 
development and select cross-sectoral policy. 
The second part of this chapter will demonstrate how SGCC, using the same 
‘synchronisation’ approach, gained government backing for a number of further crucial 
UHV development steps. Additional emphasis will be placed on SGCC’s successful 
attempts to gain approval for an expansion of its nominally illicit involvement in the 
grid equipment manufacturing segment (partially discussed in Chapter 3), which allowed 
the grid company to a) position itself as the main financial beneficiary of any further 
UHV construction and b) utilise the resulting high localisation rates in grid equipment 
manufacturing as argumentative leverage for its claims that it was, indeed, furthering 
indigenous innovation and the competitiveness of Chinese industry. Finally, SGCC’s 
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‘synchronisation’-based endeavours to place itself in charge of national-level 
standardisation bodies and gain official backing for its emerging UHV-based 
internationalisation strategy will be analysed.  
Overall, this chapter provides further insight into how and under which conditions the 
grid company was able to promote its goal of creating an integrated industry structure 
which would allow it to permanently combine its cross-regional monopoly over the 
different downstream segments with sustained market dominance in adjacent 
competitive and financially lucrative industry segments. 
 
 
5.1 Government approval of the first UHV ‘test 
demonstration’ lines 
In the aftermath of the 2005 UHV forum in Beidaihe and SGCC’s successful attempt to 
eliminate critical opinions from official deliberations, the grid company presented a 
further feasibility study pertaining to the construction of UHV pilot projects to the 
NDRC, which then passed on the material to the State Council for further 
consideration. After both Vice-Prime Minister Zeng Peiyan and Prime Minister Wen 
Jiabao had given their consent in April 2006, NDRC Vice-Director Zhang Guobao 
requested the NDRC Energy Bureau to issue the formal approval document for a 
UHV-AC ‘test demonstration’ project,394 which was published by the NDRC in early 
August 2006.395 Construction works began immediately and were completed in January 
2009, when the Jindongnan-Nanyang-Jingmen (晋东南 - 南阳 - 荆⻔) UHV-AC pilot 
project connecting the North China Grid with the Central China Grid entered 
commercial operation.396 In a similarly swift fashion, the NDRC authorised the first two 
UHV-DC ‘test demonstration’ projects for the transmission of hydropower from the 
south-western province of Sichuan into the East China Grid, namely between 
                                                
394 “Record of major events surrounding UHV (2004-2007)” (特高压大事记盘点 (2004年-2007年)), North 
Star Electric Power News Network (北极星电力新闻网), 26.02.2009. 
395 National Development and Reform Commission Energy Bureau, “Official reply regarding the 
approval of the Jindongnan-Jingmen UHV-AC test demonstration construction project” (关于晋东南至荆
门特高压交流试验示范工程项目核准的批复), Document No. 1585 [2006]; “China to launch experimental 
project of UHV grids,” Xinhua News Agency, 19.06.2006; “Two more UHV Power Transmission Lines 
to Be Built,” SinoCast China Business News, 04.08.2006. 
396 “China lays foundation for first experimental project of UHV grids,” Xinhua News Agency China 
Economic Information Service, 21.08.2006; “China moves ahead with economical ultra-high voltage 
transmission lines,” Xinhua News Agency, China Economic Information Service, 09.02.2009. 
  136 
Xiangjiaba and Shanghai (四川向家坝 - 上海 UHV-DC; approved in April 2007, operated 
since July 2010),397 and between Jinping and southern Jiangsu Province (Jinping-Sunan 
四川锦屏 - 江苏苏南 UHV-DC; approved in November 2008, operated since 2012) (see 
Figure 5.1).398 
 
 
Figure 5.1 The UHV-AC and UHV-DC ‘test demonstration’ lines 
Source: Author’s visualisation of material presented in this section. 
 
The general setting in which these approvals took place was rather contradictory given 
that the State Council in April 2007 had almost simultaneously published a 
comprehensive reaffirmation of the No. 5 Document’s regional competitive market-
building agenda which SGCC’s restructuring plans stood in stark contrast to (as 
discussed in Chapter 3). 399  Considering the available evidence, the pilot project 
approvals are arguably best explained by the authorities’ limited consideration and 
understanding of the centralising and integrating function of UHV infrastructure, the 
                                                
397 “China to Build 800KV Power Transmission Project,” SinoCast China Business News, 21.12.2007; 
“Record of major events surrounding UHV (2004-2007)” (特高压大事记盘点 (2004年-2007年)), North Star 
Electric Power News Network (北极星电力新闻网), 26.02.2009; “China starts running 3rd ultra-high-
voltage power line,” Reuters, 09.07.2010. 
398 “China moves ahead with economical ultra-high voltage transmission lines,” Xinhua News Agency, 
China Economic Information Service, 09.02.2009; “State Grid plans UHV power lines,” China Daily, 
19.01.2009. 
399 Electricity System Reform Working Group (电力体制改革工作小组), “Opinions on carrying out a 
deepening of electricity system reforms during the 11th Five-Year Plan period” (关于“十一五”深化电力体制
改革的实施意见), State Council General Office Document No. 19 [2007], 06.04.2007. 
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pressure to reach a compromise in the light of SGCC’s strong ambitions and, most 
importantly, the generally supportive attitude towards R&D endeavours pursued by 
central SOEs.  
 
Lack of information among government leaders and SGCC’s partial independence in grid planning 
In hindsight, government sources have expressed with certainty that the 1U4L plan was 
SGCC’s direct response to the risks inherent in the No. 5 Document of it being 
dissolved into regional entities and becoming politically and economically insignificant. 
An official from the state asset regulator SASAC stated during a 2013 interview that 
“[b]uilding UHV was originally proposed by SGCC as they did not want to be broken 
up along regional lines”.400 An NEA official furthermore specified that “a core reason 
behind SGCC’s push for UHV technology was to counter grid regionalisation. In 2002 
they lost huge assets to the China Southern Grid Corporation [see Chapter 3] and they 
did not want something like this to happen again. This is one of SGCC’s strategies to 
increase their size and strength”. 401  During the early stages of UHV development, 
however, SGCC was essentially the sole supplier to government of UHV-related 
information and largely succeeded in keeping critical opinions out of official 
deliberations. The few non-SGCC-affiliated specialists who made it into the state media 
– and who insisted that UHV development presented a substantial challenge to 
regionalised marketisation reforms – were mainly retired industry experts and former 
government officials whose actual influence on decision-making at the time must be 
viewed as minimal at best. Asked about the policy impact of these retired officials, an 
employee from within the SGCC system stated that they were “only experts” and that 
their impact on policy was very small. 402  Similarly, the NEA official quoted above 
explained that “these experts do not have the same administrative rank as SGCC, so 
there is not much dialogue. It would have been very difficult for the opinions of these 
old experts to influence the decision-making process.” 403  Consequently, it is 
questionable how well-informed decision-makers within the NDRC and the State 
Council actually were when they signed off early stage R&D work and the first UHV 
                                                
400 Interview with an official at the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, 
Beijing, 22.07.2013. 
401 Interview with an official at the National Energy Administration, Beijing, 25.07.2013. 
402 Interview with an employee from the Enterprise Strategy Research Institute, State Grid Energy 
Research Institute, Beijing, 11.07.2014. 
403 Interview with an official at the National Energy Administration, Beijing, 11.07.2014. 
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pilot projects, and whether they were fully aware of the structural consequences that 
widely applied UHV technology would have on both the logic of electricity supply and 
the regional competitive market building plans of the No. 5 Document. This 
interpretation is supported by a statement by Chen Wangxiang, a former consultant to 
the Electricity System Reform Working Group and a participant in the NDRC’s 
approval deliberations, who reported that the NDRC meetings did not establish 
anything substantial about the advantages or disadvantages of UHV projects; they were 
“just 20 to 30 people giving their opinions”.404  
In addition, central government at the time may have struggled to fully control SGCC’s 
ambitions in the realm of grid planning. In 2009, an official from the electricity 
regulator SERC indicated that SGCC had been vigorously developing its UHV plans 
and that it was impossible for the regulator to counter its intentions of consolidating its 
monopolistic position.405 The deputy director of the NDRC’s Energy Research Institute, 
Li Junfeng (李俊峰), furthermore asserted that “SGC[C] handles most investment and 
planning, and it may be difficult for state level planners to get involved in the short 
term”.406 This was particularly the case as the grid company’s investment plans were 
viewed very favourably by large state-owned banks such as the Bank of China who were 
“very happy to give loans to SGCC” which they perceived as very low risk.407 Similarly, 
an NEA official maintained in an interview that “UHV was SGCC’s idea. They had the 
money, so they could simply start developing these projects. Governmental permission 
was secondary.”408 And indeed, while the early ‘test demonstration’ projects all received 
government approval, none of them had been listed in the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-
2010) or gone through the full evaluation procedure that was formally required for 
projects of their size, despite the fact that the predicted investments made UHV 
development as such the most expensive project in the history of China’s electricity 
industry.409 
                                                
404 “Electric power expert petitions State Council - opposes SGCC’s UHV construction” (电力专家上书国
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While these perspectives do not fully illuminate the exact series of events that led to the 
approvals of UHV pilot projects, they do give an indication of the general setting in 
which they took place and suggest that limited information among government coupled 
with SGCC’s strong role in overall grid investment planning may have played 
contributing roles. 
 
Government support for SGCC’s R&D endeavours 
Without necessarily supporting SGCC’s UHV agenda in its full-scale application and 
probably not fully aware of its potential consequences for the functional logic of 
electricity supply, central government did hold a favourable stance on ‘indigenous 
innovation’, especially when carried out by central-level SOEs. In a speech given in 
2006, the state president and CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao emphasised that core 
technologies in industries that touched upon the lifelines of the national economy and 
the security of the state could not be purchased and needed to be developed by relying 
on autonomous innovation, calling upon Chinese industry to participate in R&D 
endeavours in order to increase independent innovative capacity.410 Shortly after, the 
state asset regulator SASAC also ordered central SOEs to devise indigenous innovation 
strategies.411  
SGCC’s CEO Liu Zhenya immediately responded to Hu Jintao’s and SASAC’s 
instructions by arguing in a speech that UHV technology strongly increased the 
innovative capacity of the electricity sector and the development of China’s grid 
equipment manufacturing industry. He furthermore claimed that constructing a UHV-
AC grid was creating huge market demand for UHV-AC and UHV-DC equipment that 
was bringing new development space to the equipment manufacturing sector and 
substantial opportunities for Chinese manufacturers to grow in an otherwise highly 
competitive market.412 Similarly, Liu insisted that the development of UHV grids since 
2005 had been “a concrete manifestation of the power sector carrying out the Scientific 
Outlook on Development [...] under the strong support of the National Development 
                                                                                                                                     
习时报), 20.12.2005; “‘Electric power activist’ bombards SGCC’s monopoly” (“电力斗士”炮轰国家电网垄断
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411 James McGregor, “China’s Drive for ‘Indigenous Innovation’. A Web of Industrial Policies,” U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, Global Regulatory Cooperation Project (2011), p. 17-18. 
412 “Liu Zhenya: UHV transmission is the only way for China’s electricity development” (刘振亚：特高压输
电是中国电力发展的必由之路), People’s Daily Online (人民网), 28.11.2006. 
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and Reform Commission, the National Energy Administration and the Ministry of 
Science and Technology”.413 As such, Liu portrayed UHV as the perfect match for 
central government’s desires regarding indigenous innovation led by central SOEs, and 
he invoked political slogans such as the ‘Scientific Outlook on Development’ – the 
vague catchphrase used by the Hu-Wen administration as the headline for its approach 
to economic development – in order to gain the support of political leaders. This 
argumentative approach omitted all references to the actual sectoral meaning of the 
1U4L agenda or its countervailing impact on regionalised market building and instead 
focused solely on pitching the technology itself to the political leadership by 
emphasising its alleged market potential and presenting it as evidence of SGCC’s dutiful 
obedience to government’s calls for enhanced R&D endeavours.  
And indeed, all obtainable early stage pro-UHV statements by government officials, 
such as those by Vice-Prime Ministers Huang Ju and Zeng Peiyan who were cited 
earlier, were based entirely on the notion that UHV as a technology deserved government 
support. 414  Not a single one of these statements went beyond purely technological 
considerations, indicating whether or to what extent UHV should actually be utilised in 
China’s grid structure or showing that system-relevant questions associated with UHV 
technology had even been considered. When asked about the reasons underlying 
government approvals of the ‘test demonstration’ projects, even an employee of the 
SGCC-affiliated SGERI Enterprise Strategy Research Institute answered that they were 
first and foremost linked to the government’s inclination to support technological 
innovation. 415  The available sources therefore suggest that government support for 
UHV pilot projects was primarily based on the notion of granting support for R&D 
attempts by a large central SOE following broader ‘indigenous innovation’ 
considerations, a line of reasoning which SGCC itself had supplied during its calls for 
approval. At the same time, there was no evidence that the questions of whether and to 
what degree functional UHV grids should actually be constructed and utilised in China 
or how such infrastructural developments would relate to existing regional market 
building policy had featured in official policy discourse around this time. 
                                                
413 Liu, 2013, p. 171. 
414 “Record of major events surrounding UHV (2004-2007)” (特高压大事记盘点(2004年-2007年)), North 
Star Electric Power News Network (北极星电力新闻网), 26.02.2009. 
415 Interview with an employee from the Enterprise Strategy Research Institute, State Grid Energy 
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5.2 Disputes over the interpretation of pilot project 
outcomes 
Once the Jindongnan-Nanyang-Jingmen UHV-AC ‘test demonstration’ project 
connecting Shanxi and Hubei Provinces via Henan Province had entered operation in 
early 2009, the dispute between SGCC and external industry experts intensified as a 
struggle ensued over how to interpret the outcome of the pilot project. SGCC claimed 
that the project was an “all-round success” while industry experts concluded that the 
test results were highly unfavourable and called into question the technical and 
economic feasibility of the UHV agenda.416 
The first issue that emerged concerned regional electricity transfers. While SGCC had 
constructed the pilot project to demonstrate its ability to better transmit coal power 
from Shanxi Province in the North China Grid to Hubei Province in the Central China 
Grid, it soon became clear that the area surrounding the coal power base in Shanxi was 
itself in need of additional supply. Zhang Yuying, a former deputy chief engineer at the 
Central China Electricity Management Bureau stated in 2011 that the Shanxi region 
“technically lacks excess capacity to send south” so that in winter “power from central 
China is carried north to alleviate the shortage [in Shanxi]”. As an ironic result of this 
reversed interchange, central China itself periodically suffered from undersupply.417 A 
similar problem existed in the province of Inner Mongolia which had been earmarked 
by SGCC as a core electricity exporter but which witnessed such steep increases in local 
demand that it became difficult to envision how it should act as a major exporter within 
the 1U4L system.418  
A second question that became increasingly pressing concerned the cost structure of 
UHV-AC.419 Comparing the UHV-AC pilot project with the conventional high-voltage 
DC transmission line connecting the Three Gorges Dam hydropower plant and the 
Guangdong provincial grid in southern China, observers pointed out that the 
conventional line was not only 44% longer, but that its total transmission capacity was 
also 50% higher and that on average it transmitted 80% more electricity. 420 
                                                
416 “Many old experts oppose the “Three China Interconnected Grid” UHV-AC plan” (多位老专家反对交
流特高压“三华联网”规划), Century Weekly (新世纪), 25.04.2011. 
417 “Jolts, Volts and High Wire Acts,” Caixin, 27.04.2011. 
418 Lantau Group, “UHV. Slow progress but momentum is building,” China Focus Newsletter (May 
2014), p. 6. 
419 “China moves ahead with economical ultra-high voltage transmission lines,” Xinhua News Agency, 
China Economic Information Service, 09.02.2009. 
420 “Jolts, Volts and High Wire Acts,” Caixin, 27.04.2011. 
  142 
Supplementing these claims, transmission technology expert Meng Dingzhong 
calculated that the construction costs for one 1000kV UHV-AC line of RMB15 
million/km were more than twice as high as the RMB7 million/km required for 
constructing two 500kV lines with the same overall transmission capacity and 
comparable corridor width. Unlike conventional DC lines, UHV-AC lines furthermore 
required transformer substations every 250 to 300km, each adding about RMB2-3 
billion to total construction costs. Based on these calculations, Meng concluded that 
UHV-AC was economically far inferior to conventional transmission systems.421 
A third contentious issue was that the pilot project’s maximum transmission capacity of 
2.8 million kW fell significantly short of the 4-5 million kW advertised by SGCC.422 
Wang Zhonghong, a professor of electrical engineering at Tsinghua University, utilised 
these technical issues to criticise the “impracticality of SGCC’s goal to unify control of 
power grids in northern and central China by using UHV”.423 In early 2011, SGCC itself 
conceded that the pilot project generally only operated at 1-1.5 million kW while the 
vice-CEO of SGCC’s Shanxi Electric Power Company, Pan Xiubao (番秀宝 ), later 
confirmed in a news interview that its transmission capacity was not significantly higher 
than that of any regular 500kV line.424  
As critics became more vocal in the aftermath of the UHV-AC pilot project, SGCC 
once more did its best to cover up project-related difficulties and to keep critical voices 
out of official documentation. A telling example was reported by Zeng Dewen (曾德⽂), 
a retired deputy director of the Electric Power Planning and Engineering Institute who 
was part of an inspection team commissioned by the NDRC to examine the pilot 
project in mid-2009. Zeng explained how, much to the dismay of State Grid executives, 
inspectors “objectively reported some issues” which resulted in an almost year long 
delay until the inspection report could be finalised as no compromise was found 
between both sides over basic requirements set by the inspectors. Moreover, a follow-
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up meeting that was supposed to be held in order to reach a conclusion on the final 
report never took place, leading Zeng to conclude that “they just had us sign off”.425  
In order to publicise their concerns, Zeng and other observers resorted to giving media 
interviews and writing critical articles, although even this option was dwindling as 
SGCC pressured specialised industry publications such as China Electric Power News (中国
电⼒报) into no longer publishing dissenting opinions on UHV. Other newspapers such 
as the China Energy News (中国能源报) and the China Economic Herald (中国经济导报) 
reportedly were also pressured by the grid company, the latter in 2010 even being 
visited by one of SGCC’s vice general managers who tried to convince the editors not 
to publish critical articles.426 As not all news outlets followed SGCC’s campaign, critical 
opinions did reach the general public, but due to the experts’ insufficient administrative 
rank and the lack of a system through which relevant ‘outside’ information could be 
absorbed into policy processes, critical expert opinions did not have any noticeable 
effect on official decision-making, at least not at this stage of UHV development.427 
 
 
5.3 Localisation, standardisation and internationalisation of 
grid equipment manufacturing as vehicles for 
persuading government of the merits of UHV 
transmission 
While industry-level criticism of the questionable trial outcomes continued to rise, 
SGCC attempted to add political legitimacy to its 1U4L agenda and further enhance 
levels of support within central government by strengthening the argumentative 
linkages between UHV development and State Council macro-policies which 
encouraged advances in R&D and improvements in state firm competitiveness in 
domestic and international markets. At the core of SGCC’s emerging argumentative 
approach, it will be shown, lay the assertion that SGCC had become a driver of 
indigenous innovation in a technological field which would propel China’s development 
as a whole and boost its international competitiveness and reputation, if only the grid 
company’s broader restructuring plan received sufficient administrative support. The 
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main argumentative vehicles employed were promises to strengthen Chinese industry by 
offering high degrees of localisation in equipment manufacturing in conjunction with 
vows to build and sustain international technological dominance in the grid equipment 
field based on control over technical standards and the declared export potential of 
UHV technology. These pledges to government, it will be argued, were used as lures for 
increased political support, supplemented by the invocation of an ‘us vs. them’ narrative 
about China’s position in the international economy. 
 
5.3.1 The localisation of equipment manufacturing 
During and after the construction of the UHV-AC and UHV-DC pilot projects, SGCC 
consistently made a point of emphasising the very high levels of domestic content, 
which according to the grid company reached 90% and 70%, respectively. 428  Liu 
Zehong, senior director for UHV construction at SGCC disclosed that the grid 
company’s procurement intentionally prioritised domestic products and that core 
components used in both projects had been “independently developed, designed, and 
manufactured by Chinese companies” which had reached “the leading level around the 
world”.429 Presenting its localisation efforts, SGCC stated that more than one hundred 
domestic companies were partaking in the manufacture and supply of UHV 
equipment.430 Furthermore, even though Liu Zhenya insisted that open tenders were 
being held for the supply of equipment and materials,431 nearly all of the UHV-related 
contracts (worth several billion RMB) had been won by domestic SOEs, leading foreign 
competitors to complain about being shut out of the market432 and SGCC to proudly 
declare that it had broken “the long-term monopoly of multinational companies in the 
international market”.433 A similar perspective was given in an SGCC press release from 
2011 which proclaimed that “the construction of [a] Strong and Smart Grid has begun 
to change from ‘made in China’ to ‘led by China’ in terms of technological 
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innovation”.434 Commenting on SGCC’s research and development endeavours, Tang 
Guangfu, a director within SGCC’s division for smart grid research, concluded that 
“[n]ow equipment was not just made in China, but created by China. And the country is 
now leading in the industry instead of learning from other countries”.435 
The claim of purely indigenous innovation stood on shaky ground, however, as 
numerous sources have indicated that much of the high-voltage technology on which 
SGCC’s technology was based had been transferred from foreign firms such as 
Siemens, Toshiba and Mitsubishi via joint ventures during other power sector related 
projects such as the Three Gorges Dam,436 while several core components used in the 
pilot projects were fully foreign products. 437  Parts of the more recent UHV 
developments were also rooted in technology used in the Soviet Union and Japan 
during earlier UHV experiments, leading SGCC’s deputy chief engineer Wu Yusheng to 
rationalise SGCC’s claim, saying “Yes, the Russians and Japanese might have the 
technology. But the most advanced core technologies cannot be bought. [...] Besides, we 
have our own conditions and technological requirements that are different from others. 
Therefore, we must rely on our own efforts for independent innovation”.438 
 
‘Synchronisation’ with macro-policies on R&D and ‘indigenous innovation’ 
Irrespective of how high the ratio of truly indigenous innovation may have been, it 
appears certain that domestic companies found themselves in a strongly advantageous 
position during the sourcing for UHV projects and that its localisation efforts were 
utilised by SGCC as a way to convince central government of the high utility of 
supporting not only UHV-related R&D work, but also the eventual construction of a 
UHV grid under SGCC leadership.  
Firstly, in attempts to increase political legitimacy and administrative backing, SGCC 
portrayed its grid development plan in a way that closely corresponded to existing non-
sector-specific macro policies issued by the State Council. The policy invoked most 
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often was the ‘National Outline for Medium- and Long-Term Science and Technology 
Development (2006-2020)’, with which the State Council had aimed to initiate stronger 
efforts at ‘indigenous innovation’ (⾃主创新) to move China into a leading position in 
science-based industry by 2020, improve its status from being the ‘workbench of the 
world’ towards being a centre of technological innovation439, and ultimately give rise to 
the “great renaissance of the Chinese nation”.440 During the initial presentation of the 
‘National Outline’ Prime Minister Wen Jiabao was quoted as saying that “[w]e 
fundamentally have to rely on two main drivers, one, to persist in the promotion of 
opening and reform, and two, rely on the progress of science and technology and the 
strengths of innovation.”441 Liu Zhenya repeatedly referenced the ideas underlying the 
State Council’s science and technology development policy in his lines of argument and 
strongly played on the notion that the development and application of UHV and smart 
grid technology was SGCC’s contribution towards applying the ‘National Outline’ in the 
electricity industry. In an SGCC press release from 2011, in an attempt to garner 
legitimacy he even – falsely – claimed that developing a UHV grid had been “a major 
decision by China’s State Council”, adding that the “UHV AC demonstration project is 
State Grid’s implementation of this policy, as well as a project in carrying out the 
concept of scientific development, transforming the development mode of [the] power 
grid and serving the nation’s financial and social development.”442 
Secondly, connecting with existing sentiments of economic nationalism in the political 
and public spheres, SGCC portrayed its development of a UHV grid as part of a 
national struggle for world dominance in grid technology. In a poorly edited press 
release, Liu explained that the UHV pilot project was “a leading project to secure the 
frontier position in the World’s [sic] power grid technology, to serve the construction of 
an innovative-oriented [sic] country and to boost domestic production of power 
equipments [sic]”. SGCC, he promised, would push forward the construction of a UHV 
grid in order to make an “even greater contribution to China’s economical and social 
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growth under the support of the Party Central Committee and State Council.”443 With 
regard to the development of smart grid technology, which SGCC was also pursuing 
and which it had begun to argumentatively tie together with UHV development under 
the heading of a ‘Strong and Smart Grid’, Liu emphasised that this was an opportunity 
for China to catch up on an international level. Given that smart grid technology was 
still at an early stage internationally, China was “at the same starting line as the 
developed countries”. SGCC’s grid development agenda therefore posed “a good 
leapfrog opportunity to secure a commanding position in international grid 
technologies.”444 According to Liu, it was “imperative that China seizes this opportunity 
to accelerate its development”, improve its technological expertise and increase its 
global competitiveness in related industries. 445  In order to do so, he implied, all 
government needed to do was to follow SGCC’s blueprint for power sector 
restructuring. 
 
The beneficiaries of localised UHV and smart grid development  
The main beneficiaries of high localisation rates in UHV equipment manufacturing, it 
should be noted, were SGCC’s own subsidiary enterprises. As explained in Chapter 3, 
the State Council’s attempts to unbundle grid assets and operations from auxiliary 
businesses such as equipment manufacturing, grid construction and maintenance had 
largely failed as SGCC had managed to establish a dominant market position in these 
nominally competitive fields. As established, the main reason for SGCC’s sustained 
control over these industry segments was that the state-asset regulator SASAC and the 
NDRC’s Foreign Investment Department had allowed SGCC to acquire manufacturing 
companies that they deemed crucial to the grid company’s attempt at bringing UHV 
technology to a marketable level, both domestically and potentially also in foreign 
markets. Even though these investments grossly violated the No. 5 Document, SASAC 
authorised them following its intrinsic institutional mandate because of SGCC’s 
assurances that it would be a very profitable endeavour and a good addition to its asset 
portfolio.446  
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While UHV development had begun as the technological core of SGCC’s anti-
regionalisation and anti-unbundling strategy, it was now on the verge of also becoming 
a major source of revenue for the grid company. Every UHV line that was approved or 
that would be approved later translated into tremendous orders for SGCC’s subsidiary 
equipment manufacturers which held significant market shares for many of  the 
necessary components. The equipment manufacturing business must therefore be 
understood as the main avenue for SGCC to financially profit from UHV construction. 
The comparatively short Jindongnan-Nanyang-Jingmen UHV-AC pilot project, for 
instance, involved initial investment of  RMB 6 billion, 60% of  which (RMB 3.6 billion) 
was invested in equipment at a 90% localisation rate; this amounted to approximately 
RMB 3.2 billion in domestic equipment investment for a single UHV project, a large 
share of  which was paid to SGCC subsidiaries.447 Similar calculations are in order for 
the much longer UHV-DC pilot projects that had already been constructed, as well as 
for all UHV projects that SGCC was pushing for in the aftermath.  
Two companies that benefited in particular from these projects were Pinggao Electric, a 
leading producer of  UHV-AC components, and Xuji Electric, which specialised in 
UHV-DC equipment.448 Both companies had been SGCC’s main acquisition targets in 
the controversial 2009/2010 deal supported by SASAC and were eventually listed on the 
stock market. Taking as a starting point SGCC’s own forecast of  RMB 270 billion in 
UHV-AC investments for the period of  the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015), Pinggao 
Electric alone would have expected to receive RMB 2.5 billion of  annual orders given its 
market share of  about 40% for crucial UHV-AC components which constituted about 
12% of  the total UHV-AC investment sum. 449  Similar calculations applied to Xuji 
Electric, which shared most of  the UHV-DC equipment market with only one other 
serious competitor, China XD Electric (中国⻄电 ).450  Other SGCC subsidiaries that 
profited from UHV development were Tianwei Baobian Electric (天威保变) with its 
strong market share for high-end transformers and the Nari Group Corporation (南瑞集
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团公司) as a key player in smart grid equipment.451 Finally, in order to further strengthen 
its position in UHV and smart grid equipment manufacturing, SGCC in June 2011 
founded a Smart Grid Research Institute which was to build up RMB 3 billion in assets 
and more than RMB 3.5 billion in sales revenues by 2015.452 Whether the procurement 
of  costly grid equipment and construction services from auxiliary companies under 
SGCC’s own control only served to increase revenues for the corporation or whether 
the partial privatisation of  profits via stock-market listings also personally benefitted 
grid company executives remains a matter of  speculation as the precise distribution of  
shares in these firms is unclear. 
 
5.3.2 The setting of technical standards and the prospect of 
international competitiveness 
Seeking administrative support by insisting that UHV and smart grid would allow for 
huge advances in the competitiveness of  China’s equipment manufacturing sector was a 
strategy that found similar application in the field of  standard setting. Not only did 
SGCC insist that it was beneficial to the country’s development as a whole to turn its 
own grid technology into a worldwide standard, it also declared it a matter of  national 
pride to undermine the developed countries’ “absolute control of  the field of  
international energy standards”453 and to break the “monopoly of  foreign oligarchs”454 
in electrical equipment manufacturing. 
According to Shu Yinbiao, SGCC’s vice-president at the time, “UHV and smart grid are 
at the core of  international market competition [...]. As a government-owned enterprise 
shouldering historic missions, SGCC has fully realised that we could not follow the old 
ways of  importing foreign technologies and equipments, or by equal adoption and 
revision of  foreign standards.”455 Consequently, SGCC began engaging with standard 
setting endeavours during the construction phase of  the UHV-AC pilot project which 
resulted in the 2008 recommendation of  its 1000kV UHV-AC voltage as the 
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international standard voltage by two leading international bodies for electricity grid 
standard setting, the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) and the 
‘Conference International des Grands Reseaux Electriques’ (CIGRE).456 This, according 
to Shu Yinbiao, “changed the traditional practice, which was [the] direct translation or 
quoting of  foreign standards. It signifies a breakthrough in [the] standardisation field of  
China.”457 Similarly, SGCC has been trying to advance its position in standard setting for 
smart grid technology. Wang Yimin, the director of  SGCC’s Smart Grid Department, 
disclosed in 2010 that SGCC would “urge the government to integrate the Smart Grid 
project with the national development strategy. This will help us have a bigger say in the 
international Smart Grid market and play a lead role in setting industry standards”.458 
Wang furthermore revealed that SGCC aimed to utilise the standardisation route in 
order to perpetuate its dominance in smart grid construction and equipment 
manufacturing via its subsidiary companies.459 To this purpose, SGCC instigated the 
establishment of  national and industry level standardisation committees which, 
according to Shu Yinbiao, in order to “meet the needs of  grid construction and market 
development” opened their offices within the SGCC compound in Beijing.460 Several 
SGCC managers were also placed in leading positions of  these national standard 
committees and of  a ‘Standardization Work Leading Group’ which was established 
within the grid company in order to “provide coordination, harmonization, and 
guidance for standardization work”.461  
After having taken over the relevant national standardisation bodies, SGCC continued 
to celebrate a series of  successes in national and international standard setting for UHV 
and smart grid technology.462 Irrespectively, some observers have been very critical of  
the grid company’s conduct in the standardisation field. Lu Feng (路⻛), a professor of  
government at Peking University and an expert on Chinese science and technology 
policy, has described the corporate advances in national standard setting as emblematic 
of  a broader trajectory that has left government trailing behind corporate interests. 
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Specifically mentioning SGCC, Lu contended that the central government’s lack of  
expertise and information had left it unable to produce its own judgement, having no 
other choice but to let large SOEs take the lead and to allow company standards to be 
turned into national standards.463 
 
5.3.3 “Enterprise standardisation – international standardisation – 
enterprise globalisation” 
Adding to its successful efforts to elevate company standards for UHV technology into 
national and international standards and localise content under the auspices of  its own 
subsidiary firms, SGCC attempted to further increase levels of  government support for 
UHV development by emphasising that the technology would allow for successful 
corporate internationalisation and strengthen the international standing of  Chinese 
industry more generally.  
As in earlier instances, SGCC directly engaged with existing macro-policy in order to 
claim legitimacy for its sector-specific corporate strategy. The grid company particularly 
built on the State Council’s ‘Going Global’/’Going Out’ (⾛出去) initiative which under 
the support of  numerous ministries and agencies including the NDRC, Ministry of  
Commerce (MOFCOM) and the state-asset regulator SASAC had encouraged China’s 
SOEs to globalise and to enter foreign markets, preferably while also exporting Chinese 
technology.464 In this vein, SGCC again insisted that upgrading its internal company 
standards to the level of  international standards was benefitting the country’s overall 
competitiveness in the energy technology field and that it was also a vital step in its own 
corporate internationalisation process which Liu Zhenya summarised under the slogan 
“Enterprise standardisation – international standardisation – enterprise globalisation”.465 
Accordingly, Liu called on government to “actively encourage domestic energy 
enterprises to take part in international competition and cooperation in the energy field, 
provide support, standards and guidance to the energy enterprises that ‘go global’”466. 
Similarly, while debating the interconnection of  standard setting and corporate 
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internationalisation, the grid company’s vice-president Shu Yinbiao contended that 
“[w]ithout its own standards or participation in international standardization, we could 
only say SGCC is a large company, but not a strong one, let alone [one that is able] to 
effectively implement the ‘go global’ strategy.”467  Shu’s statement provides a further 
example of  how references to overarching State Council policies were used to pressure 
government into giving its support to UHV development, both with regard to 
attempted foreign market entry and also domestically, particularly since his statement 
not only contained a ‘go global’ reference but also invoked the State Council’s so-called 
‘Grow large and strong’ (做⼤做强) strategy which, in practise mainly championed by 
SASAC (see Chapter 2), urged central SOEs to transform into both domestically and 
internationally competitive companies.468 
Rhetorically building on these cross-sectorally applicable State Council initiatives, SGCC 
was particularly successful in gaining the backing of  MOFCOM which had been 
approached by SGCC in a bid for support during its internationalisation efforts and 
which willingly promised its assistance. After a meeting with Shu Yinbiao, a ministry 
spokeswoman stated that it was the basic duty of  MOFCOM’s Overseas Counsellor to 
help “outstanding Chinese enterprises” such as SGCC in their efforts to “actively 
participate in international competition to enhance the overall strength and influence of  
Chinese enterprises”. She furthermore declared that the ministry supported “the two 
sides’ closer links and cooperation [in order] to jointly promote the overseas operations 
of  the State Grid Corporation for new progress”.469 
Having secured central government support for its internationalisation efforts, the grid 
company intensified its attempts at exporting its transmission technology even though 
the practical application of  UHV transmission in China had yet to progress beyond the 
pilot stage. While SGCC tried its best to convince government that its technologies 
were “at the core of  international market competition”470 and that it should therefore 
receive full administrative support for its UHV development agenda, there was, in fact, 
no international market at all for UHV equipment around 2010 as all other countries 
that had experimented with the technology in the past had subsequently abandoned it. 
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However, successes in international standardisation coupled with central government 
support ultimately helped the grid company progress with its export endeavours. 
Particularly telling in this regard were SGCC’s ventures to export UHV technology to 
Brazil starting in late 2010 when it placed a bid for a hydropower project, aiming to 
utilise UHV-DC technology to connect it with distant load centres.471 Although no final 
agreement had been reached at the time, in April 2011 SGCC spokesmen announced 
that Brazil would adopt the company’s UHV-DC technology to transmit electricity from 
the Belo Monte Dam in the Amazon River Basin over 2500km to Rio de Janeiro in a 
project jointly conducted between SGCC and Eletrobras.472 Following the involvement 
of  leading government officials on both sides a contract was signed in mid 2014 and 
construction began in mid 2015, allowing SGCC to use its unexpected international 
bidding success as political ammunition domestically by labelling it as “China’s big 
breakthrough in the ‘Going Global’ strategy for its UHV technologies”. 473  UHV 
technology, SGCC now argued, was its contribution to the ‘Going Out’ of  Chinese 
industrial enterprises, its implementation of  the wish of  China’s highest political 
institutions to not only create but also to export indigenous innovation.  
 
 
5.4 Chapter conclusions 
This chapter demonstrated how SGCC gained central government support for further 
UHV development by presenting core aspects of  its sectoral restructuring initiative as 
extensions and applications of  existing macro-policies that demanded ‘indigenous 
innovation’ and increases in the international competitiveness of  Chinese industry. At 
the centre of  the grid company’s argumentative approach stood the claim that it had 
become a driving force for indigenous innovation in a technological area that would 
enable China to take up a leadership role in international competition, and that all that 
was needed for this to materialise was enhanced government support for UHV 
development and the 1U4L plan more generally. By argumentatively matching (i.e. 
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‘synchronising’) the portrayal of  its own desired sectoral policy and corporate 
development plans with more abstract policy objectives pursued by central government, 
SGCC borrowed political legitimacy and successfully garnered support from different 
central government bodies for crucial development work underlying its sectoral 
restructuring plan; this, however, was first and foremost aimed at challenging existing 
sectoral policy in form of  the No. 5 Document’s marketisation and unbundling agenda, 
thereby playing off  strategic central government decisions at the sectoral and cross-
sectoral levels against each other.  
The grid company’s most notable success in this regard led to the construction of  UHV 
pilot projects which were approved after SGCC had convinced the State Council that 
the technology – as a case of  ‘indigenous innovation’ by a central state firm – was 
worthy of  support. While the trial outcomes were suboptimal, SGCC appeared to have 
successfully dominated the political debate about their interpretation due to its 
involvement in the drafting of  assessment reports, applying pressure on the media and 
silencing critics. SGCC continued to apply similar argumentative strategies in the 
following years while trying to enhance the attractiveness of  UHV development to 
government. In response to its insistence that UHV would improve its own asset 
portfolio as well as the international competitiveness of  China’s grid equipment 
manufacturing industry as a whole, the state asset supervisor SASAC and the NDRC’s 
Foreign Investment Department, following their respective institutional mandates, 
granted support for investments in the nominally unbundled grid equipment 
manufacturing segment. The resulting high localisation rate in UHV manufacturing was 
then presented by SGCC as evidence of  its contributions to ‘indigenous innovation’ 
while at the same time allowing the grid company to turn itself  into the main financial 
beneficiary of  further UHV development. Similar dynamics were observed in the field 
of  standard setting where government tolerated SGCC’s establishment of  national-level 
standardisation bodies within the company sphere, a step which SGCC had portrayed as 
vital to enhancing China’s national economic strength and ending the ‘monopoly of  
foreign oligarchs’, and which ultimately allowed the grid company to elevate its 
company standards to the level of  national and even international standards. Finally, 
after repeatedly invoking the State Council’s ‘Going Global’ initiative, SGCC gained the 
support of  the Ministry of  Commerce and of  the State Council itself  during attempts 
to export UHV technology as part of  its internationalisation strategy which was at least 
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partially, if  not predominantly, targeted at enhancing its domestic standing and 
collecting arguments for developing a UHV grid within China.  
In conclusion, all of  the ‘cooperative’ examples discussed in this chapter had in 
common that they a) were initiated exclusively by SGCC, b) addressed important 
macro-level policy goals and cross-sectoral policies championed by the State Council 
which aimed at increasing the innovative capacity and international competitiveness of  
Chinese industry, and c) simultaneously contained very explicit overlap between central 
government’s cross-sectoral ambitions and SGCC’s sectoral policy preferences while d) 
being part of  a reform plan pursued by SGCC that was geared towards undermining 
and replacing unfavourable sectoral market-building policy. In some of  these cases, 
SGCC supplemented its ‘synchronisation’ endeavours with targeted venue-shopping 
among central government bodies, similar to its interactions with the authorities while 
trying to circumvent the unbundling requirements of  the No. 5 Document (see Chapter 
3). Taking advantage of  the co-existence of  not always clearly coordinated mandates, 
the grid company successfully persuaded different government bodies to support parts 
of  its cause based on argumentative linkages that were carefully adapted to match their 
respective mandates. 
Despite the substantial sectoral importance of  the matters discussed in this chapter, the 
related political discussions hardly ever touched upon UHV’s relevance vis-à-vis existing 
sectoral policy or the potential impact of  UHV technology on the functional logic of  
the domestic electricity supply. Government support was exclusively directed towards 
assisting with technological development and supporting indigenous innovation by 
SOEs in line with existing cross-sectoral policy, which suggests that SGCC’s 
‘synchronisation’ approach actually succeeded. All of  the steps portrayed here were 
instrumental in the grid company bringing UHV technology closer to a fully marketable 
level, achieving and sustaining dominant market positions in lucrative auxiliary 
industries which were technically off-limits for the grid company but would allow for 
substantial financial gains, and gaining political momentum during the struggle over 
further domestic grid planning as a self-declared practitioner of  the State Council’s 
‘indigenous innovation’ and ‘going global’ strategies.  
However, the rather indirect nature of  SGCC’s attempts to shape the policy setting that 
it operated in again hints at the limits of  the grid company’s ability to challenge existing 
policy and shape sectoral decision-making. During both the introduction of  its 
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restructuring plan into the policy arena (see Chapter 4) and its attempts to gain 
government support for the initial application of  UHV technology in China’s electricity 
industry SGCC refrained from direct attacks on existing sectoral policy; instead it 
resorted to elaborate strategies to circumvent policy by appeasing government and 
portraying its own sectoral reform suggestions as being closely aligned with 
government’s cross-sectoral policy preferences. SGCC’s chosen strategy therefore 
tentatively suggests that central SOEs are not in a position to simply access policy-
making circles and request changes in policy, but that they are ultimately forced to 
tactically engage with existing policy in order to get their voices heard and increase the 
likelihood of  beneficial or at least tolerable policy output and outcomes. 
In this way, SGCC steadily circled in on its main objective which continued to be the 
further centralisation and integration of  China’s electricity supply industry under its 
own leadership through the construction of  a cross-regional synchronous ‘Three China’ 
UHV-AC grid linked to large peripheral electricity generation bases via UHV-DC 
transmission. As the following chapter will demonstrate, the cooperative interplay 
between SGCC and central government over ‘synchronisable’ macro-topics such as 
indigenous innovation or international competitiveness did not extend to the grid 
company’s attempts to actually construct the ‘Three China’ grid, as contentious sectoral 
policy questions returned to the centre of  debates. 
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6 The politics of grid planning and clashes over 
UHV approvals (2010-2014) 
Unlike the generally cooperative interplay between SGCC and central government 
regarding aspects of UHV development that related to cross-sectoral policy matters, 
substantial government opposition to the grid company’s reform plan was present in 
many fields with immediate sectoral relevance, i.e. matters which related to the actual 
sectoral application of SGCC’s restructuring plan. While the grid company’s suggestions 
of developing large regional power generation bases and employing the method of long-
distance transmission as such were eventually looked upon favourably, the plan to 
develop the cross-regional synchronous ‘Three China’ UHV-AC grid – the 
technological core of SGCC’s reform plan, the R&D foundation of which had been 
strongly supported thus far – was met with caution and scepticism by the State Council 
and particularly by the National Energy Administration (NEA), the main sectoral 
supervisory body for the electricity industry. 
The years following 2011 saw a serious dispute between the grid company and central 
government, particularly the NEA, over the sectoral 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) for 
electricity grid development. It centred on the questions of whether or to what extent 
the synchronous cross-regional UHV-AC grid should be developed and how 
interconnected China’s regional grids should be, as well as how integrated and 
centralised its overall electricity supply structure should be. During this dispute, as will 
be shown in the first part of  this chapter, the NEA prevented the grid company’s 
internal grid development plan from being accepted as an official national-level plan for 
future grid development. During the same timeframe, the NEA and NDRC also 
approved two UHV-AC projects (in 2011 and 2013), an apparent contradiction that will 
be explored in the second part of  this chapter, followed by an analysis of  ongoing 
clashes between SGCC and sectoral regulators during the assessment and evaluation 
procedures related to two additional and particularly controversial transmission lines.  
As such, the core concern of this chapter will be to analyse disputes between SGCC and 
central government bodies over the practical application of UHV in China’s grid system 
during which sometimes one side prevailed and sometimes the other, but which 
ultimately tended to lead to administrative deadlock. In contrast to the conclusions of 
the previous chapter that SGCC managed to gain government support by 
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‘synchronising’ crucial parts of its sectoral restructuring plan with cross-sectoral policy 
on industrial R&D, this chapter will demonstrate that the grid company encountered 
severe difficulties in progressing with its agenda as soon as robust argumentative 
linkages to existing cross-sectoral policy were absent and as soon as industry-specific 
considerations began to re-emerge during its engagement with sectoral authorities. 
It should be noted that a considerable proportion of the empirical material used for this 
chapter was supplied by Zeng Dewen (曾德⽂), a retired deputy director of  the Electric 
Power Planning and Engineering Institute, who personally participated in many 
assessments held by the different stakeholders, including numerous meetings regarding 
the particular UHV-AC projects discussed in the second part of the chapter. Zeng was 
called upon by the Chinese Academy of Engineering, China’s leading science and 
technology institution, to write a report concerning his observations during the approval 
procedures, which he later published in a series of articles. As such, Zeng was the only 
close observer of the approval procedures who openly shared his insight, barring a small 
number of news articles published in 2014 which make it possible to cross-reference the 
general trajectory of Zeng’s statements, but not every detail. Nevertheless, given Zeng’s 
reputation of independence and reliability in industry and journalistic circles, as well as 
his fact-oriented reporting, his accounts were used as the main empirical source for 
parts of this chapter. 
 
 
6.1 Conflicts over the 12th Five-Year Plan for grid 
development 
The following section will examine conflicts between SGCC and central government 
regarding the contents and development trajectories inherent in the most important 
state-level planning documents for electricity grid construction and development. In a 
first step, SGCC’s internal company-level grid plan will be examined and compared with 
relevant sections in China’s overall 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) in order to showcase 
important discrepancies in development goals between the grid company and the State 
Council. Secondly, the contentious interaction between SGCC and the NEA during the 
process of  devising a sector-specific national-level 12th Five-Year Plan for the electricity 
grid will be investigated.  
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6.1.1 Discrepancies between firm-level and national-level 12th Five-
Year Plans 
Conflicts between SGCC and central government over the 12th Five-Year Plan for grid 
development surfaced around 2010, when SGCC unilaterally declared that the UHV 
pilot projects had now passed government’s final examinations and that UHV as such 
was now moving on from the “demonstration phase” (⽰范阶段) to the “comprehensive 
construction phase” (全⾯建设阶段).474 Building on its internal UHV construction plans 
first publicised in 2009,475 in August 2010 SGCC issued its firm-level 12th Five-Year Plan 
in which it laid out an ambitious grid construction outlook for the years 2011-2015. By 
the end of  this period, SGCC aimed to have completed the basic structure of  the 
‘Three China’ UHV-AC grid synchronising the Central, North and East China regional 
grids while simultaneously developing 15 UHV-DC projects to match the pace of  the 
proposed expansion of  peripheral power generation bases and projected increase in 
demand for large-scale electricity transmission.476 With planned investments totalling 
RMB 270 billion for UHV alone, SGCC announced that it would build a “Three 
vertical, three horizontal, one loop” UHV-AC grid structure (三纵三横⼀环⺴) which was 
to directly incorporate northern coal bases as well as south-western hydropower 
bases:477 this was to be supplemented by a UHV-AC project tying together most of  the 
provincial grids within the regional East China Grid under a ‘Yangtze-Delta UHV 
Double-loop Grid’ (⻓三⾓特⾼压双环⺴) covering some of  China’s most developed and 
industrialised coastal provinces and municipalities (see Figure 6.1).478 
 
                                                
474 “State power grid plans to invest 270 billion yuan in smart grid construction during the 12th Five-Year 
Plan period” (国电⺴规划“⼗⼆五”投资 2700 亿元建设智能电⺴), Modern Electric Technology (现代电⼦技术) 22 
(2010): 93. 
475 “State Grid to spend RMB 600 bln on UHV power lines by 2020,” China Knowledge Press, 
25.05.2009; “First UHV line put into operation - A ‘two vertical, two horizontal’ pattern emerges” (⾸条特
⾼压线投⼊运营 “两纵两横” 格局显现), Nanfang Web (南⽅报⺴), 25.02.2009. 
476 Liu, 2013, p. 179. 
477 “State power grid plans to invest 270 billion yuan in smart grid construction during the 12th Five-Year 
Plan period” (国电⺴规划 “⼗⼆五” 投资 2700 亿元建设智能电⺴), Modern Electric Technology (现代电⼦技术) 22 
(2010): 93. 
478 “SGCC’s 12th Five-Year Plan for UHV investment officially launched” (国家电⺴⼗⼆五特⾼压投资规划
出台), Shanghai Securities News, 13.08.2010; “China grid eyes building 2 new UHV power lines this yr,” 
Reuters, 13.08.2010. 
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Figure 6.1 SGCC’s “Three vertical, three horizontal, one loop” UHV-AC construction 
plan 
Source: Author’s visualisation of material presented in this section. 
 
While the sector-specific national-level Five-Year Plan was still being prepared, the 
publication of  the overall national-level 12th Five-Year Plan in March 2011 was 
celebrated by SGCC as a big success as a number of  ideas that had originated within the 
grid company had also been included in the document.479 Among other aspects, the plan 
called for an “optimization of  the layout of  energy development” based on the 
construction of  five national energy bases together with the development of  nuclear 
power along the eastern coast and areas of  central China.480 The document furthermore 
included the idea of  enhancing long-distance transmission, calling for the “accelerat[ion 
of] the construction of  outward power supply projects from large coal power, 
                                                
479 “SGCC: UHV has already been included in the 12th Five-Year Plan” (国家电⺴公司：“特⾼压” 
已被列⼊“⼗⼆五”规划), North Star Electric Power News Network (北极星电⼒新闻⺴), 17.03.2011. 
480 “Outline of the 12th Five-Year-Plan for economic and societal development in the People’s Republic 
of China” (translated by the Delegation of the European Union in China), published by the British 
Chamber of Commerce in China, Beijing (March 2011), Chapter 11, Section 2. 
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hydropower and wind power bases, and creat[ion of] some cross-regional power 
transmission channels using advanced technologies” and to “carry out trials of  
intelligent power grid construction”.481 Even UHV transmission itself  was mentioned, 
although where SGCC’s version of  the grid plan included a substantial number of  
specific grid projects that the grid company wanted to construct, the national-level plan 
was vaguer, stating only that the government would “[...] accelerate the construction of  
a modern power grid system, further expand the scale of  west-to-east power 
transmission, improve regional core power grids, and develop advanced large-capacity, 
high-efficiency and long-distance power transmission technologies such as UHV and 
others”.482 
The fact that the general trajectory of  SGCC’s 1U4L plan was represented in the most 
important national-level economic planning document published in the PRC speaks to 
the substantial influence that the grid company wielded with regard to industry 
planning; sadly, however, no sources were available to illuminate the exact processes 
through which SGCC’s ideas found their way into the document. At the same time, 
while the wording may initially appear as a general endorsement of  the 1U4L plan, the 
precise phrasing with regard to grid development actually indicates how sceptical and 
undecided government was about this matter. The Five-Year Plan only stated that UHV 
technology should be developed, but not that a UHV grid should be constructed, echoing 
the earlier semantic battle over the ‘test demonstration’ projects (see Chapter 4). Some 
observers interpreted this choice of  wording as a compromise so that any future 
decisions regarding UHV, and particularly UHV-AC development, would have a 
foundation in the planning document, irrespective of  whether it was approved or not.483 
Similarly, Ding Daoqi (丁道⻬), a former vice director of  the State Electricity Dispatch 
Communications Centre (国家电⼒调度通信中⼼), pointed out that the “advanced large-
capacity, high-efficiency and long-distance power transmission technologies” mentioned 
in the plan gave no indication as to whether UHV-AC or the much less controversial 
UHV-DC was being referred to, and that the plan’s demand for the “strengthening of  
                                                
481 Ibid., Chapter 11, Section 6. 
482 “Outline of the 12th Five-Year-Plan for economic and societal development in the People’s Republic 
of China” (中华⼈民共和国国民经济和社会发展第⼗⼆个五年规划纲要), published by Xinhua News Agency, 
16.03.2011, Chapter 11, Section 3 (author’s own translation). The original text reads as follows: “[...]加快现
代电⺴体系建设，进⼀步扩⼤⻄电东送规模，完善区域主干电⺴，发展特⾼压等⼤容量、⾼效率、远距离先进输
电技术[...]”. 
483 Zeng Dewen (曾德⽂), “SGCC’s UHV-AC dream shattered, dream of an interconnected “Three 
China” grid will not be achieved” (国⺴梦碎交流特⾼压，“三华”联⺴恐成“南柯⼀梦”), article published on 
Zeng Dewen’s industry blog, Caixin Net (财新⺴), 12.10.2012. 
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regional core electricity grids” (完善区域主干电⺴) was ultimately to be understood as a 
government veto to the cross-regional ‘Three China’ grid.484  
Given the discrepancies between firm-level and national-level outlooks on grid 
development, contentious interactions between SGCC and sectoral authorities ensued 
over the industry-level specification of  the vague guidelines provided by the overall 12th 
Five-Year Plan document. Sectoral authorities were faced with the decision of  whether 
to utilise the internal grid company plans and adapt them into national-level plans or to 
devise entirely new plans altogether, a decision that needed to be made in the face of  
constant pressure from industry in the form of  SGCC and its subsidiaries.485 
 
6.1.2 Confrontation over the compilation of the national-level 12th 
Five-Year Plan for electricity grid development 
In preparation for the 12th Five-Year Grid Plan, the National Energy Administration 
(NEA) in September 2011 tasked the Electric Power Planning and Engineering Institute 
(EPPEI, 电 ⼒ 规 划 设 计 总 院 ), a standardisation institution representing government 
ministries and commissions while exercising administrative functions in sectoral 
planning, to devise a national strategy for grid development. For this particular purpose 
a new body was created under EPPEI, the State Electricity Planning Research Centre 
(SEPRC, 国家电⼒规划研究中⼼), which in conjunction with external experts formed a 
Planning Work Group (规划⼯作组).486 Throughout 2012 and under the guidance and 
supervision of  the NEA’s Electricity Grid Division, this Planning Work Group 
developed a first draft of  a national grid plan. After much deliberation and expert 
consultation, three reports with recommendations for the general grid structure 
emerged that were then assessed by a number of  academics.487  According to news 
                                                
484 Ding Daoqi (丁道⻬), “The 1000kV UHV-AC grid is a big step back for China’s electricity grid 
development - UHV-AC is a parasite living off the high-voltage grid” (1000 千伏交流特⾼压电⺴是中国电⺴
发展的⼤倒退 -- 交流特⾼压电⺴是寄⽣在超⾼压电⺴上的怪胎), article published on Zeng Dewen’s industry 
blog, Caixin Net, 01.03.2014. 
485 “Ultra-high voltage state engineering project deadlock unresolved” (特⾼压国家⼯程僵局待解),  
21st Century Business Herald (21 世纪经济报道), 26.12.2013. 
486 Electric Power Planning & Engineering Institute (EPPEI), “Company introduction” (企业简介), 
http://www.eppei.com/PartNodeDetail.aspx?PartNodeID=57, accessed 04/2015; “State Electricity 
Planning Research Centre officially launched” (国家电⼒规划研究中⼼正式启动), National Energy 
Administration press release, 30.01.2012, http://www.nea.gov.cn/2012-01/30/c_131381850.htm, 
accessed 04/2015. 
487 Zeng Dewen (曾德⽂), “Electricity development calls for a scientific plan, this era awaits electricity 
development under the rule of law - Offering suggestions for the Electricity Plan under the 13th Five-
Year Plan, Part 1” (电⼒发展呼唤科学规划 时代期盼法治电⼒ --为“⼗三五”电⼒规划建⾔献策 (之⼀)), article 
published on Zeng Dewen’s industry blog, Caixin Net (财新⺴), 19.01.2015. 
  163 
sources, the overall conclusion of  these internal reports was that constructing a cross-
regional UHV-AC grid was unnecessary, and that not building it would save RMB 300-
400 billion while simultaneously preserving a low risk of  large-scale blackouts.488 In 
September 2012, the Planning Work Group reported back to the NEA’s Electricity 
Department, whose director emphasised that the findings provided “forceful 
technological support for the state’s scientific decision-making” and that SGCC’s ‘Three 
China’ UHV-AC grid was “not the only proposed plan”.489  
On the basis of  these recommendations, in January 2013 the NEA published a 
document in which it provided different proposals for cross-provincial electricity 
supply, requiring both SGCC and the China Southern Grid Corporation (CSGC) to 
conduct comparative studies of  how those proposals would apply in their respective 
regions and develop implementation plans for the different scenarios.490 This series of  
events confirmed that the NEA at the time had a very cautious attitude towards UHV-
AC construction; while SGCC’s favoured development plan was part of  the deliberation 
process the planning work involved a number of  different scenarios which the NEA 
wanted the grid companies to incorporate into their own planning work. The NEA’s 
vigilant attitude was shared by the NDRC; an SGCC employee in a 2012 interview 
stated that both institutions at the time were hesitant to approve further UHV-AC 
constructions for grid security reasons.491 
The China Southern Grid Corporation immediately complied with the NEA’s requests 
and soon after provided its ‘CSGC 2013-2020 Planning Research Report’ in which it 
compared different approaches to accommodating high ratios of  outward electricity 
supply in some of  the provinces within its grid region. While UHV-AC was considered 
as one of  the options, it scored the lowest from both a technical and economic 
perspective. Based on CSGC’s research, the NEA then published the ‘CSGC 
Development Plan (2013-2020)’, which adopted CSGC’s suggested strategy of  relying 
predominantly on conventional 500kV high-voltage lines and a small number of  much 
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491 Interview with a smart grid researcher at the State Grid Energy Research Institute, Beijing, 08.11.2012. 
  164 
less controversial and consequential UHV-DC lines. In order to safeguard the region 
against widespread blackouts, the plan even considered breaking up the regional grid 
operated by CSGC into two or three smaller grid entities.492 This development strategy 
was in many ways the opposite of  what the State Grid Corporation had been pushing 
for over the previous years under its 1U4L agenda.  
Unsurprisingly, SGCC’s own response to the NEA’s requests was very different, as it 
refused to implement the requested technical and economic comparisons between 
different development approaches for its grid area and instead insisted that the ‘Three 
China’ UHV-AC plan was the only viable option.493 In May 2013, after a delay of  over a 
year, SGCC then officially passed its ‘Special 12th Five-Year Plan’ to the NEA. However, 
it was never officially published as the NEA refused to yield to the grid company’s 
demand to accept its internal company plan as the state-level Five-Year Plan for grid 
development.494 At the same time, without SGCC’s cooperation it was also impossible 
for the NEA to launch an external expert assessment of  the ‘Three China’ grid plan as 
the only solution agreeable to the grid company. As the NEA’s ‘administrative power’ (
执政⼒) did not allow it to push forward the drafting process under these circumstances, 
all procedures came to a standstill and the matter “was settled by leaving it unsettled”.495 
In January 2014, the State Council ratified the overall 12th Five-Year Plan for the energy 
sector and a series of  sub-sectoral documents, but neither the plan for the electricity 
sector nor the more specific grid plan were among them.496 Even the national grid 
planning report initially commissioned by the NEA and supplied by the above-
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mentioned Planning Work Group was never fully published because its 
recommendations did not match SGCC’s demands.497  
According to the available sources, the main reason why the 12th Five-Year grid plan was 
never published was that the NEA did not agree with SGCC’s insistence on the 
construction of  a ‘Three China’ UHV-AC grid. The NEA’s own grid planning 
preferences at the time were clearly visible during the drafting of  the China Southern 
Grid Corporation’s regional grid plan which not only did not involve UHV-AC 
transmission but also demonstrated the sectoral authorities’ distrust of  large 
synchronous grid structures. It is also noteworthy that the NEA made a point of  
consulting an external institution, EPPEI, in order to access expertise on grid 
development that was not directly supplied by SGCC itself. This was one of  many 
instances to follow in which the NEA called for external support in battles with SGCC 
over policy-relevant information and interpretations, as will be seen in the following 
sections. Most importantly, this section illustrated how clashing policy preferences 
between sectoral authorities and SGCC regarding pivotal industry-level planning 
decisions led to complete deadlock between both sides. The NEA, on the one hand, 
was unable to fully rein in SGCC’s attempts to transform its corporate agenda into 
national-level policy, and given their equal administrative ranks it was also not in a 
position to simply block the grid company’s main development ideas.498 SGCC’s refusal 
to supply accurate and pertinent data to the NEA effectively thwarted any possibility of  
the NEA creating an industry plan that did not feature UHV-AC as the sole grid 
development option but rather as one option among others. At the same time, SGCC 
also failed to integrate the very core of  its 1U4L plan – the synchronous ‘Three China’ 
UHV-AC grid – into the overall national 12th Five-Year Plan or its sectoral specification 
documents, the consequence being political stalemate in which neither side managed to 
prevail.  
This grid planning episode was the start of  an evolving battle between SGCC and the 
NEA (as well as a multitude of  external institutions and industry experts) over 
information, expertise and notions of  objectivity in assessing the necessity and 
feasibility of  UHV-AC construction and its impact on both the electricity supply system 
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and the economy at large. The conflict between the two sides became particularly 
evident during the evaluation procedures for the individual UHV-AC lines that SGCC 
had been lobbying for. Some of  these procedures will be analysed in the following 
second part of  this chapter. 
 
 
6.2 Negotiations over UHV-AC approvals 
The absence of  a formal national-level grid plan meant that there was no clear 
development framework for government to refer to when assessing project approval 
requests from industry. Some observers have argued that the lack of  such a plan, which 
would usually have given guidance to all parties involved, created more space and 
opportunities for SGCC to influence national power grid development.499 Others have 
contended that the situation actually made it more difficult for the grid company to 
place further UHV construction projects on the agenda.500 However, the fact is that 
during this lengthy struggle over the drafting of  a national-level grid plan throughout 
which the NEA prevented SGCC’s model of  a ‘Three China’ UHV-AC grid from 
becoming the frame of  reference for the future direction of  China’s overall grid 
development, the NDRC and the NEA unexpectedly approved the construction of  two 
UHV-AC lines both of  which were sections of  the UHV-AC loop construction project 
in the East China Grid which SGCC had been pursuing. Unfortunately, very few 
sources exist with regard to these two seemingly highly contradictory approvals; 
however, the little available empirical material will be interpreted as conclusively as 
possible.  
In a further step, with the use of more comprehensive empirics, the interaction between 
SGCC, government bodies and various consulting institutions during the evaluation and 
assessment stages of two further prominent UHV-AC projects will be examined. Due 
to their strategic importance for overall grid development, both of these projects were 
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surrounded by strong political controversy and therefore provide rare insight into the 
logic of struggles over authority and expertise between grid company and government 
institutions. 
 
6.2.1 The curious approvals of further UHV-AC lines in the midst of 
conflicts over grid planning (2011-2013) 
In the middle of  ongoing clashes between SGCC and the NEA over the inclusion of  
UHV-AC construction in the national grid development plan two very unexpected 
project approvals took place. The first of  these occurred in September 2011 and 
involved the southern section of  the ‘Yangtze-Delta UHV-AC Double-loop’ project 
between Huainan (southern Anhui Province), Zhebei (northern Zhejiang Province) and 
the municipality of  Shanghai (淮南 - 浙北 - 上海); it had originally been listed in SGCC’s 
internal 12th Five-Year Plan and, once completed, was to synchronise three of  the five 
provincial grids within the East China Grid region (see Figure 6.2). This transmission 
line was suddenly approved by the NDRC while the project was still undergoing formal 
evaluation and while the NEA was simultaneously holding a discussion forum on 
national electricity flow patterns and the national Five-Year Plan strategy, which 
demonstrates the uncoordinated circumstances of  this decision.501 Similarly, just as the 
NDRC employed a state-owned consulting firm, the China International Engineering 
Consulting Corporation (CIECC, 中 国 国 际 ⼯ 程 咨 询 公 司 ), to further evaluate the 
construction of  the ‘double loop’ grid structure, both NDRC and NEA leaders, on 
their very last day in office before the central government turnover of  March 2013, 
abruptly approved an additional UHV-AC line between Zhebei (northern Zhejiang 
Province) and the city of  Fuzhou (浙北 - 福州) which was to link Fujian Province to the 
previously approved southern part of  the loop structure which was already under 
construction (see Figure 6.2).502 This second approval was even more surprising given 
that from 2006/2007 onward a regional power transmission plan had been developed 
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  168 
and passed by government in which it was decided to strengthen this exact grid linkage 
based on conventional high-voltage transmission. However, as SGCC had insisted on a 
UHV-AC solution which the government at the time was reluctant to approve, long 
delays regarding this transmission route ensued which were only resolved with the 
unexpected 2013 UHV approval.503 
Just like the earlier ‘test demonstration’ projects, neither of  the two newly authorised 
UHV-AC transmission lines went through the full official approval procedures or were 
externally evaluated, which was abnormal for projects of  this magnitude.504 Following 
formal procedures, SGCC’s project plan should have been passed on to a design 
institute which would have sent the design to the Electric Power 
Planning and Engineering Institute (EPPEI; 电⼒规划设计总院) for evaluation. After 
passing EPPEI’s evaluation, the design should have then been delivered to the NDRC 
and the NEA, from where it should have been forwarded to a third party for 
assessment, usually the above-mentioned CIECC. Only after all these different steps 
would the NEA and the NDRC then approve it (or not) – and if  the investment 
required exceeded a pre-set sum an additional final approval by the State Council would 
have been required.505  
 
                                                
503 Zeng Dewen (曾德⽂), “A warning for electricity construction against falling into the trap of the ‘Three 
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the National Energy Administration, Beijing, 11.07.2014. 
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Figure 6.2 UHV-AC project approvals in the East China Grid (2011-2013) 
Author’s visualisation of material presented in this section. 
 
In response to allegations that it had engineered a shortcut through the formal approval 
procedure, SGCC argued that all lines had undergone feasibility studies, all levels of  
government had issued supporting documents and that SGCC itself  had requested an 
EPPEI evaluation which had given a positive result. Furthermore, the grid company 
insisted that it was not necessary to involve another third party with a further 
assessment because the ‘test demonstration’ project had already been in stable operation 
for a number of  years which was sufficient proof  of  UHV’s feasibility.506 
 
A tentative attempt at explaining the UHV-AC approvals in 2011 and 2013 
Very little empirical detail exists that would provide insight into the exact background to 
these approvals, and none of  the interviewees asked about these episodes were able to 
clarify matters, not even those from the NEA itself. Explanations based on the 
                                                
506 “Four questions regarding UHV: Safety and economic feasibility are still being called into doubt” (四问
特⾼压：安全性与经济性仍遭质疑), People’s Daily Online (⼈民⺴), 29.04.2014. 
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government’s intention to provide R&D support no longer applied as these projects 
were not classified as ‘test demonstration’ projects. The alternative explanation of  a lack 
of  technical understanding within government can also be ruled out, at least for the 
2013 approval, as the security risks that experts had long associated with UHV-AC were 
now well-known within the State Council, especially after a widespread and widely 
reported blackout had occurred in India in 2012 across a number of  connected 
conventional AC-grids.507 A more likely yet empirically unverifiable explanation is that 
these approvals were part of  a compromise agreement between SGCC and the 
NEA/NDRC. This interpretation is supported by the fact that neither of  the two 
approved transmission lines traversed regional grid boundaries, but rather deepened the 
linkages among different provincial grids which already belonged to the same regional 
grid. In this way, both sides maintained their positions: SGCC was able construct 
further UHV-AC projects that featured prominently in its ‘Three China’ grid plan but 
no further synchronous interconnections between regional grids occurred as a result of  
this, which had been the most controversial issue within government yet also the most 
important aspect of  SGCC’s restructuring plan. The interpretation of  the approvals as 
power struggle-based compromises is further supported by the statement of  an 
employee of  the enterprise strategy division in the State Grid Energy Research Institute: 
“if  one side does not grant its approval, SGCC has many other methods at its disposal 
to make the next higher authority apply pressure, for instance through contacts in the 
State Council or through personal relationships.”508 This means that these approvals 
should not be over-interpreted as comprehensive government support for the full 
underlying agenda, especially as they evidently did not reflect the State Council’s, as well 
as the NDRC’s and NEA’s, generally sceptical stance on the issue. 
While it remains unclear why these specific approvals were granted, this episode further 
strengthens the impression that the NEA’s factual authority vis-à-vis large SOEs in the 
energy sphere is limited. Not only did the NEA have difficulties communicating and 
implementing its highly conservative stance on UHV-AC during the formal planning 
process, it also failed to translate its position into the authorisation procedures for 
specific UHV-AC projects, possibly due to a necessary compromise. Furthermore, the 
                                                
507 Zeng Dewen (曾德⽂), “SGCC’s UHV-AC dream shattered, dream of an interconnected “Three 
China” grid will not be achieved” (国⺴梦碎交流特⾼压，“三华” 联⺴恐成“南柯⼀梦”), article published on 
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chaotic circumstances in which these approvals were granted show that there was no 
coordinated government leadership on the matter of  grid planning at this time, so any 
notion that government may have been driving UHV development or supporting it 
based on a clear agenda must be rejected. The relevant sectoral supervisory bodies 
found themselves in a thoroughly passive position with very limited participation in 
agenda-setting as they only engaged with the issues placed before them by SGCC. While 
NEA and NDRC were certainly not entirely powerless in this political exchange (as will 
become clear in the following sections) it appeared as if  they had to tolerate the grid 
company’s political manoeuvring to a certain extent and to occasionally agree to 
compromises. 
 
6.2.2 The evaluation and assessment of the Huainan-Nanjing-
Shanghai UHV-AC transmission project 
A particularly insightful series of interactions between SGCC and sectoral authorities 
regarding UHV-AC approvals occurred during the evaluation and assessment of  the 
Huainan-Nanjing-Shanghai UHV-AC transmission project (淮南 - 南京 - 上海). This 
project proposal concerned the missing northern section of the UHV-AC loop 
construction which was emerging in the East China Grid after the Huainan-Zhebei-
Shanghai (2011) and Zhebei-Fuzhou (2013) lines had already been approved. It was 
therefore set to complete the first fully synchronous intra-regional UHV-AC grid of 
SGCC’s ‘Three China’ grid plan (see Figure 6.3).  
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Figure 6.3 The emerging UHV-AC ‘Loop’ construction in the East China Grid 
Source: Author’s visualisation of material presented in this section. 
 
Arguments for and against the Huainan-Nanjing-Shanghai UHV-AC line 
The main issue of contention surrounding this project was whether the existing 500kV 
structure in the East China Grid was sufficient given the growing electricity demand in 
the region and whether it would be able to support large-scale UHV-DC electricity 
inflows from other regional grids.509 This issue arose partly because by this time a total 
of three cross-regional UHV-DC lines – which due to their asynchronous nature had 
been much less contentious than UHV-AC – had been approved, all of which were set 
to feed hydropower from China’s south-west into the East China Grid (see Figure 
6.3).510 Naturally, SGCC argued that the construction of a synchronous UHV-AC grid 
in the recipient grid region was indispensable. The head of the State Grid Energy 
Research Institute, Zhang Yunzhou (张运洲), claimed that the existing conventional grid 
structure was insufficient from a security standpoint and that only an upgrade to UHV-
AC infrastructure would support shifting currents in cross-regional supply as well as any 
                                                
509 “Ultra-high voltage state engineering project deadlock unresolved” (特⾼压国家⼯程僵局待解), 21st 
Century Business Herald (21 世纪经济报道), 26.12.2013. 
510 These three 800kV UHV-DC lines were the Xiangjiaba-Shanghai (向家坝 - 上海) ‘test demonstration’ 
project, as well as the Jinping-Sunan (锦屏 - 苏南) and Xiluodu-Zhejiang (溪洛渡 - 浙江) projects. 
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shocks on a larger scale. 511  Feng Jun (冯军 ), general manager of SGCC’s Shanghai 
Electric Power Company, similarly recommended the approval of the Huainan-
Nanjing-Shanghai line and construction of the Yangtze Delta loop project as quickly as 
possible, arguing that this was vital in order to meet the development needs of 
Shanghai’s power grid, increase the allocation of clean energy and resources to the East 
China Grid as a whole, and prevent the possibility of large accidents.512 
Industry experts such as Wang Zhonghong (⺩仲鸿) of Tsinghua University, on the 
other hand, pointed out that Anhui Province as the starting point of both the northern 
and southern part of the loop project in 2012 was already a net importer of thermal 
power and would therefore have no surplus electricity to send onward to other 
provinces in the region.513 Tan Yongcai (谭永才), a former engineer at the Northeast 
Electricity Institute (东 北 电 ⼒ 院 ), furthermore maintained that electricity exchanges 
between the five provinces in the East China Grid were very limited and that optimising 
the existing 500kV grid infrastructure would easily suffice to support Anhui’s future 
needs. Adding to the questionable feasibility of the UHV project were its unnecessarily 
high investment and land resource requirements, making it a “waste of capital and 
resources, only to let citizens pay the bill”.514 
 
Administrative struggles over assessment opinions 
The approval procedures for this controversial project began with a feasibility study 
conducted by SGCC with which it was once more supposed to demonstrate the 
necessity of constructing UHV-AC based on technical comparisons with other grid 
technologies.515 During the second half of 2012, SGCC had engaged the China Power 
Engineering Consulting Group Co. (CPECC; 中国电⼒⼯程顾问集团有限公司) for this 
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purpose; 516  CPECC was a state-owned consulting firm that belonged to the grid 
company’s vertically integrated predecessor, the State Power Corporation, and in 2011 
became part of  the China Energy Construction Group, a large central-level state firm 
administered by SASAC. Focusing entirely on consulting and evaluation services linked 
to electricity projects and specialising in consulting related to UHV power transmission, 
CPECC is deeply reliant on large state-owned corporate clients such as SGCC and has a 
rather obvious business interest in furthering SGCC’s UHV agenda. 517  Given this 
background, it is not surprising that CPECC produced a feasibility study of  SGCC’s 
planned Huainan-Nanjing-Shanghai UHV-AC line that fully supported the project. 
Zeng Dewen, who again took part in the project assessment deliberations, published 
parts of  the feasibility reports which he described as “little more than a technical 
manual for SGCC’s UHV construction plan”.518 Failing to include any of  the requested 
comparisons between alternative approaches to grid restructuring, CPECC’s reports 
also lacked any reference to overarching state planning documents as would have been 
customary and instead phrased all of  its recommendations in direct reference to 
SGCC’s own grid development plans, in this case the ‘SGCC 2008 General Plan’ (国家电
⺴总体规划设计 2008 年版). Design principles for the project, for instance, were simply 
set as “meet the requirements of  the SGCC General Plan” and “use the SGCC General 
Plan as a guide [...] and comply with SGCC’s electricity flow and UHV grid 
development arrangements”. The introduction to one of  the reports read: 
Following SGCC’s UHV electricity grid plan for the 12th Five-Year 
Plan period, the UHV-AC grid will take the shape of  a backbone grid 
with ‘two horizontal and two vertical’ lines. The North, East, and 
Central China grids will be connected via UHV-AC, thereby forming 
the ‘Three China’ synchronous grid. In the East China grid a UHV 
loop construction will be completed, of  which the Huainan-Nanjing-
Shanghai 1000kV UHV-AC transmission project will form an 
important part.519  
Based on this one-sided feasibility study prepared by CPECC the grid company 
proceeded to apply to the NDRC for authorisation. However, the NDRC also received 
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a number of  critical letters from industry experts urging it to reject the project which, 
according to a People’s Daily article, caused the NDRC for the very first time to make use 
of  the possibility of  further external evaluations by tasking the China International 
Engineering Consulting Corporation (CIECC), another state-owned consulting firm, 
with a further assessment. 520  Throughout 2013, CIECC then conducted on-site 
investigations of  the already operational UHV-AC pilot project as well as a macro-
economic study of  the East China region. But although, according to Zeng Dewen, 
CIECC had made every attempt to keep its assessment objective and fair it lacked 
reliable technical information on the project to use as a basis for its assessment. The 
reports supplied by SGCC for this purpose included substantial calculation errors, were 
full of  contradictions and contained large gaps regarding important geographical and 
technical data. This seriously impacted the assessment, as did the grid company’s 
repeated failure to provide additional material requested by the assessment experts. 
SGCC, Zeng concluded, had “adopted a careless attitude which is only passively 
responsive to the authorities, and it only followed the [assessment] process for the sake 
of  keeping up with formal proceedings and for trying to force the authorities to 
approve the start of  construction work.”521 
In late October 2013, CIECC called an assessment meeting on the Huainan-Nanjing-
Shanghai project in Beijing, bringing together industry experts and representatives from 
a number of  ministries, SGCC and EPPEI, as well as provincial Development and 
Reform Commissions.522 The expert group assembled by CIECC originally consisted of  
25 people, but for reasons unknown only 19 participants signed the ‘expert opinions’. 
Of  the 14 experts that voted in favour of  the project, 8 belonged directly to the SGCC 
system (7 of  whom were employed by SGCC) and, of  the remaining 6 favourable votes, 
3 came from EPPEI which also shared close business interests with SGCC. Four of  the 
missing signatories were employed by the China Southern Grid Corporation and, as a 
matter of  speculation, would have also not been likely to vote against SGCC’s plan as 
the southern grid’s own status as an independent regional grid was not affected by it. 
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The five opposing votes, once more, were cast by retired industry experts.523 Despite the 
majority vote in favour of  the project, in November 2013 CIECC refused to 
recommend an approval because of  the continued disagreement by some of  the experts 
on the panel, leading to further delays in the assessment procedures. In response, SGCC 
protested that there were more than fifty consulting firms like CIECC and that more 
than one company should participate in the assessment “to increase objectivity, 
transparency and fairness”.524 
Before discussing the extant material, the evaluation and assessment process of  a 
second controversial UHV-AC project will be presented. Both series of  events will then 
be jointly analysed before concluding this chapter. 
 
6.2.3 The evaluation and assessment of the Ya’an-Wuhan UHV-AC 
transmission project 
A further example of  struggles over authority and expertise during UHV-AC evaluation 
and assessment procedures concerned an SGCC project dating from 2009 which 
involved the transmission of hydropower from Ya’an in Sichuan Province throughout 
the Central China Grid, all the way to Wannan (Anhui Province) in the East China Grid 
(四川雅安 - 皖南) (see Figure 6.4). Sichuan, with its rich hydropower resources, had long 
been eyed as a source of clean energy, but earlier state-level plans had rather focused on 
transmitting the province’s surplus hydropower to the neighbouring municipality of 
Chongqing and other nearby provinces within the Central China Grid via additional 
regular high-voltage connections.525 SGCC opposed this solution and instead insisted on 
a cross-regional UHV-AC connection through which the two major regional grids were 
to be synchronised into one unified grid spanning a huge landmass, and effectively 
allowing SGCC to complete almost two thirds of its ‘Three China’ grid plan. Given the 
security-related reservations among sectoral authorities regarding cross-regional UHV-
AC lines and the synchronisation of regional grids as such, initial approval submissions 
made little progress, leading SGCC to grudgingly change the destination of the 
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transmission project to Wuhan in Hubei Province (四川雅安 - 湖北武汉).526 Although this 
alteration meant that the reach of the planned Ya’an-Wuhan project was confined to the 
Central China Grid region, overall it still created a basic UHV-AC structure within the 
region that could easily be connected to the neighbouring East China Grid at a later 
date.  
 
 
Figure 6.4 The assessment of the Ya’an-Wuhan UHV-AC project in the Central China 
Grid 
Source: Author’s visualisation of material presented in this section. 
 
Based on arguments similar to those presented in earlier sections, SGCC argued that the 
Ya’an-Wuhan project was vital to securing China’s electricity supply and improving 
environmental management throughout all connected provincial grids. Critics, on the 
other hand, questioned the project’s economic feasibility and technical necessity, as well 
as its impact on grid security, maintaining that hydropower resources in China’s south-
west were insufficient in the long run and that a synchronous UHV-AC link with its 
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constant inflow requirement would cause severe shortages in the region.527 The grid 
company countered by suggesting that supply shortages could be averted by 
constructing two additional asynchronous UHV-DC lines which would supply Sichuan 
and Chongqing with electricity from the distant north-western province of Xinjiang.528 
The critics’ response, on the other hand, was that such a long detour was superfluous 
and the current hydropower surplus should rather be supplied directly to Chongqing, as 
had been planned in the original government blueprints.529 
 
Administrative struggles over assessment opinions 
Given these different perspectives, an administrative scramble ensued which began 
when SGCC engaged the Electric Power Planning and Engineering Institute (EPPEI) to 
conduct an evaluation of  a feasibility study on the Ya’an-Wuhan line which the grid 
company itself  had carried out earlier.530 EPPEI accepted the mandate and subsequently 
testified to “very positive assessment results”, emphasising in an internal conference 
held with the grid company that SGCC’s groundwork for the project provided a “firm 
basis for a smooth launch”.531 According to Zeng Dewen, who again participated in the 
following NEA-held consultation meetings, EPPEI’s unpublished evaluation was once 
more essentially a copy of  SGCC’s internal UHV plan. Neglecting to address questions 
regarding project necessity or provide substantive economic or technical comparisons 
between different transmission methods, EPPEI had come to the conclusion that the 
grid company’s suggested construction design was entirely feasible while even quoting a 
number of  factual errors and faulty calculations that had been included in SGCC’s 
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China’ UHV-AC grid (警惕电⺴建设误⼊形成 “三华” 交流特⾼压电⺴的歧途), article published on Zeng 
Dewen’s industry blog, Caixin Net (财新⺴), 08.02.2012. 
530 “Two UHV power transmission lines are about to be passed, Ya’an line to go through second 
evaluation” (两条特⾼压输电通道将放⾏ 雅安线路⼆度评估), Economic Observer Online (经济观察⺴), 
19.07.2014. 
531 “EPPEI organizes conference on the launch of the Ya’an-Wuhan UHV-AC project geological report 
assessment” (电规总院组织召开雅安--武汉特⾼压交流线路⼯程地质报告评审会议), Electric Power Planning & 
Engineering Institute, 02.09.2013, 
http://www.eppei.com/WebDetail.aspx?PartNodeId=106&ArticleID=2062, accessed 04/2015. 
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original feasibility study. 532  While EPPEI’s own nominal mandate was to support 
government in its grid planning, it appears that the institute may have found itself  
suffering a conflict of  interest after being hired by the grid company. Its historical 
background as a former organisational part of  SGCC’s predecessor, the State Power 
Corporation (SPCC), as well as its 2011 merger with a number of  former State Grid 
subsidiaries under the newly established China Energy Engineering Group Co. (中国能
建) show that EPPEI had a distinctly administrative background and function while at 
the same time being firmly rooted in the corporatised side of  the industry, which may 
help to explain its uncritical reiteration of  the grid company’s stance.533 
Following the completion of  EPPEI’s supportive evaluation in November 2012, SGCC 
sent a series of  urgent approval requests to the NDRC over the course of  several 
months. In response, the NDRC again sought out an additional third-party opinion, this 
time by the China International Engineering Consulting Corporation (CIECC; the state-
owned consulting firm which had negatively assessed the Huainan-Nanjing-Shanghai 
UHV-AC project as discussed in the previous section): CIECC was tasked with 
reviewing EPPEI’s evaluation and organising approval assessments.534 Unlike EPPEI, 
CIECC had no immediate historical linkages to the SGCC system and was not 
exclusively tied to evaluating electricity projects,535 which, in this instance, arguably gave 
it slightly more independence from industry stakeholders. 
During CIECC’s first assessment meeting in 2013, a vote on the Ya’an-Wuhan project 
was held among the 22 participating experts, 14 of  which endorsed the project with 6 
opposing votes and 2 abstentions. Of  the 22 experts on the voting panel, 13 were 
employed either directly by SGCC or by work units closely linked to the grid company 
                                                
532 Zeng, Dewen (曾德⽂). “Statement delivered in writing at the ‘consultation meeting’ on the ‘Ya’an-
Wuhan UHV-AC electricity transmission construction project’ held by the Chinese Academy of 
Engineering - Section 1 - Communication materials regarding a series of  questions concerning the 
construction of  the Ya’an-Wuhan UHV transmission project (Part 2)” (在中国⼯程院《“雅安⾄武汉交流特
⾼压输变电⼯程”咨询会议》上的书⾯发⾔材料（之⼀）关于雅安~武汉交流特⾼压输电⼯程建设问题系列交流材料
（⼆)), article published on Zeng Dewen’s industry blog. Caixin Net (财新⺴), 19.08.2014. 
533 Electric Power Planning & Engineering Institute (EPPEI), “Company introduction” (企业简介), 
http://www.eppei.com/PartNodeDetail.aspx?PartNodeID=57, accessed 04/2015; China Energy 
Engineering Group Co., “Corporate Profile,” http://en.ceec.net.cn/col/col131/index.html, accessed 
04/2015. 
534 “Two UHV power transmission lines are about to be passed, Ya’an line to go through second 
evaluation” (两条特⾼压输电通道将放⾏ 雅安线路⼆度评估), Economic Observer Online (经济观察⺴), 
19.07.2014; Zeng Dewen (曾德⽂), “The whole story about the evaluations, assessments and consultations 
surrounding the Ya’an-Wuhan UHV-AC electricity transmission project - Communication materials  
(Part 1)” (雅安⾄武汉交流特⾼压输电⼯程评审、评估、咨询事件始末--关于雅安~武汉交流特⾼压输电⼯程建设问
题系列交流材料(⼀)), article published on Zeng Dewen’s industry blog, Caixin Net (财新⺴), 24.08.2014. 
535 China International Engineering Consulting Corporation, “Company Profile,” 
http://english.ciecc.com.cn/col/col429/index.html, accessed 04/2015. 
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via common business interests. The six opposing votes, on the other hand, once more 
came from retired industry experts who supported an asynchronous DC transmission 
solution within the Central China Grid and a regular high-voltage link to Chongqing. 
Despite the vote outcome, CIECC – as in the case of  the Huainan-Nanjing-Shanghai 
project – did not recommend an approval but instead called for a second round of  
assessments in December 2013, much to the dismay of  SGCC which criticised the 
consulting firm for “not adopt[ing] the opinions of  the great majority of  evaluation 
experts”.536  
The People’s Daily reported that in preparing for the second assessment meeting CIECC 
was “even more careful with the selection of  its expert panel” and that many changes 
were made to the attendance list until the very last moment; the result was that 13 out 
of  22 experts voted in favour of  the projects while 9 opposed them.537 Despite two 
rounds of  assessment with two strong majority votes in favour of  the project, CIECC 
again sided with the opposing minority and in January 2014 delivered its ‘authorisation 
evaluation report’ to the NDRC in which it recommended ‘due to technical and 
economic considerations’ that the project be rejected.538 The consulting firm proposed, 
instead, a solution in which the existing regular high-voltage connection between the 
provincial grids of  Sichuan and Chongqing would be strengthened and an additional 
UHV-DC line would be constructed between Ya’an and the East China Grid to transmit 
Sichuan’s hydropower both to Chongqing in the Central China Grid and to the East 
China Grid. 539  This proposed solution actually conformed with SGCC’s core ‘sales’ 
argument of  allocating hydropower between both major regional grids, but it rejected 
                                                
536 Zeng Dewen (曾德⽂), “Statement delivered in writing at the ‘consultation meeting’ on the ‘Ya’an-
Wuhan UHV-AC electricity transmission construction project’ held by the Chinese Academy of 
Engineering - Section 2 - Communication materials regarding a series of  questions concerning the 
construction of  the Ya’an-Wuhan UHV transmission project (Part 3)” (在中国⼯程院《“雅安⾄武汉交流特
⾼压输变电⼯程”咨询会议》上的书⾯发⾔材料（之⼆）关于雅安~武汉交流特⾼压输电⼯程建设问题系列交流材料
（三)), article published on Zeng Dewen’s industry blog, Caixin Net (财新⺴), 24.08.2014. 
537 “Four questions regarding UHV: Safety and economic feasibility are still being called into doubt” (四问
特⾼压：安全性与经济性仍遭质疑), People’s Daily Online (⼈民⺴), 29.04.2014. 
538 “Two UHV power transmission lines are about to be passed, Ya’an line to go through second 
evaluation” (两条特⾼压输电通道将放⾏ 雅安线路⼆度评估), Economic Observer Online (经济观察⺴), 
19.07.2014; Zeng Dewen (曾德⽂), “The whole story about the evaluations, assessments and consultations 
surrounding the Ya’an-Wuhan UHV-AC electricity transmission project - Communication materials  
(Part 1)” (雅安⾄武汉交流特⾼压输电⼯程评审、评估、咨询事件始末--关于雅安~武汉交流特⾼压输电⼯程建设问
题系列交流材料(⼀)), article published on Zeng Dewen’s industry blog, Caixin Net (财新⺴), 24.08.2014. 
539 Zeng, Dewen (曾德⽂). “Statement delivered in writing at the ‘consultation meeting’ on the ‘Ya’an-
Wuhan UHV-AC electricity transmission construction project’ held by the Chinese Academy of 
Engineering - Section 1 - Communication materials regarding a series of  questions concerning the 
construction of  the Ya’an-Wuhan UHV transmission project (Part 2)” (在中国⼯程院《“雅安⾄武汉交流特
⾼压输变电⼯程”咨询会议》上的书⾯发⾔材料（之⼀）关于雅安~武汉交流特⾼压输电⼯程建设问题系列交流材料 
(⼆)), article published on Zeng Dewen’s industry blog. Caixin Net (财新⺴), 19.08.2014. 
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any UHV-AC-based synchronisation as demanded by the grid company. In response to 
CIECC’s verdict, in April 2014 the grid company sent a report to the NEA titled ‘State 
Grid Corporation report concerning the fastest possible approval of the Ya’an-Wuhan 
UHV-AC electricity transmission project and regarding the circumstances of 
assessments’ in which it criticised CIECC’s negative assessment report, claiming that it 
“lacked any foundation” and demanding that it “should not become a factor restricting 
the authorisation of the [UHV-AC] project”. SGCC also requested that the NEA 
“should not evaluate the Ya’an-Wuhan UHV-AC project again and grant its approval as 
quickly as possible”.540  
According to Zeng Dewen, in light of  EPPEI’s strongly supportive evaluation, CIECC’s 
strongly opposing assessment and the grid company’s vehement interventions, the 
NDRC and NEA (as the relevant approval bodies) found themselves in a position 
whereby they were “not able to approve the project even if  they wanted to and not able 
to abandon it either” (欲批⽆据、欲罢不能). Struggling to reconcile the two diametrically 
opposite positions, in March 2014 the NEA approached the Chinese Academy of  
Engineering (中国⼯程院), the country’s leading science and technology institution, to 
compare the two perspectives and to act as an arbiter.541 The Academy accepted the 
consultation inquiry and held three consecutive assessment meetings on the project in 
July and August 2014, first in the form of  a briefing between Academy members and 
industry experts that were not affiliated to any of  the conflict parties, and later by also 
inviting CIECC, EPPEI and the grid company to the table. The official deliberations 
for these meetings were partially based on Zeng Dewen’s written statements which were 
used as an important source of  information for this section.542 However, at the time of  
writing no final verdict on the matter has emerged as the overall approval procedures 
encountered further delays. 
 
                                                
540 State Grid Corporation, “State Grid Corporation report concerning the fastest possible approval of 
the Ya’an-Wuhan UHV-AC electricity transmission project and regarding the circumstances of 
assessments” (国家电⺴公司关于尽快核准雅安~武汉特⾼压交流输变电⼯程及有关评估情况的报告), 
Development Document No. 503 [2014], 30.04.2014. 
541 Zeng Dewen (曾德⽂), “The whole story about the evaluations, assessments and consultations 
surrounding the Ya’an-Wuhan UHV-AC electricity transmission project - Communication materials  
(Part 1)” (雅安⾄武汉交流特⾼压输电⼯程评审、评估、咨询事件始末--关于雅安~武汉交流特⾼压输电⼯程建设问
题系列交流材料(⼀)), article published on Zeng Dewen’s industry blog, Caixin Net (财新⺴), 24.08.2014. 
542 “Two UHV power transmission lines are about to be passed, Ya’an line to go through second 
evaluation” (两条特⾼压输电通道将放⾏ 雅安线路⼆度评估), Economic Observer Online (经济观察⺴), 
19.07.2014. 
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6.2.4 Analysis of negotiations over UHV-AC approvals 
SGCC’s interactions with the National Energy Administration during the evaluation and 
assessment procedures surrounding the Huainan-Nanjing-Shanghai and Ya’an-Wuhan 
UHV-AC projects demonstrated how the grid company attempted to further the 
practical application of  its grid development plan and struggled to gain approval for 
these projects in administrative confrontations with sectoral authorities.  
During these clashes, SGCC derived considerable influence over the course of  the 
assessment procedures through its stranglehold over technical information. Despite 
repeated prompts by the NEA and the assessment panels the grid company refused to 
supply critical data, especially regarding simulations of  technical and economic 
comparisons between UHV and other transmission methods within its grid area. 
Furthermore, the feasibility reports that it did supply and the evaluation reports that it 
engaged consulting firms such as EPPEI to draw up were little more than reiterations 
of  its company-level grid development plans and as such were of  very little use for 
structured assessments. SGCC also appeared to be in a position to partially influence 
the choice of  participants in assessment procedures which in both cases included an 
absolute majority of  experts that had direct or indirect employment relations with the 
grid company.  
Of  particular interest is how intermediary state-owned consulting institutions were 
utilised in disputes over expertise. Overall, SGCC’s access to these evaluation bodies 
appeared to have been as immediate as that of  the NEA, as it displayed the ability to 
shape the contents of  numerous evaluation reports which provided the official basis for 
approval procedures. EPPEI, for instance, seemed to be strongly dependent on the 
goodwill of  both state firms and sectoral authorities and appeared to draft its reports 
based on the requirements set by whichever side approached them first. During clashes 
over the 12th Five-Year Plan, EPPEI had been hired by the NEA and in September 
2012 came to the conclusion that building a UHV-AC grid was not necessary, while in 
the case of  the Ya’an-Wuhan UHV-AC project only two months later it was hired by the 
grid company and supported the construction so comprehensively that it did not even 
bother to fully rephrase SGCC’s own feasibility study that it had used as a blueprint for 
its evaluation report. CPECC, another important intermediary institution, was 
organisationally just as interwoven with the corporate side of  the electricity sector, but 
in addition had an even stronger interest in furthering SGCC’s grid development agenda 
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due to its business focus on UHV-related consulting work. The only participating 
consulting institution that the grid company apparently did not have close enough 
linkages to in order to dominate its decision-making was CIECC, which during both 
project assessments was engaged by the NEA to deliver additional assessments and in 
both cases delivered negative verdicts, despite the previous majority votes in favour of  
the projects. 
Despite SGCC’s expertise-based influence on the evaluation and assessment process, 
results for the grid company remained meagre as the NEA repeatedly delayed approval 
procedures and insisted on further assessments. The NEA’s own contributions to the 
approval procedures, however, were mostly limited to its resorting to formal 
proceedings which were codified and therefore not as readily disputable by the grid 
company. Also, the NEA appeared to have used this as a deliberate strategy to impede 
approval procedures and bring in opinions of  critical experts as support for its own 
limited standing vis-à-vis SGCC. As a result, there was a strong increase in the influence 
of  industry experts and former government officials who stood outside the SGCC 
system. After their warnings against the risks of  UHV-AC had been largely ignored by 
government over the course of  many years, these experts’ critical opinions were now 
made part of  the formal assessment procedures by the NEA in order to build a 
counter-balance to SGCC’s dominance of  opinion. 
These findings regarding ‘battles of  expertise’ between SGCC and sectoral authorities 
during UHV-related decision-making are substantiated by interview data that indicates a 
more general informational mismatch between the two sides. Although research related 
to the electricity industry in China is conducted by a variety of  public and private 
institutions, SGCC-affiliated research bodies are the only ones consistently able to 
access reliable grid data.543 According to an employee of  one of  the grid company’s 
research institutes, external and independent researchers are usually not granted access 
to this data and similar limitations apply to databases compiled by the other large state-
owned energy companies. Although central government also has its own industry-
related research capacity, government research tends to be conducted with a policy 
focus and by researchers with social science backgrounds. Technical research, such as 
the research required to assess the feasibility of  large transmission projects, is almost 
entirely produced within the SGCC company sphere which gives the grid company an 
                                                
543 Interview with a smart grid researcher at the State Grid Energy Research Institute, Beijing, 20.07.2012, 
08.11.2012. 
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influential position regarding the interpretation and dispersion of  policy-relevant 
knowledge. Furthermore, according to this employee, SGCC’s research institutes 
deliberately provide government with advice that primarily aims to ensure that the grid 
company profits from policy, while sectoral authorities encounter immense difficulties 
accessing independent consulting services. 544  An employee of  the National Energy 
Administration partially confirmed these statements, maintaining that the SGCC-
affiliated institutes “provide [the NEA] with industry research which is always shaped by 
their own commercial interests.”545  
While its advantages in the field of  expertise allowed SGCC to interfere with UHV-
related evaluation and assessment proceedings, as demonstrated in this chapter, they did 
not enable it to simply sidestep the sectoral authorities. Rather, the NEA’s insistence on 
its procedural prerogative as a counterweight to the grid company’s informational 
advantages resulted in prolonged approval delays and extended phases of  administrative 
deadlock.  
 
 
6.3 Chapter conclusions 
This chapter showed how the fate of  SGCC’s restructuring plan changed during 
attempts to advance with a broader sectoral application of  UHV technology as the grid 
company now encountered substantial government resistance regarding the same types 
of  projects that had previously been looked upon favourably through the lens of  cross-
sectoral R&D policy. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, SGCC had been able to 
tactically align itself  with the latter by portraying the 1U4L agenda in terms of  
furthering ‘indigenous innovation’ and overall industrial competitiveness, but its linkages 
at the industry level were considerably weaker. Although the grid company had invested 
tremendous effort in presenting its 1U4L plan as a more direct technological solution to 
many of  the same macro-issues that had been targeted by the State Council via the 
No. 5 Document’s sectoral marketisation agenda, it now came under much closer 
scrutiny as part of  sectoral deliberations. In the absence of  convincing ‘synchronisation’ 
with State Council macro-goals it became very difficult for the grid company to 
progress with its restructuring plan. 
                                                
544 Ibid. 
545 Interview with an official at the National Energy Administration, Beijing, 25.07.2013. 
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Empirically, this chapter analysed the administrative struggle that emerged between 
SGCC and the National Energy Administration regarding the drafting of  national-level 
grid plans as well as the evaluation and assessment procedures pertaining to a number 
of  crucial UHV-AC transmission projects. The first part of  this chapter gave insight 
into how SGCC attempted to influence government’s grid planning procedures. Based 
on a narrative of  energy development necessities that was largely supplied by the grid 
company itself, parts of  the basic logic of  the 1U4L plan (i.e. the construction of  
regional energy bases and the concept of  long-distance electricity transmission) were 
indeed included in the State Council’s overall 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) but the 
core of  SGCC’s agenda – the construction of  a ‘Three China’ UHV-AC grid – was left 
out. Throughout its negotiations with the NEA over the more specific 12th Five-Year 
Plan for electricity grid development, SGCC tried to make up for the lost ground by 
pushing for its internal grid development plan to be converted into national-level policy. 
The NEA prevented this, but was unable to produce an alternative plan due to SGCC’s 
opposition. As a consequence, a sectoral Five-Year Plan for this timeframe was never 
agreed and planning procedures entered deadlock. 
The second part of  the chapter analysed the evaluation and assessment procedures 
surrounding four different UHV-AC projects in the absence of  a sectoral Five-Year 
Plan, showing how SGCC entered into direct confrontation with sectoral regulators 
while demanding project approvals based on sector-specific reasoning. Between 2011 
and early 2014, a situation reminiscent of  a compromise evolved in which the NEA 
refused to accept UHV-AC as part of  the sectoral Five-Year Plan while still approving 
two comparatively short intra-regional transmission projects. This allowed SGCC to 
begin construction on its ‘Yangtze-Delta UHV-AC Loop’ within the East China Grid 
while limiting the overall sectoral impact of  SGCC’s restructuring plan. Both approvals 
were granted in nebulous circumstances and were not accompanied by any broader 
statements of  purpose or overall support for this grid development agenda that would 
have indicated significant changes in sectoral reform preferences within central 
government. The obvious hastiness and lack of  coordination among responsible 
government bodies furthermore suggests that the approvals were not part of  a broader 
government agenda supporting UHV-AC.  
After the two completed approvals, two further project evaluation and assessment 
procedures were analysed where, again, the NEA obstructed SGCC’s attempts to 
synchronise the Central and East China regional grids and complete the synchronisation 
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of  provincial grids within these two grid regions. The NEA’s opposition coincided with 
aggressive administrative manoeuvring on the part of  SGCC, whose high administrative 
rank allowed it to engage with sectoral authorities on an equal footing. The grid 
company’s main courses of  action during these interactions included a) entering into 
ongoing ‘battles of  expertise’ with the NEA, mainly via its direct access to important 
intermediaries such as sectoral consulting and evaluation firms which were used as 
proxies by both sides; b) utilising its strong control over industry information and 
expertise to withhold policy-relevant information and supply biased reports which 
formed the sole available data foundation for official assessments; c) seemingly 
influencing the list of  participants in approval procedures to ensure voting majorities, 
and d) repeatedly raising objections to the NEA’s decisions and refusing to cooperate 
during assessments when its interests were threatened. Applying these strategies, SGCC 
was able to partially shape the course of  bureaucratic processes during both grid 
planning and project assessments, although this only helped the grid company to a 
rather limited extent and tended to lead to situations in which both sides kept each 
other more or less in check.  
Particularly interesting in this regard were both sides’ ongoing attempts to outdo each 
other in terms of  expertise so as to get ‘objectivity’ on their side. Rather than being able 
to simply rely on political connections or on its administrative rank, SGCC actually had 
to participate in political debate and provide convincing arguments in order to protect 
and further its interests. Similarly, when addressing the grid company’s demands the 
NEA also had to engage on an argumentative level instead of  being able to dismiss 
project ideas outright, even those considered unfeasible by evaluators. In fact, entering 
into battles of  expertise with the grid company and resorting to protocol in order to 
extend project assessment procedures appeared to be the main available option for the 
NEA to actually resist the pressure applied by SGCC. In doing so, the NEA relied 
heavily on the expertise provided by a number of  external industry experts and retired 
government officials whose arguments had previously been largely overlooked, but who 
had now been granted formal participation in bureaucratic processes, most probably in 
order to provide a counter-balance to SGCC’s provision of  one-sided industry 
expertise. Together with the assessments of  the China International Engineering 
Consulting Corporation (CIECC), these experts’ critical analyses challenged SGCC’s 
argumentative prerogative and its claims regarding UHV-AC’s efficiency, 
economic/environmental costs and grid security profile, thereby slowly undermining 
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the grid company’s tactical ‘synchronisation’ with the policy goals inherent in the No. 5 
Document on which it had based its original introduction of  its 1U4L plan into the 
policy arena (see Chapter 4). Under these circumstances of  dwindling ‘synchronisation’ 
with the industry-level macro-goals pursued by the State Council and given the 
inapplicability of  its previously successful ‘synchronisation’ with cross-sectoral R&D 
policy (see Chapter 5), SGCC experienced substantial difficulties in further applying its 
agenda as it was unable to dissolve or bypass the NEA’s opposition; the NEA, on the 
other hand, was unable to rein in SGCC’s persistent challenges or remove its project 
suggestions from the agenda. 
 
 
6.4 PART B Epilogue regarding the analysis of SGCC’s 
influence on sectoral policy-making 
The three chapters in Part B of  this study showed empirically how SGCC placed its 
own industry reform plan on the political agenda (Chapter 4), managed to gain 
administrative support for R&D endeavours and the construction of  pilot projects 
(Chapter 5) and struggled against the refusal of  sectoral authorities to approve a full 
sectoral application of  its 1U4L plan (Chapter 6).  
As such, Part B of  this study has revealed a number of  important observations 
regarding the configuration of  interplay between SGCC and central government during 
the emergence of  the new sectoral reform plan. It was shown that a) the 1U4L plan as 
such originated within SGCC, that its inherent logic presented a distinct and intentional 
challenge to existing sectoral policy, and that all attempts at applying it in practice were 
initiated solely by the grid company; b) no conclusive evidence for clear central 
government leadership accompanying any of  these steps was detected, as government 
almost exclusively reacted to SGCC’s advances rather than taking proactive steps of  its 
own; c) there was systematic evidence of  government support for aspects of  the 
restructuring plan that were portrayed by the grid company as being beneficial to the 
implementation of  already existing sectoral macro-goals or cross-sectoral policy, 
portrayals which in most cases were disputed by external industry experts and d) there 
was equally systematic evidence of  government opposition to the overall sectoral 
application of  SGCC’s restructuring plan.  
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So, despite distinct differences regarding stated sectoral policy preferences, there were 
numerous instances in which government showed tolerance or even support for aspects 
of  SGCC’s grid restructuring agenda which presented an indirect yet fundamental 
challenge to existing sectoral policy on competitive regional market building. A large 
majority of  these supportive instances coincided with strong attempts by the grid 
company to tactically ‘synchronise’ the portrayal of  its restructuring plan with macro 
goals pursued by the State Council. For example, SGCC introduced its 1U4L plan into 
the policy arena by ‘synchronising’ with the overarching goals inherent in the No. 5 
Document while presenting an entirely different route towards those goals. Furthermore, 
the grid company successfully demanded government support for the construction of  
early UHV pilot projects and numerous related and sectorally contentious pursuits by 
consistently invoking cross-sectoral State Council policy regarding ‘indigenous 
innovation’ and insisting that the 1U4L plan would greatly enhance the international 
competitiveness of  Chinese industry. Finally, the grid company gained government 
support for a number of  contentious investments which openly violated the unbundling 
requirements of  the No. 5 Document but helped it progress with UHV development by 
‘synchronising’ itself  with the intrinsic institutional mandates of  different government 
bodies and engaging in targeted venue-shopping among them.  
While these ‘synchronisation’ attempts generally led to supportive responses from 
different parts of  government and allowed SGCC to progress with different aspects of  
its UHV-based agenda, the cooperative interplay ended abruptly when these 
argumentative macro-linkages were weakened or absent, as was the case during the grid 
planning-related administrative clashes between the grid company and the NEA over 
the expected sectoral effects of  applied UHV-AC technology. In the absence of  such 
suitable macro-alignments, SGCC resorted to head-on confrontation with sectoral 
authorities, but the resulting administrative ‘tug-of-war’ rarely allowed for significant 
advances and mostly led to prolonged periods of  deadlock.  
In conclusion, an important determinant for the extent of  grid company influence on 
the sectoral policy environment appears to have been whether it managed to 
‘synchronise’ the portrayal of  its own sectoral plans with government-sanctioned 
macro-goals. Given that the 1U4L plan from the outset was aimed at challenging 
existing sectoral market building policy and asset unbundling requirements, it appears 
that SGCC has been applying this ‘synchronisation’ strategy in a deliberate manner, 
attempting to utilise variances between different levels of  policy in order to circumvent 
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critical sectoral reform debates, by-pass sectoral policy requirements by gathering 
support based on higher-level policy pretexts and thereby influence the sectoral policy 
environment according to its own preferences. As well as challenging existing sectoral 
policy that was perceived as a threat to its organisational unity, the main goal pursued by 
the grid company via this ‘synchronisation’ mechanism appeared to be the 
establishment of  a setting that would allow it to permanently combine its cross-regional 
monopoly position across the transmission, distribution and retail segments with 
reliable and persistent market dominance in lucrative and nominally competitive 
auxiliary segments so as to maximise economic results at the firm level (as argued in the 
Chapter 3 conclusions). The 1U4L plan brought together both of  these pursuits as it 
combined enhanced vertical and horizontal integration of  grid assets and operations 
with a technological core that offered substantial commercial opportunities to the grid 
company due to its control over leading equipment manufacturers and technological 
standards.  
It appears that the application of  this ‘synchronisation’ strategy has indeed been 
working in the grid company’s favour and that it has been an effective mechanism for 
engaging with the policy environment in which it operated, especially in comparison 
with the confrontational bureaucratic manoeuvring observed during grid planning 
procedures which required tremendous effort but did not yield very high rewards. 
SGCC’s most significant progress during the advancement and practical application of  
its sectoral reform plan appeared to have resulted from deliberately ‘synchronising’ with 
macro-level/cross-sectoral policy in order to overcome sector-specific reservations to its 
restructuring plan. Falling ‘out of  sync’ with these macro-goals, on the other hand, 
coincided with an immediate increase in difficulties for the grid company at the sectoral 
level. 
When considered together (Part B with its focus on SGCC’s role during the emergence 
of  a new sectoral policy agenda and Part A with its evidence of  SGCC’s obstruction of  
crucial unbundling steps that formed the core of  the 2002 market building agenda), the 
two parts of  this study suggest that the grid company was able to shape processes of  
policy formulation and implementation in China’s electricity supply industry in a way 
which calls into question the validity of  the dominant government-centred perspectives 
on how economic policy is formulated and applied in China’s strategic industries. At the 
same time, Parts A and B also showed that SGCC’s influence was not nearly as 
overwhelming as the SOE-centred literature would have expected it to be as the grid 
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company repeatedly encountered severe sectoral opposition that it was unable to 
overcome despite utilising its direct access to policy-making processes and high 
administrative rank/political connections or, indeed, applying political pressure based 
on these features. In combination, Parts A and B suggest that the way in which action 
and intent on the part of  SGCC mattered in terms of  the implementation and 
formulation of  sectoral policy in a ‘most likely’ case for both streams of  the literature 
has followed a particular pattern which has been briefly outlined above. Some parts of  
this pattern, namely central state firms’ engagements with differences in mandates 
among central government bodies and with broader state goals, have been noted by a 
small number of  authors within the SOE-centred literature (such as Downs (2008b), 
Chen (2010) and Xu (2012)). These engagements’ actual effects, however, were 
inconclusively demonstrated due to these authors’ omission of  comparative angles, their 
reliance on very small numbers of  anecdotal examples and their general failure to 
provide insight into the processes via which they occurred and were linked to policy 
results. Moreover, these authors mainly interpreted their observations as evidence of  
central state firms’ extreme strength vis-à-vis weak administrative bodies while 
furthermore overlooking the distinct limitations to state firms’ policy influence and the 
bi-directional logic of  interplay between firms and regulators, as well as the factors that 
affect this logic – all of  which throughout Parts A and B appeared to be of  the utmost 
importance for understanding policy output and outcomes.  
In the following and final Part C, the suggested ‘synchronisation’-based pattern of  
interaction between central government and SGCC will be re-tested against a later series 
of  empirical processes from the electricity supply industry. If  this pattern continues to 
apply, it may be viewed as a tentative qualifier for the dominant perspectives on both 
sides of  the literature regarding the balance of  government guidance and central SOEs’ 
influence on central-level policy processes in China’s strategic industries, as well as for 
the different perspectives regarding the mechanisms through/conditions under which 
said influence occurs. 
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PART C: Re-testing findings 
 
7 Tracing SGCC’s ‘synchronisation cycle’ 
In Part C of this study, the combined findings from Parts A and B about how, under 
which conditions, and to what extent SGCC – based on both actions and intent – has 
been able to shape central-level processes of policy formulation and implementation in 
the electricity supply industry are re-tested across a number of later empirical sequences 
originating from the same industry case. A series of before-after comparisons will be 
applied in order to examine the validity of the findings that resulted from the 
application of process tracing and the congruence method throughout previous 
chapters.  
As argued in the preceding chapter on grid planning, in the absence of suitable 
‘synchronisation’ with macro-level policy SGCC encountered substantial sectoral 
opposition to the practical application of its industry restructuring plan and the 
construction of a UHV transmission network. Part C of this dissertation consists of one 
long final chapter which will illustrate in three ‘before-after’ steps how SGCC a) 
successfully overcame sectoral opposition by ‘re-synchronising’ its grid planning 
suggestions with cross-sectoral policy, this time in the environmental field; b) was 
forced back into sectoral policy gridlock once the new cross-sectoral ‘synchronisation’ 
dissolved again; and c) in response again tried to find new ways to ‘re-synchronise’ so as 
to bypass or at least reduce the impact of these new hindrances on its restructuring 
endeavours. This series of events which took place over a comparatively short period 
(mostly between mid-2014 and mid-2015) demonstrates the systematic nature of 
SGCC’s ‘synchronisation’ strategy. By illustrating a full ‘synchronisation cycle’, this 
chapter outlines the effects of both successful ‘synchronisation’ and ‘falling out of sync’ 
on the implementation progress of SGCC’s sectoral reform agenda while allowing for a 
number of inferences regarding factors that affect the applicability and shape the effect 
of this mechanism. 
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7.1 Breaking up the grid planning deadlock 
This first section will demonstrate how SGCC tactically ‘re-synchronised’ the portrayal 
of its ‘1 Ultra, 4 Large’ (1U4L) plan with cross-sectoral central government policy 
preferences in order to overcome sectoral deadlock in political negotiations. In response 
to the difficulties it encountered at the sectoral level during the clashes over grid 
planning and project approvals, the grid company adapted the presentation of its 
restructuring plan in accordance with the cross-sectoral policy shifts that were occurring 
simultaneously. These shifts were driven by a major anti-air pollution plan published by 
the State Council that lent itself to a new ‘synchronisation’ attempt and allowed the grid 
company to move its own sectoral policy suggestions from a disadvantageous 
framework of assessment to another, more advantageous one. By once more tactically 
‘synchronising’ its claims with cross-sectoral central government policy preferences, it 
will be argued, SGCC managed to shape the way in which the new macro-policy was 
applied during sectoral decision-making, ultimately leading to several new and very swift 
UHV-AC project approvals despite the tense sectoral struggles over grid planning 
which had peaked only weeks before. 
 
7.1.1 SGCC’s ‘synchronisation’ with cross-sectoral policy on air 
pollution control 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the most controversial topics of political debate 
during the repeated confrontations between SGCC and sectoral authorities over grid 
planning and UHV project approvals concerned questions regarding the economic 
feasibility of the grid company’s 1U4L plan and its probable impact on overall grid 
security. SGCC insisted that the construction of a UHV-AC grid would have major 
advantages in both areas, while external industry experts and evaluation bodies working 
with the NEA argued the opposite. Other alleged advantages on which the grid 
company had initially rested its case included claimed benefits regarding the control of 
environmental pollution based on the idea of moving air polluting thermal power plants 
to China’s periphery, far away from urban centres. Over the years and together with 
generally rising environmental awareness in Chinese politics, the grid company also 
began to emphasise potential efficiency gains and enhanced grid access for renewable 
energy as components of its grid restructuring plan.  
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While pollution control was always on the list of arguments used by SGCC to lobby for 
its agenda, it was initially not emphasised any more than any of the other multiple 
alleged advantages, as can be seen from Liu Zhenya’s 2006 landmark speech on UHV 
transmission in which the topic appears only very briefly and as one of many.546 During 
the recurring clashes between NEA and SGCC over UHV project assessments between 
2010 and 2013 the topic was hardly addressed at all, whether as part of the grid 
company’s portrayal of its projects or during the assessments driven by the NEA. As 
China’s air pollution problems intensified and it emerged that the State Council was 
working on a new policy guideline to counter this increasingly pressing issue, SGCC 
immediately seized the opportunity to rebalance its argumentative strategy by placing 
the topic of pollution control at the very top of its agenda while promoting its 1U4L 
plan to central government and the wider public. After the State Council published its 
‘Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of Air Pollution’547 in September 2013, 
SGCC began to almost exclusively present its agenda in reference to air pollution 
concerns,548 referring to the 1U4L strategy as “the inevitable, and possibly the only 
choice” for mitigating China’s smog problem.549 In the following sections, both SGCC’s 
engagement with the State Council’s anti-pollution plan as well as its impact on the fate 
of the 1U4L plan will be analysed. 
 
7.1.2 The State Council’s ‘Action Plan’ against air pollution 
Published in September 2013, the State Council’s Action Plan for the Prevention and Control 
of Air Pollution revolved around the specification of air pollution reduction targets, 
according to which the concentration levels of fine particles (PM2.5) in the air of all 
larger cities were to drop by a minimum of 10% by 2017 as compared to 2012 levels. 
For the large metropolitan area encompassing Beijing, Tianjin and the province of 
Hebei the requirement was set at 25%, and for the Yangtze and Pearl River deltas at 
20% and 15%, respectively. 550  In order to reach these targets, the ‘Action Plan’ 
                                                
546 “Liu Zhenya: UHV transmission is the only way for China’s electricity development” (刘振亚：特⾼压输
电是中国电⼒发展的必由之路), People’s Daily Online (⼈民⺴), 28.11.2006. 
547 State Council, “Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of Air Pollution” (⼤⽓污染防治⾏动计划), 
Document No. 37 [2013], 10.09.2013. 
548 “Controversy underlying the ‘effective strategy against air pollution’, SGCC promoting UHV with 
grand words” (“治霾良⽅”背后存争议 国⺴⾼调推动特⾼压), People’s Daily Online (⼈民⺴), 17.03.2014. 
549 Liu, 2013, p. 69. 
550 State Council, “Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of Air Pollution” (⼤⽓污染防治⾏动计划), 
Document No. 37 [2013], 10.09.2013. 
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demanded a general push towards renewable energy and called for a decrease in coal 
consumption in eastern and southern areas; it listed numerous measures by which these 
changes should be achieved, including, among several others, the vaguely phrased 
possibility of “progressively increasing the proportion of electricity received from 
outside” ( 通 过 逐 步 提 ⾼ 接 受 外 输 电 ⽐ 例 ). 551  While the mention of  long-distance 
transmission indicated increased backing for the concept as such, there remained 
intense political controversy regarding the specific types of  transmission systems that 
should be used (i.e. regular high-voltage or UHV, as demanded by SGCC) and the 
question of  whether synchronous interconnections between the separate regional grids 
should be constructed (i.e. whether a cross-regional UHV-AC grid should be built) or 
whether connections should remain asynchronous on the basis of  DC technology.552 In 
light of  these disputes, and just as in the 12th Five-Year Plan published in 2011, the State 
Council included a broad reference to long-distance transmission as one possible 
development trajectory but omitted any reference to UHV technology. 
When the Action Plan was disseminated to relevant central government institutions 
including the National Energy Administration, the State Grid Planning Centre (国家电⺴
计 划 中 ⼼ ) immediately stepped forward and proposed a plan centred on the 
construction of  four new UHV-AC lines, three of  which were to synchronise the six 
provinces and municipalities that together formed the North China Grid and also 
encompassed Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei Province – the major urban hub which the 
Action Plan had identified as the most urgent target for anti-air pollution measures. 
Supplemented by another four UHV-DC lines which were to transmit electricity among 
the North, North-West and East China grids, the fourth and final suggested UHV-AC 
project was the still unapproved and highly contentious northern section of  the 
Yangtze-Delta UHV-AC loop project over which SGCC and the NEA had been fighting 
for several years (see Chapter 6). According to the State Grid Planning Centre’s vice-
director Zhang Zhengling (张正陵), this plan was presented to the NEA in September 
2013, immediately after the State Council Action Plan had been published.553  
A number of  important aspects of  SGCC’s reaction to this cross-sectoral policy shift 
should be noted, particularly the grid company’s autonomous interpretation that the 
                                                
551 Ibid., Part 3, §8. 
552 “Meng Dingzhong: DC power transmission can meet all requirements” (蒙定中：直流输电完全可以满⾜
要求), Daily Economic News (每⽇经济新闻), 20.05.2014 
553 “China plans to construct twelve cross regional power lines to control smog - to enter operation 
before 2017” (中国规划建设 12 条治霾跨区送电通道 2017 年前发挥作⽤), Caijing, 26.02.2014. 
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Action Plan’s intentionally vague phrasing on long-distance transmission referred to 
UHV-AC and UHV-DC grid development, thereby determining the basis for 
subsequent negotiations over specific projects. Furthermore, in response the grid 
company only suggested transmission projects that were very close regional matches 
with the State Council’s requirements of  focusing on the urban area surrounding Beijing 
and the Yangtze River delta. Finally, all of  the suggested projects had already been 
pursued by the grid company since at least 2009 and had formed core components of  
its internal 12th Five-Year Plan. As such, they had been at the centre of  the assessment 
and evaluation struggles several years before the State Council even started drafting its 
anti-air pollution document.554 These were not new projects quickly conceived by SGCC 
in order to comply with the State Council’s requirements, but already existing project 
blueprints that the grid company had, for a long time, been struggling to realise against 
the scepticism of  sectoral authorities and which were now recycled under a different 
guise in order to appeal to the State Council as a higher authority. By presenting these 
pre-existing sector-specific projects as perfect matches for the cross-sectoral Action 
Plan, the grid company aggressively pushed the boundaries of  what had hitherto been 
politically possible at the sectoral level. 
 
7.1.3 The NEA’s sectoral application of the State Council ‘Action 
Plan’ 
One month after the State Council’s Action Plan, in October 2013 the NEA published a 
work plan which required the State Electricity Planning Research Centre (SEPRC, 国家
电⼒规划研究中⼼) to devise a research report on how to apply the new cross-sectoral 
anti-air pollution policy in the grid segment. Significantly, the appendix of  this work 
plan listed twelve specific transmission corridors as research targets which included the 
exact routes pushed for by SGCC.555 While the precise political processes through which 
SGCC’s route suggestions found their way into the NEA document remain unclear, it is 
                                                
554 “First UHV line put into operation - A ‘two vertical, two horizontal’ pattern emerges” (⾸条特⾼压线投
⼊运营 “两纵两横” 格局显现), Nanfang Web (南⽅报⺴), 25.02.2009; “State power grid plans to invest 270 
billion yuan in smart grid construction during the 12th Five-Year Plan period” (国电⺴规划 “⼗⼆五” 投资
2700 亿元建设智能电⺴), Modern Electric Technology (现代电⼦技术) 22 (2010): 93; “SGCC’s 12th Five-Year 
Plan for UHV investment officially launched” (国家电⺴⼗⼆五特⾼压投资规划出台), Shanghai Securities 
News, 13.08.2010. 
555 National Energy Administration, “Letter about entrusting research work regarding the launch of the 
electricity grid implementation programme as part of the implementation of the Action Plan for the 
Prevention and Control of Air Pollution” (关于委托开展落实⼤⽓污染防治⾏动计划电⺴实施⽅案研究的函), 
Document No. 406 [2013]. 
  196 
highly unlikely that this document represented an actual shift of  opinions regarding 
UHV-AC within the NEA, as can be seen from the phrasing of  the document itself. 
Firstly, the document instructed SEPRC to conduct its research “on the basis of  
existing national electricity grid plans”, which, as a matter of  fact, did not include any 
official support for the construction of  UHV infrastructure and which, in the case of  
the most recent version, was facing complete deadlock at the time due to clashes of  
opinion between NEA and SGCC (see Chapter 6). Secondly, the document omitted any 
specifications regarding transmission methods and voltage levels, referring to the 
projects neutrally as “electricity transmission channels” (输电通道).556  
Moreover, the document was published at a time when the NEA had just blocked 
UHV-AC from officially becoming the basis of  future national-level grid planning and 
was still in the midst of  strenuous negotiations with SGCC over various project 
evaluations and assessments. The list of  transmission corridors in the document’s 
appendix even included the exact route of  the controversial northern section of  the 
Yangtze-Delta loop which the China International Engineering Consulting Corporation 
(CIECC), a state-owned project assessment firm, on behalf  of  the NEA, was about to 
block due to security concerns (also see Chapter 6). Although the NEA did not specify 
this project as UHV-AC in its list, it was the only missing section in an already emerging 
UHV-AC grid in the East China region, so naturally only a UHV-AC specification made 
sense in these circumstances. While the exact processes underlying the publication of  
this document remain unclear, the general political setting and concurrent clashes with 
SGCC over some of  the exact same projects, as well as the phrasing of  the document 
itself, give the impression that it was issued under pressure from both the State Council 
(in order to quickly submit targeted sectoral solutions to the air pollution problem) and 
from SGCC (which had publicly advertised UHV-based project plans that perfectly 
matched the State Council’s requirements about which the NEA itself, however, 
remained highly sceptical). The political urgency underlying the matter and the pressure 
under which the NEA found itself  appears to have facilitated SGCC’s attempts to 
influence the official sectoral response to the new macro-policy. 
In its work plan, the NEA subsequently employed the above-mentioned State 
Electricity Planning Research Centre (SEPRC) to conduct follow-up research work on 
the listed transmission corridors, which was to include a forecast of  expected practical 
                                                
556 Ibid. 
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effects. The SEPRC had originally been established in September 2011 for grid planning 
assistance purposes under the Electric Power Planning and Engineering Institute 
(EPPEI, 电⼒规划设计总院),557 the evaluation institution that, qua regulations, played a 
crucial role in almost all project approval processes in the electricity sector and which 
sustained very close ties with SGCC. Just how close its working relationship with the 
grid company was could be deduced from one of  EPPEI’s 2015 press releases which 
summarised a meeting that took place between its vice chairman, Xie Qiuye (谢秋野), 
and the director of  the grid company’s UHV-DC Department, Liu Zehong (刘泽洪), in 
which Xie was quoted as saying that EPPEI would “as always continue to support 
SGCC’s work”, while Liu maintained that “SGCC and EPPEI have always been and will 
continue to be cooperative partners”, even asserting that their “mutual existence 
depends on each other”.558  
Given EPPEI’s and the grid company’s self-stated mutual dependence, it is no surprise 
that the SEPRC, as an EPPEI subsidiary, in January 2014 supplied the NEA with a 
Research Demonstration Report in which it recommended the construction of  four UHV-
AC projects, five UHV-DC projects and three conventional 500kV high voltage lines 
involving investments of  over RMB 200 billion: this exactly matched the pattern 
originally suggested by SGCC and was in full accordance with the grid company’s 
‘Three China’ grid plan.559 According to a synopsis published in the media, the report 
contents mostly repeated and summarised SGCC’s original application materials while 
emphasising that SGCC’s transmission plan fulfilled the “requirements of  the overall 
national grid pattern” and expounding on the “general plan to link up the North China 
electricity transmission channels” with the prospect of  forming a “UHV network”. At 
the same time, the report presented the four UHV-AC projects and UHV technology as 
a suitable infrastructural response to the Action Plan against air pollution, but without 
                                                
557 National Energy Administration, “State Electricity Planning Research Centre officially launched” (国家
电⼒规划研究中⼼正式启动), 30.01.2012, http://www.nea.gov.cn/2012-01/30/c_131381850.htm, accessed 
04/2015. 
558 “Xie Qiuye meets with the director of SGCC’s UHV-DC department Liu Zehong and his delegation” 
(谢秋野会⻅国家电⺴公司直流部主任刘泽洪⼀⾏), Electric Power Planning & Engineering Institute (press 
release), 02.02.2015, http://www.eppei.com/WebDetail.aspx?PartNodeId=106&ArticleID=3854 
(accessed on 01.04.2015). 
559 “NEA about to authorize 12 new transmission lines - UHV-AC to be passed” (传国家能源局将批复 12
条输电通道 放⾏交流特⾼压), Sina Web, 12.05.2014; “SGCC’s eight large UHV projects approved - grid 
link-up in northern China is looking hopeful” (国⺴⼋⼤特⾼压获准 华北联⺴有望), 21st Century Business 
Herald Online (21 世纪⺴), 13.05.2014. 
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providing any indication of  how exactly the building of  these transmission lines related 
to the air pollution reduction targets set by the State Council.560 
After receiving SEPRC’s evaluation report, the NEA engaged the sectorally less 
entangled and therefore arguably more independent China International Engineering 
Consulting Corporation (CIECC) for an additional assessment, just as it had done 
during earlier approval processes regarding UHV-AC project assessments.561 
 
7.1.4 The 2014 ‘Two Meetings’ as SGCC’s platform for 
strengthening its ‘synchronisation’ with anti-smog policy 
While the CIECC’s assessment of  SEPRC’s Research Demonstration Report was still 
pending, SGCC sought out opportunities to further implant its environmental pro-
UHV arguments into the broader political debate. One such opportunity presented 
itself  in March 2014 in the form of  the plenary sessions of  the National People’s 
Congress (NPC) and the National Committee of  the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference (CPPCC), commonly referred to as the ‘Two Meetings’ (两会). 
The ‘Two Meetings’ is when the two bodies, on an annual basis, discuss and then 
approve political decisions that tend to have already been made within the State Council 
and the Communist Party. While the decisions made during the ‘Two Meetings’ are 
usually more or less scripted, the associated discussions that take place tend to attract a 
lot of  publicity and media attention and also provide the opportunity to spread policy-
relevant messages among a large number of  high-ranking officials.  
Consequently, on the opening day of  the ‘Two Meetings’ in March 2014, SGCC placed 
articles in both the People’s Daily and the People’s Political Consultative Daily (⼈民政协报), 
the news organ associated with the CPPCC, in which the grid company chairman Liu 
Zhenya (himself  a member of  the CPPCC’s Standing Committee) explained the 
numerous ways in which UHV could help to solve China’s air pollution problem. 
Listing all of  SGCC’s environmental pro-UHV arguments (as briefly analysed in 
Chapter 4), Liu also claimed that by constructing a UHV grid in accordance with the 
                                                
560 “The claim that UHV-AC is suitable for smog control lacks a scientific basis” (交流特⾼压治雾霾缺乏科
学依据), Dongfang Daily (东⽅早报), 27.03.2014. 
561 “Assessment conference on the ‘Research demonstration report on key electricity transmission 
channels under the Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of Air Pollution’ opened in Beijing” (《⼤
⽓污染防治⾏动计划重点输电通道研究论证报告》评估会在京召开), Electric Power Planning & Engineering 
Institute (press release), 06.01.2014, 
http://www.eppei.com/WebDetail.aspx?PartNodeId=106&ArticleID=2738, accessed on 04/2015. 
  199 
1U4L strategy, PM2.5 pollution in eastern and central China could be lowered by 12% 
by 2015 and 28% by 2020, both as compared to 2010 levels. “By relying on the UHV 
grid and by forming an energy utilisation structure centred around electricity and 
focussed on clean energy”, Liu asserted, “we can solve China’s air pollution problem at 
its source”.562 The following day, similar statements were made by two of  SGCC’s top 
managers in their dual function as NPC delegates. Meng Qingqiang (孟庆强), general 
manager of  SGCC’s grid subsidiary in the central government-administered 
municipality of  Chongqing, stated that speeding up the construction of  Chongqing’s 
UHV link (the strongly contested Ya’an-Wuhan UHV-AC line; see Chapter 6) would 
effectively relieve the city’s “daily growing environmental pressure”, as it would allow a 
reduction in Chongqing’s coal usage and substantially lower its emission of  pollutants.563 
The general manager of  SGCC’s grid subsidiary in Shanghai, Feng Jun (冯军), added 
that a speedy construction of  the UHV-AC grid in the east (referring to the equally 
contested Huainan-Nanjing-Shanghai UHV-AC project, i.e. the final missing northern 
section of  the Yangtze Delta loop construction) would improve the allocation of  clean 
energy to Shanghai as well as the East China Grid as a whole and thereby provide 
“forceful support” during the process of  solving the air pollution problem.564 According 
to the People’s Daily, SGCC chairman Liu Zhenya on several occasions also personally 
intervened in discussion forums during the ‘Two Meetings’, demanding that nationwide 
UHV and smart grid construction should be accelerated. Giving “high sounding 
speeches” at a CPPCC forum, Liu announced that SGCC was now aiming to expand 
the UHV-AC grid from the previously targeted “Three vertical, three horizontal, one 
loop” setting into a “Five vertical, five horizontal” grid structure, supplemented by now 
27 planned UHV-DC projects, proclaiming that “constructing UHV can open up a 
completely new approach to smog control”.565 
This series of  statements can be interpreted as targeting a number of  different 
objectives. By linking UHV’s alleged benefits for smog control to the State Council’s 
action plan against air pollution, SGCC aimed to gain further political legitimacy for its 
                                                
562 “SGCC’s Liu Zhenya: Develop the UHV electricity grid, break the smog dilemma” (国家电⺴刘振亚:发
展特⾼压电⺴ 破解雾霾困局), People’s Daily Online (⼈民⺴), 03.03.2014; “Four questions regarding UHV: 
Safety and economic feasibility are still being called into doubt” (四问特⾼压：安全性与经济性仍遭质疑), 
People’s Daily Online (⼈民⺴), 29.04.2014. 
563 “General Manager of Chongqing Electric Power Co. proposes to speed up the construction of UHV 
lines to Chongqing” (重庆电⼒总经理：建议加快⼊渝特⾼压建设), Caijing, 04.03.2014. 
564 “SGCC representative recommends to quickly approve Huainan-Shanghai UHV line” (国⺴代表：建议
尽快核准淮南-上海特⾼压), Caijing, 04.03.2014. 
565 “Controversy underlying the ‘effective strategy against air pollution’, SGCC promoting UHV with 
grand words” (“治霾良⽅” 背后存争议 国⺴⾼调推动特⾼压), People’s Daily Online (⼈民⺴), 17.03.2014. 
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agenda, just as it had done in previous instances with regard to other cross-sectoral 
central government policies. In particular, the reference to specific and highly ambitious 
air pollution reduction targets in Liu Zhenya’s news article must be read as an attempt 
to present the construction of  the ‘Three China’ UHV-AC grid as a practical and 
immediately applicable option for implementing the State Council’s generally rather 
vague anti-air pollution policy. As such, the very mixture of  specificity in goals and 
vagueness regarding the possible routes towards achieving those goals inherent in the 
action plan appears to have facilitated SGCC’s political engagement with it.  
Also, the time and place for SGCC’s public assertions were well chosen for two reasons. 
Firstly, smog levels in northern China and especially in Beijing, where the ‘Two 
Meetings’ were taking place, had been exceedingly high in previous weeks which allowed 
the grid company to jump on the bandwagon of  public outrage over persisting ‘off  the 
charts’ smog levels and what was widely perceived as insufficient countermeasures by 
government.566 Secondly, the statements were made by the SGCC chairman and other 
top managers in their dual roles as CPPCC and NPC delegates during the annual ‘Two 
Meetings’, which is when the media focus on political macro issues tends to be at its 
highest. With its statements, SGCC further increased the already considerable pressure 
on government to more effectively counter air pollution while at the same time 
conveniently offering an ‘in-house’ solution in the form of  new UHV-AC lines. The 
timing of  these statements was very likely an important factor determining the 
applicability and subsequent effect of  the ‘synchronisation’ mechanism. 
 
7.1.5 Growing support for UHV among top officials 
Following the grid company’s growing argumentative emphasis on the claimed 
environmental merits of  further UHV construction since the publication of  the State 
Council’s Action Plan in late 2013, a number of  high-ranking government officials 
began to speak in favour of  SGCC’s agenda, including Fu Zhifang (付志⽅), a former 
alternate member of  the CCP Central Committee and now a leading official in the CCP 
Provincial Committee of  Hebei, the smog-ridden province surrounding the municipality 
of  Beijing. Fu, who had a history of  working closely with SGCC’s Liu Zhenya,567 
                                                
566 “Beijing raises pollution alert as smog lingers,” China Daily, 21.02.2014; “Beijing Pollution: How Bad 
Does It Have to Get for a Red Alert,” China Realtime Blog, Wall Street Journal, 26.02.2014. 
567 “Liu Zhenya holds talks with Hebei Province’s vice-governor Fu Zhifang” (刘振亚与河北省常务副省⻓付
志⽅举⾏会谈), SGCC press release, 12.03.2010, http://www.sgcc.com.cn/shouye/tbxw/219115.shtml, 
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suggested that “on the basis of  an ultra-high voltage grid through which north-west 
China could be connected with the Centre and the East, pollution from thermal coal-
based power generation in Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei Province can be strongly 
alleviated.” 568  Another influential ally was found in Zhang Guobao ( 张 国 宝 ), who 
between 2008 and 2011 had been the director of  the National Energy Administration 
but during whose tenure not a single new UHV-AC project and only one meagre UHV-
DC project had been approved. In a 2013 television interview, in which he disclosed 
that the dispute regarding UHV “had not been settled”, Zhang now stated that he 
believed that the government had “full confidence” in the technology which would 
“help government efforts to [...] reduce environmental pressures along the industrialised 
eastern coast”.569 During the ‘Two Meetings’ in March 2014, Zhang proceeded to argue 
that since China now had the largest installed power generation capacity in the world, it 
was “extremely necessary” to develop UHV. “Based on my own personal viewpoint”, 
he stated, “I support the development of  a UHV grid in China”.570 Although Zhang’s 
term as director of  the NEA had ended in 2011, he continued to act as a member of  
the Communist Party Group within the NEA and retained vice-ministerial rank within 
the NDRC, 571  making him an influential figure in the realm of  energy policy and 
probably one of  SGCC’s most distinguished allies within central government at the time 
even though very few connections between SGCC’s interests, Zhang’s actions and final 
industry outcomes were visible. 
In the wake of  SGCC’s modified environmental reasoning, even a number of  politicians 
at the very highest level of  the State Council for the first time publicly stated their 
support for UHV construction as a practical measure against air pollution. In 
November 2013, the vice-prime minister and deputy director of  the State Energy 
Commission under the State Council, Zhang Gaoli (张⾼丽) (ranked seventh out of  
seven members in the Politburo Standing Committee, the CCP’s highest decision-
making body), was quoted as saying that UHV would contribute to solving the smog 
                                                                                                                                     
accessed 09/2014; “Provincial leaders hold talks with heads of the State Grid Corporation - Zhou 
Benshun, Fu Zhifang and Liu Zhenya participate” (省领导与国家电⺴公司负责⼈举⾏会谈 周本顺付志⽅刘振亚
出席), Hebei Daily (河北⽇报), 19.06.2014. 
568 “Committee member Fu Zhifang: Speed up the construction of the UHV grid” (付志⽅委员：加快特⾼
压电⺴建设), People’s Daily Online (⼈民⺴), 12.03.2014; “Controversy underlying the ‘effective strategy 
against air pollution’, SGCC promoting UHV with grand words” (“治霾良⽅”背后存争议 国⺴⾼调推动特⾼
压), People’s Daily Online (⼈民⺴), 17.03.2014. 
569 “China grid says half of $100 bln high-voltage network under way,” Reuters, 21.08.2013. 
570 “Zhang Guobao: It is extremely necessary for China to develop a UHV grid” (张国宝：中国发展特⾼压
电⺴⾮常必要), People’s Daily Online (⼈民⺴), 24.03.2014. 
571 China Vitae, Biography of Zhang Guobao, 
http://www.chinavitae.com/biography/Zhang_Guobao|4103, accessed 08.09.2015. 
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problem and that it would also help to even out the regional imbalances between 
resource endowments and energy demand.572 Then, in February 2014, Prime Minister Li 
Keqiang who is, of  course, ranked second in the Politburo Standing Committee (after 
the CCP General Secretary and State President Xi Jinping) and who furthermore acts as 
the director of  the State Energy Commission, in a speech during a State Council 
executive meeting referred to cross-regional long-distance power transfers as the “main 
measure” against China’s air pollution problem, calling for the construction of  “a 
number of  transmission lines sending electricity from west to east using both UHV and 
conventional transmission technology”. 573  In April 2014, the prime minister gave a 
similarly supportive statement, which SGCC in a celebratory press release declared to 
have “ended the argument of  whether to construct UHV. The answer is YES and 
MORE.” 574  Although Li’s statements did not allow for inferences regarding his 
perspective on the issue of  constructing a synchronous UHV-AC grid, together with the 
other statements made by top officials during this time frame, they did suggest that 
SGCC’s argumentative linkage between UHV transmission and air pollution control had 
had an effect on the way in which the grid company’s infrastructural agenda was viewed 
at the highest levels of  government. 
 
7.1.6 Positive project assessments and a series of UHV approvals 
In a political environment that had grown increasingly supportive of  SGCC’s 1U4L 
plan and in which a range of  very influential government officials were now convinced 
that UHV transmission was indeed a suitable measure for combating air pollution, the 
state-owned consulting firm China International Engineering Consulting Corporation 
(CIECC) in May 2014 on behalf  of  the NEA concluded its assessment of  the Research 
Demonstration Report which had been prepared by the State Electricity Planning Research 
Centre (SEPRC) in full conformity with the grid company’s own original project 
recommendations. Unlike earlier assessments over the course of  the previous six 
months in which CIECC had repeatedly interfered with UHV-AC projects on the basis 
of  inconclusive supporting materials regarding technical and economic issues, it now 
                                                
572 “Li Keqiang: Smog can be managed through cross-regional electricity transmission - UHV to pick up 
speed in 2014” (李克强：跨区送电可治雾霾 2014 特⾼压⼤提速), AAStocks News Agency (⼤智慧阿思达克通
讯社), 17.02.2014. 
573 Ibid.; “NEA about to authorize 12 new transmission lines - UHV-AC to be passed” (传国家能源局将批
复 12 条输电通道 放⾏交流特⾼压), Sina Web, 12.05.2014. 
574 “China Enters a Golden Era of Developing UHV,” SGCC press release, 16.05.2014. 
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declared the Research Demonstration Report to be feasible. This positive verdict even 
included the Huainan-Nanjing-Shanghai UHV-AC line, the northern section of  the 
Yangtze Delta loop project in the East China Grid which CIECC itself  had blocked 
only a few months earlier on the basis of  unresolved security risks – and for which 
apparently no additional supporting material had since been supplied that could have 
reasonably altered CIECC’s previous judgement. 575  In a press release titled “China 
Enters a Golden Era of  Developing UHV”, SGCC interpreted the positive assessment 
as proof  that “constructing UHV has become a consensus.”576 
Accompanied by endorsements from top-level politicians and preceded by CIECC’s 
supporting assessment, the NEA now entered the final approval procedures.577 Over the 
course of  the following year and, seemingly, without any further administrative 
problems, all of  the four proposed UHV-AC transmission lines and two of  the five 
proposed UHV-DC projects were approved. The first of  these approvals took place in 
May 2014 and encompassed the Huainan-Nanjing-Shanghai UHV-AC project,578 which 
the grid company had been pushing for since 2010579  using a differently weighted 
argumentative approach and which, in pre-Action Plan assessments, had stirred up 
much controversy and strong opposition (see Chapter 6). With this last missing link, 
SGCC had now achieved its first objective of  synchronising all provincial grids within 
the East China Grid via its UHV-AC loop construct.580  
In further steps, three UHV-AC projects were authorised for construction which, once 
completed, will connect all six provinces and municipalities in the North China grid 
                                                
575 “SGCC’s eight large UHV projects approved - grid link-up in northern China is looking hopeful” (国⺴
⼋⼤特⾼压获准 华北联⺴有望), 21st Century Business Herald Online (21 世纪⺴), 13.05.2014. 
576 “China Enters a Golden Era of Developing UHV,” SGCC press release, 16.05.2014. 
577 National Energy Administration, Electricity Department, “Notification about accelerating and carrying 
forward the construction of  12 key electricity transmission channels as part of  the Action Plan for the 
Prevention and Control of  Air Pollution” (关于加快推进⼤⽓污染防治活动计划 12 条重点输电通道建设的通知), 
Document No. 212 [2014], 16.05.2014. 
578 “‘Northern half loop’ UHV-AC project gains approval amidst controversy” (“北半环” 特⾼压争议中 
获批), China Industry and Electrical Appliance Net (中国⼯业电器⺴), 08.05.2014; “SGCC’s Four AC and 
Four DC UHV Projects Listed in the Action Plan for Air Pollution Prevention and Control,” SGCC press 
release, 15.05.2014. 
579 “State power grid plans to invest 270 billion yuan in smart grid construction during the 12th Five-Year 
Plan period” (国电⺴规划 “⼗⼆五” 投资 2700 亿元建设智能电⺴), Modern Electric Technology (现代电⼦技术) 22 
(2010): 93. 
580 The three UHV-AC lines in the East China Grid are: Huainan-Zhebei-Shanghai (淮南－浙北－上海), i.e. 
the southern half of the “loop”; Huainan-Nanjing-Shanghai (淮南－南京－上海), i.e. the northern half of 
the “loop”; Zhebei-Fuzhou (浙北－福州). They connect the provinces and municipalities of  Anhui, 
Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, and Fujian. 
See “China’s 2nd UHV AC Power Line Approved by NDRC,” SinoCast Energy Beat, 29.09.2011; “Power 
Delivery Project from Anhui to East China Crosses the Huaihe River,” Transmission & Distribution 
World, 22.02.2013; “Construction begins on 1000kV Huainan-Nanjing-Shanghai UHV-AC project” (1000
千伏淮南-南京-上海特⾼压交流⼯程开⼯建设), Anhui News (安徽新闻), 04.11.2014. 
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region and with which the grid company had now received approval for the internal 
synchronisation of  two out of  the three major grid regions which it sought to 
subsequently combine into its overarching ‘Three China’ grid (see Figure 7.1).  
The first of  these three projects to be approved in July 2014 was the Ximeng-Jinan 
UHV-AC line (内蒙锡盟 - 北京东 - 天津 - ⼭东济南) which will vertically connect Inner 
Mongolia, Beijing, Tianjin and Shandong Province.581 This line was originally planned to 
reach all the way into Jiangsu Province in the East China Grid, but according to a media 
source this suggestion by the grid company was objected to by the NEA which argued 
that the current electricity demand in the eastern region did not necessitate a cross-
regional grid link. Given the substantial pressure to present countermeasures to the 
smog problem and the constant pressure from SGCC, the NEA therefore conceded the 
approval of  a shorter route while still preventing a synchronous interconnection 
between the two major grid regions; this further showcases that the NEA continued to 
be very cautious of  UHV-AC technology despite this series of  approvals.582 
 
                                                
581 “1000kV Ximeng-Shandong UHV-AC project obtains permission to start construction” (锡盟--⼭东
1000 千伏特⾼压⼯程获准开建), Worker’s Daily (⼯⼈⽇报), 25.07.2014. 
582 “Is ‘rectifying the reputation’ of UHV-AC too much weight for the NEA to bear?”  
(“正名”交流特⾼压，能源局不可承受之重?), Huaxia Energy Net (华夏能源⺴), 19.05.2014. 
  205 
 
Figure 7.1 UHV-AC approvals in the North and East China grids (2014/2015) 
Source: Author’s visualisation of material presented in this section 
 
The second line in the North China Grid was approved in January 2015 and will merge 
horizontally with the first line, connecting western Inner Mongolia with the city of  
Tianjin via Shanxi Province and Beijing (Mengxi-Tianjin South UHV-AC; 内蒙蒙⻄ - ⼭
⻄晋北 - 北京⻄ - 天津南).583 The third and final project in the North China Grid was 
approved in May 2015 (Yuheng-Weifang UHV-AC; 陕北榆横 - ⼭⻄晋中 - 河北⽯家庄 - ⼭
东潍坊). Originating in Shaanxi Province and passing horizontally through the provinces 
of  Shanxi and Hebei before reaching Shandong, this transmission line will complete the 
interconnection of  all provincial grids in the North China region.584 
                                                
583 “The first UHV project of 2015 has gained approval: Mengxi to Tianjin South” (2015 年⾸条特⾼压⼯程
获核准：蒙⻄⾄天津南), China Securities Net (中国证券⺴), 22.01.2015. 
584 “Yuheng-Weifang 1000kV UHV-AC transmission construction project authorization reply issued”  
(榆横〜潍坊 1000 千伏特⾼压交流输变电⼯程项⺫核准批复下发), North Star Smart Grid Online (北极星智能电
⺴在线), 07.05.2015; “Yuheng-Weifang 1000kV UHV project obtains state approval” (榆横-潍坊 1000 千伏
特⾼压⼯程获得国家核准), People’s Daily Online (⼈民⺴), 11.05.2015. 
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Of  the three UHV-AC projects in the North China Grid, the Mengxi-Tianjin South line 
most clearly demonstrates the impact of  SGCC’s smog control rhetoric on approval 
procedures. The Mengxi energy base in Inner Mongolia had for years supplied electricity 
to other parts of the North China Grid via conventional high-voltage lines, and in 2011 
an expansion of these conventional lines had already undergone government-driven 
feasibility studies and entered the first design stages before SGCC refused to further 
cooperate on the project unless the construction of a UHV-AC line leading out of 
Mengxi was also authorised.585 Once SGCC had shifted its argumentative strategy to 
match the State Council’s anti-air pollution requirements, this previously deadlocked 
UHV project was approved without much ado. SGCC’s decision to strategically modify 
and weight its arguments so as to create overlap with the new State Council’s Action 
Plan appears to have been the main mechanism through which this type of  change had 
become possible. 
 
7.1.7 Section conclusion 
This section showed how SGCC argumentatively ‘synchronised’ with cross-sectoral 
policy in the environmental field in order to circumvent sectoral-level opposition to its 
grid development plans. Cross-sectoral policy change calling for economy-wide 
environmental adjustments to mitigate air pollution provided SGCC with the 
opportunity to present its existing UHV agenda as a solution to national environmental 
challenges, and the empirics presented in this section suggest that the grid company’s 
subsequent modification in the portrayal of  its already existing UHV project blueprints 
ultimately brought about a series of  approvals for important transmission projects 
which had still been blocked by the NEA at the sectoral level shortly before due to 
strong security concerns. Once SGCC’s cross-sectoral linkages had superseded critical 
sectoral debates and once its agenda was portrayed in a way that convinced top officials 
in the State Council that the grid company was furthering the goal of  environmental 
macro-policy aimed at mitigating air pollution, the NEA’s ability to interfere with or 
even question SGCC’s agenda based on sectoral reasoning diminished rapidly. By 
                                                
585 “‘State Grid Empire’ ‘cut apart’: How four large regional grid companies became hollow shells 
overnight” (“国⺴帝国” “削藩”：四⼤区域电⺴公司⼀夜间成为空壳公司), Sina Blog, 14.05.2011, 
http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_667242870100qus0.html, accessed 03/2016; Zeng Dewen (曾德⽂), “A 
warning for electricity construction against falling into the trap of  the ‘Three China’ UHV-AC grid (警惕
电⺴建设误⼊形成 “三华” 交流特⾼压电⺴的歧途), article published on Zeng Dewen’s industry blog, Caixin 
Net (财新⺴), 08.02.2012. 
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‘synchronising’ with cross-sectoral policy, SGCC was able to evade cumbersome 
sectoral contests of  expertise and push through a significant part of  its grid 
development plan despite sectoral resistance. 
Important factors that appear to have facilitated SGCC’s successful application of  the 
‘synchronisation’ mechanism were related to the timing of  its political response, the 
political urgency of  the issue at stake and, arguably, also the particular level of  specificity 
inherent in the macro-policy to which the grid company attached its lines of  argument. 
As the sectoral authorities found themselves under immense pressure to present 
industry-level solutions to the increasingly urgent air pollution crisis, the grid company 
was able to immediately offer concrete suggestions on how to implement the new State 
Council policy. Furthermore, the anti-air pollution plan appeared particularly suited to a 
‘synchronisation’ attempt as it combined very specific sectoral targets for air pollution 
reduction with vaguely phrased potential routes for achieving those targets, thereby 
offering clear outcome-related indicators to address while leaving ample space for the 
grid company to argumentatively place its suggestions within the presented confines.  
The following two sections will demonstrate a) how SGCC’s latest ‘synchronisation’ 
with cross-sectoral policy was challenged as sectoral concerns re-surfaced in political 
debate and, as a result, government’s support for UHV-AC came to an abrupt standstill, 
and b) how the grid company responded to this challenge by feverishly searching for 
new ways to ‘synchronise’ its agenda with cross-sectoral policy as a means of  
circumventing its new opposition. 
 
 
7.2 The renewed dissolution of cross-sectoral 
‘synchronisation’ 
While SGCC had succeeded in moving past sectoral opposition to gain approval for the 
construction of  a series of  high-profile UHV projects, the underlying sectoral struggle 
had only been circumvented, not resolved, and thus continued to simmer in the 
background. This section shows how sectoral opposition flared up again, triggered by 
the grid security-related outcries of  critical industry experts who were brought into the 
official deliberation process on grid planning, thus eroding SGCC’s new cross-sectoral 
policy linkage and once more placing the debate on UHV-AC in the context of  sectoral 
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concerns. On the basis of  these sectoral concerns, top-level policymakers and, in turn, 
also the NEA eventually paused further authorisations and initiated an entirely new 
round of  very basic assessments regarding all facets of  UHV-AC technology and its 
application. As soon as SGCC’s previously successful ‘synchronisation’ with cross-
sectoral policy collapsed, it will be shown, top-level government support was withdrawn 
and the grid company found itself  back in sectoral-level deadlock. 
 
7.2.1 The emergence of counter-arguments to SGCC’s linkage 
between UHV and air pollution control 
The ‘Two Meetings’ of  the NPC and the CPPCC in March 2014 had provided the grid 
company with an excellent opportunity to further publicise its environmental pro-UHV 
arguments, but the heightened public attention surrounding air pollution control and 
UHV’s alleged contributions to it also caused experts and industry observers to 
scrutinise the validity of  the grid company’s claims closely. Beginning around March 
2014, a number of  critical articles were published in state-owned news outlets such as 
the People’s Daily in which industry analysts deemed it highly questionable whether the 
large-scale construction of  UHV infrastructure was really an effective strategy for air 
pollution control. Lin Boqiang (林伯强), one of  China’s leading academic observers of  
the energy industry, agreed that UHV might indirectly help to provide smog relief  if  it 
was combined with limitations on thermal power generation in the most strongly 
affected regions. At the same time, he argued that existing environmental problems 
would simply be transferred to China’s northern and western regions where thermal 
power generation would be drastically scaled up and that atmospheric circulation could 
still distribute the pollutants across the entire country. Given that the already operational 
UHV transmission projects had achieved neither the technical nor economic efficiency 
levels proclaimed by SGCC (see Chapter 5), Lin concluded that other measures were 
generally better suited to addressing air pollution and that UHV should be last on the 
list.586 Wang Zhixuan (⺩志轩), general secretary of  the China Electricity Council (中电联
), shared a similar view, stating that the main causes of  air pollution in China were 
linked to problems in the general energy structure and the widespread burning of  coal 
which, he argued, could not simply be solved by ‘substituting coal for electricity’, as was 
                                                
586 “Controversy underlying the ‘effective strategy against air pollution’, SGCC promoting UHV with 
grand words” (“治霾良⽅”背后存争议 国⺴⾼调推动特⾼压), People’s Daily Online (⼈民⺴), 17.03.2014. 
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cryptically propounded by SGCC.587 Given that overall emissions of  pollutants were still 
on the rise and would continue to be so even if  SGCC’s suggested smog relief  strategy 
were adopted as this ultimately rested on the expansion of  large-scale regional thermal 
power bases, other observers remarked that the essence of  the air pollution problem 
would remain unchanged and questioned whether constructing more UHV lines would 
even improve the overall air quality at all.588 Additionally, critics pointed out that the 
high losses of  electricity incurred during UHV transmission as compared to 
conventional high-voltage transmission made it very doubtful whether the alleged 
environmental gains of  UHV would even be able to balance out the additional line 
losses.589 Finally, industry expert and former official Zeng Dewen argued that while 
UHV-DC as the asynchronous and more economical variant of  UHV-based long-
distance transmission might at least have some merit as a measure against air pollution, 
the synchronisation of  regional grids via UHV-AC demanded by SGCC was entirely 
superfluous as conventional intra-regional high-voltage AC lines supported by UHV-DC 
could achieve the same outcomes at lower economic cost and without the systemic risk. 
Hinting at the corporate interests at stake in this issue, Zeng advised that the SGCC 
Planning Centre, which had devised the grid company’s UHV-based response to the 
State Council’s Action Plan against air pollution, “needed to keep in mind the state’s 
benefit and the people’s benefit”.590 
 
7.2.2 The impact of renewed expert criticism on the fate of UHV-AC 
After being quoted in influential state-owned news organs such as the People’s Daily, the 
increasingly vehement critical voices which had already contributed to the emergence of  
substantial obstacles for the grid company during earlier UHV-AC project assessments 
held by the NEA were now also granted participation in the national-level meetings of  
the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). In May 2014, the 
CPPCC held a discussion forum titled “Develop UHV electricity transmission, optimise 
                                                
587 Ibid. 
588 “SGCC’s eight large UHV projects approved - grid link-up in northern China is looking hopeful”  
(国⺴⼋⼤特⾼压获准 华北联⺴有望), 21st Century Business Herald Online (21 世纪⺴), 13.05.2014. 
589 “Four questions regarding UHV: Safety and economic feasibility are still being called into doubt”  
(四问特⾼压：安全性与经济性仍遭质疑), People’s Daily Online (⼈民⺴), 29.04.2014. 
590 Zeng Dewen (曾德⽂), “Serious technical and economic problems exist with the North China UHV-
AC grid framework” (华北电⺴交流特⾼压⺴架⽅案存在严重的技术经济问题), article published on Zeng 
Dewen’s industry blog, Caixin Net (财新⺴), 13.02.2014; “The claim that UHV-AC is suitable for smog 
control lacks a scientific basis” (交流特⾼压治雾霾缺乏科学依据), Dongfang Daily (东⽅早报), 27.03.2014. 
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electrical power patterns” to which the critical industry experts were invited and which 
they used as a platform to speak up against UHV-AC while disseminating their 
environmental, economic and grid security-related counter-arguments among an 
audience of  distinguished officials.591 The intervention by external industry experts prior 
to and during this discussion forum sparked heated altercations among high-profile 
forum participants about the fate of  UHV-AC and ultimately led to a spectacular 
confrontation between grid company executives and top officials.  
The guiding speech during the discussion forum was given by CPPCC chairman Yu 
Zhengsheng (于正声), who is also a member of  the Politburo Standing Committee and 
ranks fourth in command within the entire Communist Party. In his address, Yu stated 
that long-distance power transmission as such was inevitable and that no further 
debates would be held about the merits of  asynchronous UHV-DC transmission, while 
adding that strong differences of  opinion persisted with regard to synchronous UHV-
AC’s transmission capacity, economic efficiency, preferable scope of  application and 
associated security concerns. Regarding those differences of  opinion, which hitherto 
had been almost exclusively addressed by the small group of  retired industry experts, 
Yu, in the presence of  SGCC’s top executives, posed a series of  highly contentious 
questions. He first asked whether it would be problematic to forgo UHV-AC entirely 
and to place more emphasis on UHV-DC transmission so as to construct “strong DC 
and weak AC” transmission (强直弱交; i.e. UHV-DC feeding into conventional high-
voltage AC grids). In doing so, he challenged the alleged inseparability of  UHV-AC and 
UHV-DC which had been a core component of  the chain argument used by the grid 
company to tie together different parts of  its reform agenda while presenting it to 
central government as an advantageous bundle of  technological upgrades. Yu 
concluded that if  such a division were indeed possible, no further UHV-AC should be 
built, adding that this question touched upon national security as well as national 
development trajectories and therefore needed to be solved promptly. Secondly, 
addressing another counter-argument which had originally been presented by the group 
of  industry experts, Yu questioned whether UHV-AC was actually more economical 
than the regular high-voltage AC transmission which was already being used across 
China’s grid structure. If  UHV-AC was more expensive, he inquired, why should it be 
built? Finally, he asked, if  UHV-AC construction were to continue, “what about the 
                                                
591 “What did the CPPCC say about ‘UHV’?” (关于“特⾼压”政协座谈会都说了些啥?), Wusuobuneng Energy 
News (⽆所不能), 19.05.2014. 
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security of  the synchronous ‘Three China’ grid”?592 Following these questions, Yu stated 
that “collective research and scientific proof ” was necessary, calling upon the NEA to 
organise further demonstrations and assessments regarding UHV-AC development.593 
The NEA’s vice director Wang Yumin (⺩禹民), who also spoke at the discussion forum, 
immediately responded to Yu Zhengsheng’s appeal. On the one hand, he vowed to 
“actively support UHV as an important long-distance high-capacity transmission 
method” (as phrased by top leaders such as Prime Minister Li Keqiang during the 
preceding ‘supportive’ phase) and that the construction of  UHV transmission should be 
“scientifically carried forward” in accordance with the already finalised recent approvals 
following the publication of  the State Council’s Action Plan for pollution control. On 
the other hand, Wang agreed that further assessments of  issues pertaining to the 
synchronous ‘Three China’ grid were necessary, the main risk being widespread and 
uncontrollable blackouts across large grid areas. A decision on whether or not to 
continue constructing the ‘Three China’ grid, Wang stated, could only be made on the 
basis of  further assessments regarding grid security.594 
As top-level officials began to suggest that the further development of  SGCC’s core 
grid restructuring project ought to be suspended until further notice, the grid company’s 
new CEO Shu Yinbiao (in office since May 2013), according to a meeting summary 
published by a number of  attending experts, angrily intervened by asking rhetorically:  
While discussing UHV-AC and UHV-DC, is it really necessary to try 
and differentiate which is good and which is not? If  so, I could also 
ask whether men are better or whether women are better! Would 
things work out if  there were only men or only women? How can 
UHV-AC and UHV-DC even be compared? UHV-AC and UHV-DC 
must be developed in a coordinated manner, just like the relationship 
between men and women must take a harmonised form.595  
                                                
592 Ding Daoqi (丁道⻬), Wang Zhonghong (⺩仲鸿), Zeng Dewen (曾德⽂) and Meng Dingzhong (蒙定中). 
“Recording the truth about the CPPCC’s statement ‘Develop UHV electricity transmission, optimise the 
structure of the electricity system’ - The false opinions fabricated by SGCC persist during and after the 
Conference...” (全国政协《“发展特⾼压输电，优化电⼒布局”双周协商座谈会》记实--国⺴公司发展交流特⾼压
电⺴的错误舆论在会上、会下继续...), article published on Zeng Dewen’s industry blog, Caixin Net, 
19.06.2014; “What did the CPPCC say about ‘UHV’?” (关于“特⾼压”政协座谈会都说了些啥?), 
Wusuobuneng Energy News (⽆所不能), 19.05.2014. 
593 “CPPCC symposium exposes: Proponents and opponents of UHV-AC for the first time ‘directly 
crossed swords’” (全国政协座谈会曝光：交流特⾼压正反⽅⾸次“正⾯交锋”), Caijing Online (财经⺴), 
19.05.2014. 
594 Ibid.; “What did the CPPCC say about ‘UHV’?” (关于“特⾼压”政协座谈会都说了些啥?), Wusuobuneng 
Energy News (⽆所不能), 19.05.2014. 
595 Ding Daoqi (丁道⻬) et al., Caixin Net, 19.06.2014. 
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While Shu’s nonsensical comparison failed to address any of  Yu Zhengsheng’s 
questions, it did indicate that SGCC’s top executives were becoming very nervous about 
losing their argumentative prerogative regarding grid development trajectories. In its 
own news organ, the State Grid News (国家电⺴报), SGCC subsequently glossed over all 
controversy by the simple means of  not reporting any of  the criticism voiced during the 
discussion forum. Censoring the opinions of  a Politburo Standing Committee member, 
the grid company even omitted Yu Zhengsheng’s guiding speech, claiming instead that 
“a wide consensus regarding all aspects of  UHV has taken shape” and that all experts in 
attendance had praised UHV-AC as well as the ‘Three China’ grid.596 
The probing comments on SGCC’s reform agenda on the part of  top-level central 
government officials witnessed in this episode were unprecedented. In the midst of  
SGCC’s very successful attempt to secure approvals for further UHV-AC transmission 
projects by constructing argumentative linkages between its sectoral restructuring plan 
and the State Council’s cross-sectoral Action Plan for smog control, the grid company 
suddenly found itself  confronted with severe sector-specific criticism by top leaders 
who were now citing experts’ arguments related to potential security threats and 
economic risks associated with UHV-AC technology. The experts’ persistence and top 
officials’ support for their participation in important discussion forums halted SGCC’s 
run of  success in latching on to cross-sectoral environmental policy to push through 
new transmission projects: the controversy surrounding UHV-AC was pulled back 
down to the sectoral level and into an argumentative realm that was much more difficult 
for SGCC to control than the macro-debate about smog control, which, in its first 
transposition to the electricity industry, had been mainly shaped by the grid company 
itself.  
The cross-sectoral debate which had been highly advantageous for the grid company 
and the much more adverse sectoral dispute about potential security risks now arguably 
for the first time simultaneously had the full attention of  top leaders. Previously, SGCC 
had been very successful at playing off  different levels of  government against each 
other and keeping debates separate by silencing opposing experts, addressing their 
arguments with elaborate counterpoints that were difficult to independently verify, 
manipulating reports to the State Council and repeatedly amending its portrayals of  the 
1U4L plan in attempts to guide broader political awareness at the top away from 
                                                
596 State Grid News 1931 (19.05.2014), as quoted by Ding Daoqi (丁道⻬) et al., Caixin Net, 19.06.2014. 
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inconvenient sectoral debates and towards more opportune discussions about macro-
issues championed by the State Council which it claimed to be contributing to. The 
effectiveness of  this approach was now reaching its limits. Overall, SGCC had largely 
managed to rid itself  of  previous debates about deepening monopoly structures and the 
questionable economic nature of  UHV-AC, but the grid security issue in particular was 
now back on the agenda and causing top officials to question whether any further 
UHV-AC projects should be constructed at all, thereby posing an enormous threat to 
the grid company’s development plans. 
 
7.2.3 The NEA’s U-turn on UHV-AC 
Following Yu Zhengsheng’s call for additional assessments, in December 2014 the NEA 
published a new policy document in which it declared that “for a long time, there has 
been a dispute about questions regarding the wide-spread application of  1000kV UHV-
AC technology, which to a certain level has restricted the healthy and sustainable 
development of  China’s electricity industry”. 597  In order to “fully demonstrate the 
necessity, security and economic feasibility of  using UHV-AC technology”, the 
document charged various institutions with conducting an entirely new round of  
research while “upholding the principle of  ‘seeking the truth from facts’ [...], so as to 
provide valuable consultation for the state’s scientific decision-making regarding 
electricity grid development”.598 While the NEA was still in the midst of  finalising the 
approvals of  the four UHV-AC projects that had been authorised with broad 
government backing in response to the State Council’s anti-air pollution plan, any 
further approvals were now officially made dependent on the outcome of  this renewed 
research enquiry.599  
The new requirement for very basic additional research work concerning UHV-AC 
technology was an enormous setback for the grid company. However, although the 
research has not yet been completed at the time of  writing, a close analysis shows that 
the precise setup of  the prescribed research work contained a number of  compromises 
that are likely to limit the objectivity of  the overall endeavour. Especially notable in this 
                                                
597 National Energy Administration, General Department, “Letter about entrusting research tasks 
regarding the development of UHV-AC” (国家能源局综合司关于委托开展特⾼压交流课题研究的函), 
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regard are the particular combinations of  institutions chosen to carry out the 
investigations. Research on important topics such as “Nationwide electricity flows”, the 
“Sustainability of  West-to-East electricity transfers”, and a “Nationally unified grid 
computation platform”, for instance, was to be conducted by a consortium headed by 
the State Electricity Planning Research Centre (SEPRC),600 a subsidiary of  the Electric 
Power Planning and Engineering Institute (EPPEI) which was one of  the core sectoral 
evaluation bodies and a default participant in project evaluations. Both SEPRC and its 
parent organisation are deeply intertwined with SGCC in terms of  business interests 
and also have a history of  strongly supporting SGCC’s grid development endeavours 
(see previous section in this chapter and also Chapter 6). Furthermore, the research 
reports that SEPRC was now asked to supply as part of  the overall re-evaluation of  
UHV-AC were to be devised under the participation not only of  well-known domestic 
universities and the China Electricity Council, but also of  the China Southern Grid 
Corporation as well as SGCC itself.601  
Other crucial research tasks which touched upon the core issue of  grid synchronisation 
and encompassed comparisons between UHV-DC, UHV-AC and conventional high-
voltage technology were to be carried out by the very same entities as above, albeit in a 
non-cooperative fashion where each entity was to supply a separate research report. 
These topics included “‘Strong DC, weak AC’ research” (i.e. the combined application 
of  UHV-DC and conventional AC technology as suggested by CPPCC Chairman Yu 
Zhengsheng), the “Analysis of  accidents in large power grids domestically and abroad”, 
“Research on the security of  the ‘Three China’ grid” and an “Economic comparison 
between UHV and conventional high-voltage grids”.602 Being able to compare separate 
reports regarding these topics will place the NEA in a slightly more powerful position, 
although given the close working relationships between SEPRC and the two grid 
companies it still appears unlikely that this will prevent cooperation between the 
different entities and equally unlikely that any of  these entities will veto SGCC’s plans.  
Finally, of  particular note were the small number of  research tasks in which SGCC was 
not listed to participate at all. Arguably the most important and contentious of  these 
was “Research on the rational scope of  China’s synchronous grids” (我国同步电⺴合理规
模研究). This research topic, which essentially summarised the core issue over which 
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NEA and State Grid had been fighting for years, was the only one that was assigned to a 
group of  well-known domestic universities for separate evaluation and was not given to 
any sectoral entities, whether from industry or the several sectoral planning and 
consulting institutions.603 While this indicates the particular importance of  this issue, it 
is also emblematic of  the NEA’s ongoing struggle to receive policy-relevant industry 
information that was not biased in favour of  the grid company. It remains to be seen 
how conclusive the requested academic reports will be as even the universities, which 
may be viewed as the most impartial participants in this new round of  research, will 
very likely be unable to provide objective expertise if  SGCC refuses to supply relevant 
and accurate data, as during earlier NEA attempts to assess the feasibility of  UHV-AC. 
Overall, the chances that the new round of  research will lead to conclusive outcomes 
that will allow for a clear verdict for or against the construction of  a synchronous 
‘Three China’ UHV-AC grid do not seem very high as further decision-making will 
almost certainly continue to be subject to a conflict over the interpretation of  industry 
information of  questionable accuracy. 
 
7.2.4 Section conclusion 
While the previous section showed how SGCC’s tactical ‘synchronisation’ with the State 
Council’s anti-air pollution policy allowed the grid company to bypass sectoral resistance 
and forced the NEA to yield to its project suggestions, this section demonstrated that as 
soon as these new cross-sectoral linkages began to be overridden by pressing issues of  
sectoral relevance the progress the grid company was making in implementing 1U4L 
came to a standstill. With dwindling cross-sectoral synchronisation, SGCC was forced 
to take its claims back to the sectoral level and into very heated and cumbersome 
technical arguments about the advantages and disadvantages of  different types of  grid 
structures and technologies. 
This section substantiated earlier findings regarding the importance of  the expertise 
factor in sectoral conflicts which were now re-emerging. Although SGCC undoubtedly 
had tremendous advantages over the central government bodies in the information 
realm, the sectoral authorities showed the ability to bring in external expertise as a 
counterbalance. The inclusion of  critical external industry experts during the CPPCC 
meeting in 2014 had immediate impact, as their participation in political debates at the 
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highest levels brought about a shift in perspectives among top leaders which ultimately 
allowed the NEA to re-engage in its previously interrupted assessment work on UHV 
technology. The top officials’ demands for further assessments at the CPPCC meeting 
were based entirely on arguments that these experts had emphasised for a whole decade 
(i.e. economic and security issues surrounding UHV-AC) and that the NEA had in 
recent years integrated into its sectoral decision-making where it had already led to 
significant setbacks for the grid company. Most recently, SGCC had been able to 
successfully circumvent these obstacles by matching the portrayal of  its 1U4L plan with 
top leaders’ intense focus on the issue of  air pollution, but as soon as this cross-
sectorally grounded line of  argument lost traction in political debate the grid company 
found itself  back in sectoral deadlock. 
The fact that the majority of  the external experts who triggered this renewed shift 
belonged to the same small group of  retirees without administrative rank also 
reconfirms just how limited the availability of  non-SGCC-infused expertise was (and is) 
for the sectoral authorities. This is not to argue that the experts brought in by the NEA 
did not also have their own biases, but at least they offered perspectives that were not 
entirely driven by grid company interests and that therefore placed SGCC under 
pressure to prove more comprehensively the validity of  its arguments. A further 
important example of  the NEA’s resorting to external expertise as a way to challenge 
the grid company’s informational and interpretational prerogative was given by the 
engagement of  universities that were asked to separately – and explicitly without the 
participation of  the grid company – supply assessment opinions regarding the risks and 
opportunities of  synchronising China’s regional grids, although the outcomes of  this 
new round of assessments were still anticipated at the time of writing. 
The onset of the extensive re-evaluation of UHV-AC technology immediately after a 
series of UHV-AC projects had been approved provided a strong challenge to SGCC’s 
1U4L plan. At the same time, it should be remembered that the conceptual basis on 
which essentially all deliberations between SGCC and government institutions were 
taking place at this point had been supplied in its entirety by the grid company. SGCC 
itself had provided the conceptual foundation underlying most of the sectoral 
restructuring measures that had taken place since about 2009. Regardless of the 
outcome of the new re-assessments, crucial components of the 1U4L plan such as 
regional energy bases, UHV-DC and regionally separate UHV-AC grids to a large extent 
already exist or are currently being constructed. The core issue which remains to be 
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settled is whether the emerging regional UHV-AC grids will ultimately be connected 
into a single cross-regional ‘Three China’ UHV-AC grid, which naturally remains a 
highly important question for the grid company. However, even if the ‘Three China’ 
grid interconnection ultimately fails to be fully authorised, the grid patterns that have 
emerged since the mid-2000s and that are emerging at the time of writing already 
represent a compromise solution in which SGCC, after both effortless (argumentatively) 
‘synchronised’ and cumbersome ‘non-synchronised’ phases of deliberations with central 
government, has achieved the implementation of a very large portion of its sectoral 
development plan while over the course of more than a decade preventing the practical 
application of substantial market reforms – including all of the grid-specific asset 
unbundling requirements and the emergence of regionalised competition. 
Despite these very objective successes that it had already achieved, the grid company 
immediately reacted to the new grid development challenges that it was facing. As the 
following final section in this chapter will demonstrate, it did so by a) suggesting a 
double-edged ‘compromise’ to calm down the heated sectoral debate, while b) feverishly 
searching for new ways to argumentatively ‘synchronise’ 1U4L with other cross-sectoral 
policies in order to overcome its new sectoral obstacles, exactly as it had done in 
numerous earlier instances. 
 
 
7.3 A compromise to buy time – and new cross-sectoral 
‘synchronisation’ attempts 
Despite the significant set-back suffered due to the disintegration of its cross-sectoral 
‘synchronisation’ and the NEA’s subsequent insistence on a new round of basic 
assessments, implementing the 1U4L plan remained SGCC’s top priority. The grid 
company found itself in a situation where it simultaneously encountered resistance from 
sectoral and cross-sectoral authorities over a conflated mixture of sectoral concerns 
(grid security and economic feasibility) and cross-sectoral concerns (smog control, 
national security and development trajectories), which it responded to in two steps. 
Firstly, attempting to pacify the chaotic debate, SGCC yielded its position concerning 
the grid interconnection issue, suggesting a compromise solution whereby three separate 
regional UHV-AC grids would be constructed instead of one cross-regional ‘Three 
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China’ grid, a ‘compromise’ that, however, appeared to be mainly geared towards 
achieving grid interconnection via a detour. Secondly, trying to regain argumentative 
dominance, the grid company attempted to reconfigure the disrupted argumentative 
linkages between 1U4L and cross-sectoral policy by placing a renewed emphasis on 
grid-centred development ideas for the energy sector at large; it had been developing 
these ideas in the background and now attempted to ‘synchronise’ them with other 
macro-level policy issues that were currently trending in policy circles. These steps will 
be discussed in the following sections before concluding both this chapter as well as the 
empirical part of this dissertation. 
 
7.3.1 SGCC’s suggestion of a grid development ‘compromise’ 
Faced with renewed criticism and doubt regarding UHV-AC, in June 2014 (i.e. 
immediately after the disastrous CPPCC meeting during which further UHV-AC 
construction had been called into question) SGCC put forward a grid development 
suggestion which, on the surface, abandoned the idea of  a cross-regional ‘Three China’ 
UHV-AC grid and instead entailed upgrading existing high-voltage transmission within 
the three large grid regions into separate regional UHV-AC grids.604  While separate 
regional UHV-AC grids had already been approved and were emerging in the East and 
North China grids, the grid company now suggested that an analogous structure in the 
Central China Grid should be built. In this way, the grid company addressed the 
growing worries over potential security threats posed by a cross-regional interconnected 
grid while keeping an avenue open for the continuation of  UHV-AC construction as 
such.  
A number of experts pointed out the problematic nature of SGCC’s ‘compromise’ 
suggestion. Ding Gongyang ( 丁 功 杨 ), a respected authority in the field of  grid 
technology and planning, had contended for years that synchronous intra-regional 
UHV-AC grids posed the very same type of  security risks for provincial grids as a cross-
regional UHV-AC grid would pose for the different regional grids.605 These risks, he and 
                                                
604 Guo Xiangrong (郭象容) and Tan Yongcai (谭永才), “We cannot allow lies to conceal the facts - 
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Wang Zhonghong (⺩仲鸿) of Tsinghua University argued, were especially pertinent 
within the East China Grid where a general lack of  surplus electricity made cross-
provincial transfers within the region via UHV-AC completely unnecessary and a huge 
waste of  investment. Additionally, Ding warned that the predictable scarcity of  surplus 
electricity could eventually be used by SGCC as a justification for connecting and 
synchronising the East China UHV-AC grid with neighbouring UHV-AC grids at a later 
date in order to ‘alleviate supply shortages’.606  
Telling information about the nature of  SGCC’s compromise suggestion can be derived 
from the company’s grid investment plan for 2015. While SGCC had dropped all 
project suggestions that would have led to an immediate synchronisation of  the North 
and East China regional grids from its investment plan, it included blueprints for new 
UHV-AC projects that would instead bring the two regional grids as close to each other 
as possible without actually connecting them. Firstly, it suggested a U-shaped structure 
within Shandong Province on the southern fringes of  the North China region as well as 
an adjacent ∩-shaped line in Jiangsu Province on the northern fringes of the East China 
region (see Figure 7.2).607 The routes were to run in immediate proximity to each other 
along the border of the two grid regions, the distance between the two closest 
substations amounting to barely 80km. Given the tremendous distances SGCC generally 
aimed to cover via UHV-AC and that the main purpose of UHV-AC technology was to 
enable the construction of large interconnected grids, the planned routes indicate that 
SGCC’s ‘compromise’ was more akin to a detour towards eventual cross-regional 
interconnection at a later point. 
 
                                                
606 “Ultra-high voltage state engineering project deadlock unresolved” (特⾼压国家⼯程僵局待解), 21st 
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607 Route envisioned in Shandong Province: Jinan-Zaozhuang-Linyi-Weifang UHV-AC (济南 - 枣庄 - 临沂 
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“SGCC plans to invest RMB420 billion in 2015 - UHV construction strongly exceeds expectations”  
(国⺴ 2015 年计划投资 4202 亿 特⾼压建设⼤超预期), Shanghai Securities News (上海证券报), 16.01.2015; 
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六交⼋直”线路), CNPC Online, 19.01.2015. 
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Figure 7.2 SGCC’s 2015 ‘compromise’ suggestions for UHV-AC grid development 
Source: Author’s visualisation of material presented in this section. 
 
A similarly suspicious suggestion emerged as part of SGCC’s development plans for the 
Central China Grid. Not even a month after the NEA had mandated the large round of  
UHV-AC re-assessments, SGCC published its intention to construct a number of  new 
mega-projects within, as well as beyond, the Central China Grid.608 While no longer 
listing the Ya’an-Wuhan line which was stuck in administrative deadlock (see 
Chapter 6), SGCC instead planned to extend the already operational Jindongnan-
Nanyang-Jingmen (晋东南 - 南阳 - 荆⻔) UHV-AC ‘test demonstration’ project which 
reaches into the North China Grid, albeit not far enough to connect with the newly 
emerging UHV-AC structure within the northern grid region. A north-south extension 
of  this line between Mengxi/Inner Mongolia and Changsha/Hubei was to alleviate this 
shortcoming. Moreover, SGCC listed a second perpendicular north-south axis which 
would also connect the Central and North China grids a little further to the east 
between Zhangbei/Hebei and Nanchang/Jiangxi, supplemented by four shorter 
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horizontal segments that would link the two major vertical lines. 609  Finally, SGCC 
proposed to build a large ⦶-shaped UHV-AC loop connecting hydropower bases in 
western Sichuan Province with the municipality of Chongqing, for which the grid 
company aimed to complete a feasibility study during 2015 (see Figure 7.2).610  
Together, these projects would form a comprehensive regional UHV-AC grid in the 
Central China Grid region, including two solid interconnections with the North China 
Grid, which supports the notion that SGCC’s ‘compromise’ proposal was little more 
than a thinly disguised continuation of its original grid development strategy. Although 
the grid company had publicly backed away from its demands regarding a cross-regional 
‘Three China’ UHV-AC grid, its 2015 grid investment plan strongly indicated that it was 
still pursuing a cross-regional interconnection as its final goal. 
 
7.3.2 SGCC’s renewed attempts at cross-sectoral ‘synchronisation’ 
In addition to its attempts at pacifying the intense sectoral debate about UHV-AC via its 
‘compromise’ suggestion, SGCC immediately began searching for new argumentative 
linkages between 1U4L and cross-sectoral policy that would help shift the focus of  
debates away from the prevailing security concerns and give new momentum to its 
sectoral agenda. Further showcasing the systematic nature of  SGCC’s cross-sectoral 
‘synchronisation’ strategy as a means for overcoming sectoral opposition, this section 
will briefly outline three ‘grand ideas’ that the grid company argumentatively connected 
and utilised in political debates specifically for this purpose. The ideational foundation 
for this new argumentative approach was formed by the prediction of  a ‘Third 
Industrial Revolution’ (第三次⼯业⾰命) which SGCC had made public references to 
since late 2013 and based on which it now presented a new grid development concept 
under the heading of  a ‘Global Energy Internet’, at the core of  which, however, 
remained the familiar 1U4L strategy. A political entry point for pursuing a practical 
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application of  this ‘Global Energy Internet’ plan was then provided by a recent addition 
to China’s foreign economic policy, the so-called ‘One Belt, One Road’ strategy. 
 
The ‘Third Industrial Revolution’ 
SGCC’s renewed attempt at ‘synchronising’ its 1U4L plan with cross-sectoral policy was 
built on an ideational foundation provided by the work of  the American economic and 
social theorist Jeremy Rifkin. In his book, The Third Industrial Revolution (2011), which 
was publicly praised by Prime Minister Li Keqiang,611 Rifkin proposed that imminent 
shifts in the energy field would soon lead to radical global economic change. This ‘third 
industrial revolution’, he argued, would be characterised by five ‘pillars’: 1) a shift to 
renewable energy; 2) the growth of  distributed renewable power generation across the 
world; 3) the growing importance of  energy storage technologies; 4) the utilisation of  
“Internet technology to transform the power grid of  every continent into an energy 
internet that acts just like the Internet”; and 5) the transition to electric vehicles that can 
“buy and sell green electricity on a smart, continental, interactive power grid”. 612 
Without going into further detail regarding the contents of  the book itself, suffice it to 
say that SGCC recognised and utilised the opportunity provided by Rifkin’s visions of  
the future to amend the portrayal of  its grid development agenda accordingly. 
In December 2013, just as SGCC’s public portrayal of  UHV as the ultimate solution to 
China’s smog problem was becoming accepted, the grid company’s chairman Liu 
Zhenya gave a speech to the CCP’s Central Committee in which he engaged with 
Rifkin’s ideas.613 In his speech, ‘Smart Grid and the Third Industrial Revolution’, Liu 
presented to China’s top leaders a version of  Rifkin’s development concept that was 
deeply interwoven with the 1U4L plan and its smart grid extension which since 2009 
SGCC had presented under the heading of  a ‘Strong and Smart Grid’.614 Liu argued that 
energy transformations had always been the fundamental driving force of  industrial 
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revolutions and industrial development and that currently a new type of  energy 
transformation was occurring in which unprecedented increases in electricity demand 
were triggering numerous technological breakthroughs in the renewable energy and 
smart grid realm which were sustaining and promoting a ‘third industrial revolution’. 
This new “smart grid stage”, Liu asserted, was based on new energy technology, 
distributed power generation technology, large-scale energy storage technology, and 
super-long distance (read “UHV-DC”) and large scope (read “UHV-AC”) transmission 
technology. These technologies, Liu concluded, provided the foundation for the 
opportunity to develop a “strong grid framework-based, extensively interconnected, 
highly intelligent and interactive ‘smart internet’”.615 
Emphasising the successes of  the United Kingdom and the United States during the 
first two industrial revolutions, Liu argued that “whoever seized the opportunity during 
phases of  energy transformations to establish competitive superiority found himself  in 
a position of  invincibility”. It was now up to the Central Committee to “adjust to the 
development currents, to seize the historical opportunity, to speed up the construction 
of  a smart grid, and to firmly occupy the heights of  the new round of  energy 
transformations.” 616  Liu maintained that China already possessed all the necessary 
technological components to build a smart grid, but that the country needed to “comply 
with the development patterns of  rising grid voltage levels, the growing scope of  grid 
interconnectivity, and increasingly high allocation capacity” in order to use the smart 
grid as the guiding industry tool during the third industrial revolution. In an elaborate 
chain argument Liu then explained that developing UHV was a necessary foundation 
for the smart grid, its focal point being the synchronous ‘Three China’ UHV-AC grid.617  
With this final argumentative twist Liu essentially portrayed further UHV-AC 
development as an imperative first step for China’s ascendency to global economic 
dominance, a perspective which also shone through in his final remarks in which he 
underlined the uniqueness of  the current opportunity for the Chinese nation as a 
whole:  
Whether we are able to firmly grasp the historical opportunity of  the 
third industrial revolution will to a large extent decide China’s future 
position in global competition. The major difference in comparison to 
                                                
615 “Smart grid and the third industrial revolution” (智能电⺴与第三次⼯业⾰命), SGCC chairman Liu 
Zhenya’s speech to the 3rd plenary session of the 18th CCP Central Committee, Science and Technology 
Daily, 05.12.2013. 
616 Ibid. 
617 Ibid. 
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the last two industrial revolutions is that that China is already on the 
road to a grand rejuvenation. China’s new energy and smart grid 
development are already at the global forefront and place the country 
in an advantageous position during this new round of  energy 
transformation. [...] Opportunities are fleeting! The energy and 
electricity industry must consciously follow history and accelerate the 
development of  a smart grid in order to consolidate and expand 
China’s already emerging superiority in the smart grid domain, and in 
order to contribute to the Chinese Dream of  a grand rejuvenation of  
the Chinese people.618 
This December 2013 speech was given at a time where SGCC’s linkages between UHV 
development and cross-sectoral environmental policy were beginning to prove 
successful. As the anti-smog campaign took over public and political consciousness, 
Liu’s economically nationalistic spin on Rifkin’s ‘Third Industrial Revolution’ – with 
which the grid company pursued the very same goals as with the anti-smog campaign, 
namely government approval of 1U4L and particularly the ‘Three China’ grid – 
temporarily disappeared from the headlines. However, in early 2015, just as SGCC was 
running into difficulties because of the NEA’s decision to completely re-evaluate UHV-
AC technology and its ‘synchronisation’ with anti-air pollution policy was starting to 
lose political traction, variants on this earlier theme suddenly re-appeared. 
 
The ‘Global Energy Internet’ 
Slowly toning down its pollution-related pro-UHV arguments (relatively speaking), in 
early 2015 SGCC began to once more strongly emphasise the linkages between Rifkin’s 
ideas and its own 1U4L and ‘Strong and Smart Grid’ initiatives. In particular, the 
addition of UHV technology to Rifkin’s idea of an ‘Energy Internet’ was portrayed as 
SGCC’s blueprint for implementing the ‘Energy Internet’ on a global scale. UHV and 
“energy internet technology”, the grid company now claimed, formed inseparable 
foundations for the emergence of a “Global Energy Internet” (全球能源互联⺴), a vision 
in which different regional ‘energy internets’ across the world – all regionally 
synchronised via UHV-AC and supported by smart grid technology – would be 
connected via UHV-DC in order to “globally share renewable energy”.619  
 
                                                
618 Ibid. 
619 “UHV and energy internet technology jointly constitute the Global Energy Internet” (特⾼压、能源互
联⺴技术共同构成全球能源互联⺴), North Star Electric Power News Network (北极星电⼒新闻⺴), 
08.04.2015. 
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Figure 7.3 The ‘Global Energy Internet’ as envisioned by SGCC 
Source: State Grid Corporation, Corporate Social Responsibility Report 2014, Beijing, 2014, p. 74. 
 
While the medium-term focus was to be on the interconnection of  domestic grids, by 
2050 energy bases in different countries and continents were to be linked together in 
three stages of  grid interconnection – cross-national, inter-continental and worldwide – 
so as to globally transmit and distribute clean electricity to wherever it was needed 
across all voltage levels and based entirely on SGCC’s technology and standards. Liu’s 
grand vision (fully laid out in his 2015 book The Global Energy Internet620) even included 
the transmission of  wind power from the Arctic regions and solar power from the 
equatorial ( ⼀ 极 ⼀ 道 ) to load centres across the globe via long-distance UHV 
transmission, leading some news outlets to draw literary comparisons with the science 
fiction genre.621 
While the idea of a ‘Global Energy Internet’ was evolving, it was lacking not only in 
practical but also in political applicability as the only real linkage to existing policy 
debates remained Prime Minister Li Keqiang’s 2012 endorsement of Rifkin’s book. This 
situation changed rapidly as new developments in China’s foreign economic policy 
                                                
620 Liu, The Global Energy Internet (全球能源互联⺴) (Beijing: China Electric Power Publishing House, 2015). 
621 “The ‘Global Energy Internet’ looks very good but is still faced with three large difficulties” (“全球能源
互联⺴”看上去很美：仍⾯临三⼤难题), North Star Electric Power News Network (北极星电⼒新闻⺴), 
15.04.2015; “SGCC actively serves the ‘One Belt, One Road’ strategy” (国家电⺴公司积极服务“⼀带⼀路”战
略), State Grid News (国家电⺴报), 13.04.2015; “China’s $50 Trillion Plan for a Global Energy Grid,” The 
Diplomat, 01.04.2016. 
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provided an opportunity for the grid company to once more engage in a 
‘synchronisation’ attempt. 
 
Synchronising the ‘Global Energy Internet’ concept with the central government’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ 
strategy 
In late 2014, just as the NEA was about to publicise its decision to require a whole new 
round of  evaluations regarding UHV-AC technology, a new foreign economic policy 
strategy initiated by State President Xi Jinping began to dominate the headlines. This 
strategy was comprised of  two components, referred to as the ‘New Silk Road 
Economic Belt’ (新丝绸之路经济带) and the ‘Maritime Silk Road of  the 21st Century’ (21
世纪海上丝绸之路) respectively and commonly abbreviated as ‘One Belt, One Road’ (⼀
带⼀路). The purpose of  this new strategy was manifold, but can be summarised as 
being geared towards strengthening economic ties with neighbouring countries via large 
infrastructure projects in order to further regional economic development while 
securing lucrative contracts for state firms in the process.622 Other incentives which 
were not publicly stated plausibly also included strengthening China’s economic and 
political influence in the wider region. With regard to the energy sphere more 
specifically, NEA director Wu Xinxiong in a November 2014 interview stated that the 
motivation of  ‘One Belt, One Road’ was to safeguard energy supply diversification and 
supply security in the Asia-Pacific region, devise mechanisms to keep energy prices 
steady and construct an overall regional security mechanism. The NEA, it became 
known, fully supported deepening energy interlinkages with Central and South Asia, yet 
while there was constant talk of  constructing more oil and gas pipelines, electricity 
transmission lines and different kinds of  transportation infrastructure, there was no 
mention whatsoever by government officials of  UHV construction in this context.623 
This gap was once more filled by SGCC. In his 2013 book, Electric Power and Energy in 
China, Liu Zhenya had already pointed out the potential of UHV transmission to 
establish international power grid linkages, allowing China to enhance its electricity 
                                                
622 “‘One Belt, One Road’ goes hand in hand with APEC, China’s energy silk road ‘going out’ strategy is 
intensifying” (“⼀带⼀路”携⼿ APEC 中国能源丝绸之路“⾛出去”战略升级), North Star Electric Power News 
Network (北极星电⼒新闻⺴), 05.11.2014; “Energy interconnection and intercommunication: ‘One Belt, 
One Road’ is leveraging infrastructure investment” (能源互联互通：“⼀带⼀路”撬动基建投资), 21st Century 
Business Herald (21 世纪经济报道), 10.11.2014. 
623 “Energy interconnection and intercommunication: ‘One Belt, One Road’ is leveraging infrastructure 
investment” (能源互联互通：“⼀带⼀路”撬动基建投资), 21st Century Business Herald (21 世纪经济报道), 
10.11.2014. 
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supply security by tapping into the hydropower and coal resources of neighbouring 
countries and even achieve grid interconnections between China’s western-most 
provinces, Central Asian and, perhaps, even European countries to “form electric 
power channels and networks that will traverse the Eurasian landmass”.624 In its January 
2015 grid investment plan the grid company now took up these earlier ideas and stated 
that it aimed to initiate early-stage development work for four major international 
transmission lines (two of which were planned as UHV-DC and two as conventional 
high-voltage lines) connecting different parts of China with Russia, Mongolia, 
Kazakhstan and Pakistan, all explicitly based on the idea of “constructing a Global 
Energy Internet”.625 Furthermore, when in April 2015 the state assets regulator, SASAC, 
officially instructed central state firms to participate in the ‘One Belt, One Road’ 
strategy through the construction of infrastructure and the export of Chinese 
manufacturing, technology, standards and management, SGCC took this general 
encouragement as a premise for claiming in a series of enthusiastic press releases that its 
idea of a UHV-based ‘Global Energy Internet’ was, in fact, the grid company’s called-
for contribution to successfully implementing the state’s new regional foreign policy; 
that it was, indeed, “actively serving the ‘One Belt, One Road’ strategy”.626 As its newly 
discovered linkages to trending macro-policy showed the first signs of real political 
applicability, SGCC also began to adopt the language of the new policy it was now 
trying to ‘synchronise’ itself with by formulating the concept of a UHV-based 
‘Electricity Silk Road’ (电⼒丝绸之路) which it vowed to construct as a constituent of the 
Global Energy Internet.627  
It remains too early to tell whether SGCC’s renewed application of its previously highly 
successful strategy to challenge sectoral opposition by tactically linking itself to cross-
sectoral policy will ultimately assist the grid company in attaining the grid development 
results it has been working towards. There have, however, been some early signs that its 
ideas have already been taken up by the top leadership. In October 2015, President Xi 
Jinping was quoted in an SGCC press release as having proposed that the United 
                                                
624 Liu, 2013, p. 71. 
625 “SGCC to spend RMB420 billion to construct ‘6 AC and 8 DC’ transmission lines” (国家电⺴ 4202 亿
建”六交⼋直”线路), CNPC Online, 19.01.2015. 
626 “SGCC actively serves the “One Belt, One Road” strategy” (国家电⺴公司积极服务“⼀带⼀路”战略), 
State Grid News (国家电⺴报), 13.04.2015; “SGCC to implement ‘One Belt, One Road’ by constructing a 
Global Energy Internet - 10 stocks about to dig gold” (国家电⺴落实⼀带⼀路构建全球能源互联⺴  
掘⾦ 10 股), China Capital and Securities Net (中国资本证券⺴), 10.04.2015. 
627 “SGCC’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ UHV blueprint: RMB 200 billion worth of investments expected 
within the borders of Xinjiang” (国家电⺴“⼀带⼀路”特⾼压蓝图：光新疆境内就投两千亿), North Star 
Electric Power News Network (北极星电⼒新闻⺴), 14.04.2015. 
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Nations Sustainable Development Summit discuss the establishment of a Global 
Energy Internet in order “to facilitate efforts to meet the global power demand with 
clean and green alternatives”.628 SGCC itself also did everything in its power to further 
enhance the political applicability of the new macro-linkage. In March 2016, the ‘Global 
Energy Internet Development Cooperation Organisation’ (全球能源互联⺴发展合作组织) 
was founded in Beijing with the participation of State Grid and a number of important 
domestic and international market players in the fields of grid and telecommunications 
technology such as Huawei, ABB and Siemens.629 By April 2016, the grid company had 
furthermore independently signed related memoranda of understanding with the 
Russian grid company OAO Rosseti, the Korea Electric Power Corporation and the 
Japanese telecommunication and internet corporation SoftBank Group.630 Moreover, a 
policy document published by the NEA in February 2016 outlining plans for the 
construction of an “energy internet” (能源互联⺴) suggests that SGCC’s reasoning had 
already begun to impact sectoral policy-making, although while this document 
contained several ideas originally spearheaded by the grid company it noticeably omitted 
any mention of the UHV question. 631  The mere fact, however, that when SGCC 
encountered opposition it immediately resorted to its trusted ‘synchronisation’ strategy 
demonstrates the systematic nature of this mechanism’s application in the pursuit of 
political gain, exactly as witnessed during numerous earlier episodes. 
 
 
7.4 Chapter conclusions 
This final empirical chapter demonstrated that SGCC’s attempts to ‘synchronise’ with 
select cross-sectoral policy in order to overcome sectoral opposition to the application 
of  its policy preferences followed systematic patterns that repeated themselves over 
                                                
628 “It’s about Time to Construct Global ‘Electricity High-speed Network’,” SGCC press release, 
13.10.2015. 
629 “Global Energy Internet Development Cooperation Organisation established in Beijing” (全球能源互联
⺴发展合作组织在京成⽴), China Council for the Promotion of International Trade  
(中国国际贸易促进委员会), 31.03.2016, 
http://www.ccpit.org/Contents/Channel_3699/2016/0331/603204/content_603204.htm, accessed 
04/2016. 
630 “China proposes $50tn global renewable energy network,” RT Business, 01.04.2016. 
631 National Development and Reform Commission, National Energy Administration, and Ministry of 
Industry and Information Technology, “Guiding opinions regarding the advancement of ‘Internet +’ 
intelligent energy development” (关于推进“互联⺴+”智慧能源发展的指导意⻅), Document No. 392 [2016], 
29.02.2016. 
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time and across issue areas. It also provided additional evidence that the presence or 
absence of  ‘synchronisation’ had profound effects on SGCC’s ability to shape sectoral 
decision-making. 
The first section examined how SGCC, in response to strong sectoral opposition, 
‘synchronised’ the portrayal of  its industry restructuring plan with cross-sectoral anti-air 
pollution policy which led to a series of  UHV-AC approvals on the grounds of  
environmental arguments – approvals which had been blocked by sectoral authorities 
only months earlier based on grid security concerns. Cross-sectoral ‘synchronisation’, it 
was shown, allowed the grid company to bypass sectoral resistance and shape sectoral 
decision-making according to its own preferences. The second section demonstrated 
that as soon as the grid company’s newly devised argumentative linkages to cross-
sectoral policy disintegrated, SGCC’s progress in implementing the 1U4L plan came to 
a sudden standstill as renewed sectoral gridlock emerged. In the absence of  functional 
cross-sectoral ‘synchronisation’, the grid company found itself  back in heated sector-
specific debates about different facets of  its proposed industry restructuring plan. This 
ultimately led to a whole new round of  very basic assessments and the suspension of  
further UHV-AC approvals which strongly threatened the overall success of  the grid 
company’s broader corporate development strategy. Finally, the third section explored 
SGCC’s attempts to once more regain the argumentative high ground by pacifying the 
political debate via a semi-credible ‘compromise’ suggestion for grid development while 
simultaneously testing the suitability of  several new ‘grand ideas’ as the foundation for a 
‘re-synchronisation’ with cross-sectoral policy and testing their political applicability for 
overcoming the new sectoral resistance that it was facing.  
These findings supported the conclusions from Parts A and B of  this study that a) 
SGCC’s actions and intent have had a substantial effect on sectoral processes of  both 
policy formulation and implementation and b) this effect followed a particular pattern 
regarding the mechanisms, conditions and effects of  SOE influence on sectoral policy. 
This pattern, which allows for a number of  inferences with regard to the balance of  
power between central SOEs and central government concerning policy-making in 
China’s strategic industries, will be spelled out in the following conclusion chapter. 
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8 Conclusion 
Synopsis of the dissertation project 
Building on empirical evidence from China’s electricity supply industry, this dissertation 
engaged with prominent studies on the political economy of that country’s industrial 
reforms which emphasise central government’s sustained control over ‘strategic’ sectors 
of the economy as a core pillar of China’s overall approach to economic governance 
(e.g. Pearson, 2005, 2007; Hsueh, 2011; Heilmann and Shih, 2013; Eaton, 2013; Li, 
2015). Among these authors, there is a widely-shared perspective of strict central 
government leadership as well as active and effective government guidance underlying 
policy and development trajectories in these ‘strategic’ industries. The nature of this 
guidance has been interpreted differently by different authors, e.g. by Hsueh (2011) as 
being based on central government’s ‘strategic value’ considerations of different 
industries, which take shape in a manner that is “insulated from domestic political 
pressures” and which central government applies by “interven[ing] in strategic sectors 
and issue areas when it sees fit without having to face political retaliation or 
opposition” 632 ; by Pearson (2005, 2007) with her explanatory focus on central 
government’s different political and economic ‘imperatives’ which supposedly guide 
sectoral policy trajectories; and by Heilmann and Shih (2013) who emphasise shifts in 
ideas about economic governance within central government as the immediate 
determinant of how the centre engages with and shapes the functional logic of strategic 
parts of the country’s economy. Despite the notable differences between these 
accounts, they share as a commonality their near-exclusive focus on central 
government’s policy preferences as the core determinant for the macro-policy and 
industry-specific policy settings and, ultimately, the operational logic inherent in China’s 
strategic industries.633 
In this dissertation, these government-centred accounts with their shared notion of 
deliberate and effective government leadership of strategic segments of China’s 
economy were contrasted with perspectives that view the policy preferences of state-
owned industry as crucial determinants of how sectoral policy in some of the country’s 
                                                
632 Hsueh, 2011, p. 269. 
633 Heilmann and Shih (2013) focus on cross-sectoral policy and its subsequent application at the industry 
level, while Hsueh (2011) and Pearson (2005, 2007) mostly discuss industry-specific economic governance 
approaches in strategic industries. 
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most strategically relevant industries is formulated and applied. Large central-level state 
firms with a particular focus on the wider energy realm, these authors assert, tend to 
have a dominant influence on sectoral policy processes due to their high administrative 
rank, formal and informal political connections, superior sectoral knowledge, and 
substantial political and financial autonomy (e.g. Downs, 2008a, 2008b; Xu, 2008, 2012; 
Chen, 2010; Tsai, 2013; Zhang, 2015). Central government’s sectoral oversight, on the 
other hand, is viewed as lacking in effectiveness, while its role in sectoral policy 
processes is perceived by some as being reduced to endorsing ‘after the fact’ projects 
and policies drawn up by state firms based primarily on those firms’ own corporate 
interests (Xu, 2008). 
The two perspectives were brought together by using empirical material from China’s 
electricity supply industry – an industry setting characteristic of a ‘most likely’ case for 
dominant government-centred perspectives – in order to test the explanatory value of 
counterclaims made by SOE-centred studies regarding state firms’ dominant influence 
over the formulation and implementation of sectoral policy, a factor which has been 
neglected in many widely-read accounts of the politics of China’s industrial reforms. As 
China’s electricity supply sector has witnessed a considerable shift in sectoral 
development trajectories since the turn of the millennium, first aiming at unbundled 
competitive regional market building in electricity supply and later emphasising the 
development of an integrated non-competitive nationally unified supply system, this industry 
setting presented a suitable environment for tracing the contentious political processes 
underlying this shift and, in particular, the effects of state industry’s action and intent as 
part of these processes.  
The dissertation was structured in three parts. Part A attempted to explain the outcomes 
of central government’s attempts to implement sectoral policy for China’s electricity 
supply, using the State Council’s 2002 marketisation agenda for the electricity industry 
as the core example. Part B focused on the drivers underlying the mid-2000s emergence 
of a new sectoral reform agenda that contained a reform route that in many ways ran 
counter to the original marketisation agenda. Building on claims made by the SOE-
centred literature, it was assessed via the application of process tracing whether 
mechanisms existed through which large state firms, given both action and intent, were 
able to shape these different stages of the policy process, while the congruence method 
was applied to examine whether findings were equally well or better explicable via the 
premises underlying government-centred accounts. While Part A demonstrated 
  232 
mechanisms through which state industry was able to effectively obstruct the 
implementation of ‘unfavourable’ market building policy in spite of government 
opposition, the combined findings derived from Parts A and B suggest the prevalence 
of a ‘synchronisation’ mechanism (discussed in detail further below) through which 
state industry actively shaped the formulation of sectoral policy decisions according to 
its own preferences. To ensure the validity of this conclusion, this suggested mechanism 
of state firm policy influence was re-tested in Part C of this study against additional 
empirical material from the same industry case through a series of ‘before-after’ 
comparisons which further provided a number of factors that determine this 
mechanism’s applicability and effects. 
 
Summary of empirical findings and their relevance 
The systematic analysis of political processes underlying the shift in sectoral reform 
trajectories in China’s electricity supply industry allowed for a number of important 
conclusions.  
Central government and the State Grid Corporation of China (SGCC) as the structurally 
most relevant industry player were reliably at odds with each other regarding the 
question of how to shape the future of the electricity industry. While central 
government’s sectoral policy preferences (more specifically those preferences voiced by 
the State Council) consistently included a focus on regional grid development and the 
introduction of retail competition, SGCC engaged in very effective countermeasures to 
avoid the materialisation of both of those goals (as shown in Part A of the empirical 
section). Furthermore, there was ample evidence of SGCC’s intense and often 
successful political manoeuvring to undermine existing sectoral policy and gradually 
replace it with a different reform plan, one rooted in its own sectoral policy preferences 
which were mainly geared towards maintaining and further deepening its own structural 
integrity across industry sub-sectors while limiting the role of competition in the 
industry, as well as towards establishing a nationally unified, integrated and synchronous 
grid system under its own corporate leadership (Parts B and C).  
Many of SGCC’s actions under this particular interest setting were answered with 
government opposition, particularly by sectoral authorities, based on existing sectoral 
policy. This sometimes succeeded in curtailing SGCC’s advances but was repeatedly 
circumvented by the grid company based on its utilisation of uncoordinated 
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variance/overlap between central government policy at different levels of abstraction. 
Based both on its actions and intent, SGCC, since its establishment in 2002, was found 
to have had a substantial effect on the way in which sectoral policy in China’s electricity 
supply industry was formulated and applied; this was highly consequential for the 
evolution of the operational logic of the industry as such, while the witnessed shifts in 
sectoral policy trajectories were not equally well explained by changes in central 
government’s sectoral policy preferences.  
The dynamics underlying the changes in sectoral policy trajectories in China’s electricity 
supply industry call into question the otherwise rarely challenged notion of central 
government’s active and effective guidance via policy and administrative control over 
the country’s strategic industries, as propagated by various government-centred 
accounts which were insufficiently able to explain their own ‘most likely’ case. Although 
it will require further research to determine the extent to which these findings may 
apply in other industry settings, the logic of the uncovered mechanisms of SGCC’s 
policy influence suggests that sectoral policy in the strategic parts of China’s economy is 
not necessarily an exclusive product of central government’s policy preferences. The 
emergence and application of sectoral policy in the ‘commanding heights’ of China’s 
economy may instead be better explained through patterns of contentious interactions 
and repeated tactical ‘synchronisation’ of reform agendas between large state firms and 
central government in which state industry’s ‘bottom-up’ influence is often equally, and 
occasionally more, important than central government’s ‘top-down’ influence. At the 
same time, while SOE-centred accounts have been generally correct about paying close 
attention to the political behaviour of large state firms, they appear to have 
overestimated their policy impact while suggesting mechanisms of influence that only 
partially matched the findings in this dissertation. 
Before the relevance of these findings for the literature is discussed further, the 
following section will integrate the conclusions from all three empirical parts of this 
dissertation into a bi-directional model of government-SOE interaction over sectoral 
policy in the electricity supply industry as an important case of a ‘strategic’ economic 
sector. As part of this model, the particular set of mechanisms through which SGCC as 
a central SOE, based on action and intent, has been able to shape the formulation and 
implementation of sectoral policy will be further specified, together with the conditions 
under which and to which effect it has been able to do so. 
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8.1 Central SOEs’ influence on sectoral policy processes 
and patterns of interaction with central government as 
observed in the electricity supply industry 
In order to specify the observed range of policy-relevant actions taken by SGCC as a 
large central-level SOE and their respective effects given a persistent mismatch with 
central government’s policy preferences, the distinction should be made between reactive 
measures, defined here as measures aimed at preventing or altering the implementation 
of existing sectoral policy and proactive measures, defined as attempts at shaping the 
content and direction of sectoral policy itself. 
 
8.1.1 Reactive measures against the implementation of 
‘unfavourable’ sectoral policy  
The empirical findings suggest that SGCC has been very successful at frustrating the 
practical application of even central government’s most far-reaching sectoral policy 
decisions if they were perceived as incompatible with the grid company’s own policy 
preferences. As was demonstrated in Part A of the empirical sections, SGCC 
persistently countered the implementation of the State Council’s major sectoral 
marketisation plans by undermining the execution of asset unbundling requirements 
between industry segments (i.e. between power generation, transmission and 
distribution, as well as auxiliary businesses) that were essential for the establishment of 
competitive regional electricity markets as set out in the No. 5 Document (2002). In all 
four settings evidence was provided that demonstrated how the grid company blocked 
and partially reversed asset unbundling, thereby causing substantial slowdowns and 
interruptions to the policy implementation. The successful obstruction and 
circumvention of these unbundling steps can therefore be viewed as equivalent to the 
obstruction of the marketisation plan as a whole. ‘Defensive’ measures applied by the 
grid company can be broadly summarised under the following three headings: 
• Distorting investment behaviour: SGCC repeatedly conducted autonomous and often 
unapproved investments across industry sub-segments through which it 
deliberately distorted emerging competition (particularly in electricity wholesale 
in different parts of  the country and in the auxiliary grid business where 
SGCC’s subsidiaries regained market dominance);  
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• Obstruction and/or strategic misuse of  pilot projects: SGCC openly refused to 
cooperate with unbundling pilot projects (e.g. regarding direct power sales for 
gradual T&D unbundling) or utilised pilot projects to feign cooperation with 
policy requirements (e.g. by establishing allegedly private companies in the 
generation and retail segments while maintaining direct ownership ties so as to 
privatise profits); and 
• Manipulation of  internal asset structures: SGCC unilaterally reshaped the structure 
of  assets that it had been allowed to ‘temporarily’ retain so as to prevent further 
unbundling and/or reverse asset losses that it had already incurred (e.g. 
hollowing out the assets of  regional grid companies and undermining their 
operational autonomy to avoid further grid regionalisation and transforming 
affiliated research institutes into holding companies for grid equipment 
manufacturing firms so as to limit/reverse the impact of  auxiliary business 
unbundling). 
Central government actors at both State Council and sectoral level repeatedly 
intervened in SGCC’s multi-faceted attempts to ensure its continued engagement across 
sub-sectoral boundaries by vetoing or reversing some of the most prominent 
investments and acquisitions and publicly scolding the grid company for its neglect of 
central policy. In 2007, the State Council issued a new policy document that openly 
listed the tremendous problems in executing asset unbundling and reemphasised the full 
validity of the policy goals inherent in the market building agenda, while in 2012 Prime 
Minister Wen Jiabao went on public record once more demanding the break-up of the 
remaining monopoly structures in the electricity sector, thereby demonstrating that 
central government’s intentions towards sectoral reform had largely remained stable 
over time. However, despite the repeated interventions, SGCC’s countermeasures to 
State Council policy brought about a marked slowdown in its implementation progress.  
Simultaneously, there was also evidence of instances in which central government 
bodies responded in a supportive fashion to some of the grid company’s obstructive 
measures, particularly to some of its illicit investments. All of these instances shared as 
commonalities that they were preceded by targeted venue-shopping during which 
SGCC presented its acquisition plans as furthering those particular bodies’ non-sector 
specific mandates, leading to administrative support on the basis of the exact reasoning 
supplied by the grid company but with no, or very little, consideration of the resulting 
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sectoral impact. This finding shows that large central SOEs such as SGCC are able to 
utilise the variances and lack of coordination among broader political mandates between 
different central government institutions as a foundation for venue-shopping through 
which they further enhance their ability to influence or obstruct the implementation of 
sectoral policy. 
Overall, the empirical findings suggest that central SOEs’ opposing behaviour has been 
an important determining factor for the way in which the most far-reaching State 
Council policy decision for the electricity supply industry in the last two decades was 
applied and for its structural outcomes regarding the industry’s overall functional logic. 
Central government experienced severe difficulties in trying to implement sectoral 
policy against SGCC’s will, and its ability to guide reforms according to its own policy 
preferences was strongly curtailed by the grid company’s ability to counteract and 
neutralise government guidance that conflicted with its own sectoral reform 
preferences. 
 
8.1.2 Measures for proactively shaping the policy environment 
Unlike SGCC’s reactive defensive measures with their generally very high success rate in 
obstructing the implementation of  unfavourable policy, the effectiveness of  proactive 
measures to shape the policy environment by introducing and successively pushing for 
the application of its own sectoral policy agenda (as laid out in Part B of the empirical 
sections) followed a cyclical path. Attempts at influencing sectoral policy- and decision-
making via direct contentious engagement with sectoral authorities usually led to 
deadlock between both sides (‘basic conflict mode’). However, tactically synchronising its 
portrayal of sectoral reform suggestions with existing cross-sectoral policy in several crucial 
instances allowed SGCC to overcome sectoral-level opposition (‘synchronisation mode’) 
and to thereby gradually adjust the overall reform trajectory. 
 
‘Basic conflict mode’ (low effectiveness) 
‘Basic conflict mode’ refers to the default setting of direct interactions between SGCC and 
central government over sectoral policy formulation and decision-making given 
conflicting opinions regarding sectoral policy trajectories, i.e. in this case on the one side 
SGCC’s pursuit of new policy ensuring the sustained integration of transmission, 
  237 
distribution and retail and the development of a nationwide synchronous grid vs. central 
government’s ongoing emphasis on increased competition and sustained regionalisation 
on the other. During this ongoing clash of  perspectives over the shape and content of  
sectoral policy, SGCC relied on its high administrative rank which ensured direct access 
to all parts of the central administration, exchanges on an equal footing with sectoral 
regulators, and participation in important evaluation and assessment procedures that 
form core components of  sectoral decision-making. Notable measures applied by the 
grid company on this basis included its interference with sectoral bureaucratic processes 
of infrastructure planning via extensive ‘battles of expertise’, especially through a) its 
strong influence on intermediaries such as sectoral research, consulting and assessment 
firms; b) the utilisation of its stronghold over industry knowledge to deliberately 
withhold policy-relevant information and supply biased reports to government as the 
only available data foundation for official project evaluations; and c) the application of 
pressure on the media and attempts to silence opposition, both in official deliberations 
and in public debate. 
Through the application of these strategies, the grid company was able to partially shape 
the course of bureaucratic processes, yet although the sectoral authorities encountered 
difficulties in fending off SGCC’s political manoeuvring the grid company was only 
rarely able to fully overcome the authorities’ procedural prerogative; and where it did, it 
usually appeared as part of a compromise in which approvals for some projects were 
conceded by the authorities while the overall impact of the grid company’s sectoral 
agenda was contained. Confrontation between state firm and sectoral authorities in 
‘basic conflict mode’ tended to lead to political stand-offs during which sometimes one 
side prevailed and sometimes the other, usually leading to a tense overall status quo in 
which both sides were able to thwart each other’s efforts but neither was able to shape 
overall sectoral development trajectories without the other’s support or tolerance. 
Overall, SGCC’s attempts at proactively shaping the sectoral policy environment in 
‘basic conflict mode’ did not have a very strong effect. SGCC was partially able to 
influence bureaucratic processes during clashes with sectoral regulators over prospective 
policy decisions, yet it was generally not influential enough to sideline and overcome 
opposition by sectoral authorities.  
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‘Synchronisation mode’ (high effectiveness) 
The only reliable way for SGCC to bypass the sectoral bureaucratic and political 
obstacles characteristic of ‘basic conflict mode’ was through the employment of a 
‘synchronisation’ mechanism, defined here as tactically matching its portrayal of 
pursued sectoral policy or corporate development plans with more abstract policy 
objectives pursued by central government, usually the State Council. Following this 
strategy, SGCC remained within cross-sectorally sanctioned boundaries while at the 
same time challenging existing sectoral policy. More specifically, this approach moved 
contentious sectoral issue matters into a different, and often more favourable, context. 
This allowed SGCC to claim legitimacy for its sectoral counter-reform plan and to 
gather support at higher administrative levels based on entirely different policy pretexts, 
thereby playing off central government’s sectoral and cross-sectoral policy goals against 
each other. The repeated application of this ‘synchronisation’ mechanism allowed 
SGCC to achieve significant step-by-step progress during the practical application of its 
sectoral agenda. It gave rise to a series of critical junctures through which the grid 
company progressively altered the course of China’s electricity system reforms to reflect 
its own policy goals, largely at the expense of central government’s original market 
building plan.  
In conclusion, whether or not SGCC as a large central SOE managed to convincingly 
‘synchronise’ the portrayal of its sectoral reform plan with stated central government 
macro goals appeared to be an important determinant for more versus less successful 
episodes for the state firm in shaping sectoral policy according to its own preferences. 
Once convincing linkages with cross-sectoral policy were in place, the grid company’s 
influence on sectoral policy showed a steep increase as compared to ‘basic conflict 
mode’. 
 
8.1.3 ‘Synchronisation’ in practise 
The process of establishing ‘synchrony’ between SGCC’s sectoral policy preferences 
and existing cross-sectoral policy appeared to follow a logic of trial and error across 
different macro-level policy subjects at the same time. As high profile cross-sectoral 
policy changed, SGCC’s portrayal of its sectoral reform agenda was adapted accordingly 
– while the agenda itself largely remained stable in terms of content. Whenever a new 
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subject matter that was broadly related or relatable to SGGC’s reform plan caught the 
State Council’s attention or featured prominently in new cross-sectoral policy, the grid 
company swiftly tested its potential for presenting its reform plan in a new light that 
would potentially allow for faster advances at the sectoral level. Following this logic, 
SGCC repeatedly and skilfully depicted its pre-existing sectoral reform ideas or 
particular corporate development projects as ‘tailor-made’ solutions for new and 
pressing cross-sectoral policy challenges, irrespective of existing sectoral policy and the 
standpoints of sectoral regulators. All instances in which SGCC made tangible progress 
with the application of its sectoral reform plan were directly tied to recently adjusted 
claims regarding its alleged ability to contribute to the solution of urgent cross-sectoral 
political problems that were currently being prioritised within the State Council. This 
strategy repeatedly resulted in administrative support by departments and commissions 
at the ministerial level or above and pressured sectoral authorities to conform regarding 
measures that had previously been heavily contested at the sectoral level, as was 
demonstrated by the following empirical examples: 
• SGCC was able to place its own ‘counter-reform plan’ for sectoral development 
on the political agenda by ‘synchronising’ with select macro-goals inherent in 
the marketisation plan of  the State Council’s No. 5 Document and by portraying 
its own reform plan as the faster and more effective route towards those and 
several other goals, claims which were strongly disputed at the sectoral level. 
• SGCC’s ‘synchronisation’ with cross-sectoral policy aimed at furthering 
indigenous innovation and the international competitiveness of  Chinese 
industry brought about State Council support for the research and development 
underlying the technological foundations of  the grid company’s sectoral reform 
plan, as well as for the construction of  ultra-high voltage (UHV) transmission 
pilot projects, all despite strong sectoral controversy. 
• SGCC’s flexible ‘synchronisation’ with the cross-sectorally informed 
institutional mandates of  different commissions and ministries (particularly via 
venue-shopping at SASAC, the NDRC Foreign Investment Department and 
MOFCOM) resulted in highly consequential investment approvals which 
allowed the grid company to further undermine unbundling restrictions and 
gain market dominance in profitable auxiliary industries (heavily disputed at the 
sectoral level and in immediate violation of  the No. 5 Document). 
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• SGCC’s ‘synchronisation’ with the State Council’s cross-sectoral policy on air 
pollution control brought about approvals for a widespread practical application 
of  synchronous UHV-AC technology across substantial parts of  China’s 
electricity grid, despite simultaneously occurring high-profile bureaucratic 
clashes between SGCC and sectoral regulators regarding the very same 
transmission projects and their anticipated impact on the electricity supply 
system. 
• In order to overcome new sectoral challenges that arose after UHV 
construction approvals had already been granted, SGCC immediately attempted 
to ‘re-synchronise’ with shifting cross-sectoral policy, this time in the realm of  
China’s regional foreign policy (‘One Belt, One Road’) and via economically 
nationalist perspectives surrounding the concept of  a ‘Third Industrial 
Revolution’. 
In all of these crucial instances, SGCC’s tactical ‘synchronisation’ with cross-sectoral 
policy convinced top leaders within ministries, commissions and/or the State Council to 
grant their support based entirely on cross-sectoral premises and with little to no 
consideration of impact on existing sectoral policy. In several cases support was granted 
against the strongly opposing viewpoints of sectoral regulators and non-SGCC-affiliated 
industry experts, and despite, or even unaware of, the fact that this support ultimately 
facilitated the emergence of the grid company’s sectoral ‘counter-agenda’ and further 
obstructed simultaneously ongoing market building endeavours. Not only did top-level 
support derived from the tactical ‘synchronisation’ with cross-sectoral policy help 
SGCC’s sectoral agenda to gain political momentum, it also placed very effective 
pressure on sectoral regulators to temporarily give up any remaining opposition.  
These observed dynamics help to further explain why ‘synchronisation’ tactics became 
the centrepiece of SGCC’s political strategy. By challenging sectoral policy on the basis 
of more abstract macro-policy, the grid company was able to claim legitimacy during its 
pursuit of ends which, on the basis of existing sectoral policy, were at least partially 
illegitimate. This made it very difficult for critics to maintain that SGCC ‘violated’ policy 
because, following its own claims, it was simply implementing policy of a higher order, 
even though it did so with the specific purpose of weakening, circumventing or 
replacing existing sectoral policy. This approach repeatedly allowed the grid company to 
avoid costly confrontation with sectoral government bodies, while much of the 
  241 
confrontation that did occur ultimately took place within the confines of an 
argumentative framework that had been prepared by the grid company itself and in 
which it possessed strong informational advantages. Comparatively indirect in nature, as 
compared to head-on confrontations with central government bodies, ‘synchronisation’ 
therefore provided the easiest and most effective way for the grid company to shape 
sectoral policy. 
 
8.1.4 Factors that affected the applicability and effect of the 
‘synchronisation’ mechanism 
A number of factors were found to determine the applicability and effect of the 
‘synchronisation’ mechanism, although claims regarding these factors’ relative impact 
and mutual interaction will require further testing in subsequent studies. 
SGCC’s ability to establish and politically utilise argumentative linkages across policy 
levels appeared to be contingent on the underlying mechanisms of influence outlined 
under ‘basic conflict mode’, i.e. its high administrative rank and privileged access to industry 
information. High administrative rank ensured that the grid company’s executives were 
able to present their suggestions for sectoral solutions to cross-sectoral policy challenges 
to top-level officials in the State Council and in relevant government and party 
committees. Furthermore, due to SGCC’s control over industry data and the majority of 
industry research and consulting bodies, central government at all levels was heavily 
reliant on SGCC’s willingness to cooperate on informational matters. As previously 
noted, the grid company repeatedly exploited its informational advantage by supplying 
one-sided policy suggestions, project proposals, feasibility studies and evaluation 
materials which reliably portrayed the alleged linkages between its own proposals and 
cross-sectoral policy in a positive light; these were based largely on internal company 
data, the factual accuracy of which was very difficult for government bodies to verify. 
Just how dominant the grid company was regarding industry expertise was also 
demonstrated by the fact that the sectoral authorities repeatedly resorted to 
commissioning expertise from a small number of retired government officials and 
industry experts, many of them in their eighties and without administrative rank or 
current institutional affiliation. This group of retired experts was eventually granted full 
voting rights in assessment and evaluation procedures linked to some of the most far-
reaching infrastructure-related decisions in China’s recent history, which makes it seem 
  242 
likely that engaging them was one of the few ways that the sectoral authorities could 
access policy-relevant perspectives that were not shaped by business dependencies. In 
some cases, bringing in these external experts made it possible for the sectoral 
authorities to at least partially challenge the grid company’s general dominance of 
opinion by countering it with opposing perspectives and argumentatively pulling cross-
sectorally ‘synchronised’ issue matters back down to the industry level (and back into 
‘basic conflict mode’, as outlined above). In this vein, sectoral regulators repeatedly 
responded to SGCC’s ‘synchronisation’ attempts by bringing in experts who in turn 
contrasted controversial aspects of the grid company’s reform agenda with particularly 
pressing industry-level matters, usually by emphasising security or economic risks. The 
resulting ‘battles of expertise’ in a series of cases allowed the sectoral authorities to stall 
contentious decision-making procedures and in some cases led top officials at the State 
Council level to change their views and provide additional space for formal assessments. 
However, the grid company’s privileged access to relevant information continued to 
place the sectoral authorities at a distinct disadvantage during these interactions and 
often required them to resort to their procedural prerogative in order to diffuse the 
pressure applied by SGCC. 
Without its high administrative rank and control over industry expertise, SGCC would 
probably not have been able to make use of  its ‘synchronisation’ strategy in the first 
place. At the same time, depending exclusively on its high administrative rank, superior 
expertise and access to top-level politicians rarely led to success in shaping the sectoral 
policy environment in its favour, as demonstrated through the very low effectiveness of  
SGCC’s proactive measures in ‘basic conflict mode’.  
The successful application of  the ‘synchronisation’ mechanism also appeared to be 
contingent on the factor of  timing. Many of  the grid company’s successful 
‘synchronisation’ attempts occurred in immediate response to shifts in top-level macro-
policy and during phases where clear sectoral specifications for those macro-guidelines 
had yet to be established, providing the grid company with a void that it quickly filled 
with its own suggestions. Relying on first-mover advantage during its swift responses to 
changes in cross-sectoral policy allowed for substantial freedom concerning the 
interpretation of  how cross-sectoral policy changes should be applied at the sectoral 
level and forced sectoral authorities to engage on an argumentative level specified by the 
grid company itself.  
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Another important factor concerned the level of  political urgency underlying newly 
emerging cross-sectoral guidelines, resulting, for example, from time pressure to find 
solutions to the challenges at hand or from the fact that the respective guideline was 
personally initiated by a top leader. The more urgent it was for sectoral authorities to 
deliver industry-level solutions, the more leverage the grid company appeared to have in 
influencing official sectoral responses to top-level demands. Furthermore, the degree of  
specificity/detail inherent in the respective macro-policy also appeared to matter during 
the application of  the ‘synchronisation’ mechanism. The ideal target policy for 
‘synchronisation’ seems to have been of  medium specificity, i.e. macro-policy that was 
not too specific in its scope and application so as to leave space for suggestions 
regarding more detailed sectoral specifications, but also not too broad, as this would 
have potentially diminished the comparative relevance of  the sectoral responses 
presented. 
As an example, the State Council ‘Action Plan’ against air pollution (Chapter 7) may, in 
hindsight, be considered a particularly suitable target for ‘synchronisation’ as it was of  
high urgency due to sharply rising public discontent over government’s smog 
management and SGCC was able to react immediately by shifting the portrayal of  its 
1U4L plan. Also, the ‘Action Plan’ contained very specific pollution reduction goals but 
only vaguely phrased possibilities as to how to attain them. High urgency and medium 
specificity placed substantial pressure on the sectoral authorities to report back with 
practical suggestions for sectoral solutions, which arguably enhanced SGCC’s ability to 
feed its own project proposals into the cross-sectoral sphere even though they were 
being strongly contested at the sectoral level. In contrast, a much less suitable 
‘synchronisation’ target was provided by the State Council’s ‘Western Development 
Programme’ aimed at regional economic development in China’s western regions 
(briefly addressed in Chapter 4). Firstly, there was a substantial time-lag between the 
publication of  this policy (2000) and SGCC’s engagement with it (2006) which strongly 
reduced the level of  political urgency as it was almost certain that there were already 
numerous officially sanctioned sector-specific projects in place that addressed the goals 
laid out in the macro-policy. Moreover, the policy was quite broad in scope as it aimed 
for regional development across a number of  different domains, which arguably 
reduced the immediate relevance and applicability of  SGCC’s 1U4L plan as a sector-
specific response. Consequently, the ‘Western Development Programme’ never became 
a useful macro-linkage for the grid company. 
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A final important point to take note of regarding the impact of the ‘synchronisation’ 
mechanism is its inherent ‘lock-in’ effect. Decisions made by high-ranking government 
commissions on the basis of higher order policy were rarely – or if they were, only 
partially – altered after the fact, not only because they tended to entail applied 
infrastructural changes which were difficult to undo, but likely also because this 
required top-level authorities to admit that their macro-policy-driven decisions had been 
wrong and that they needed to be reversed based on sector-specific considerations and 
arguments supplied by lower level authorities. This element of path dependence allowed 
SGCC to successively apply various parts of its reform plan in a step-by-step manner, 
even if earlier instances of ‘synchronisation’ had dissolved in the meantime.  
 
8.1.5 Goals and drivers of central SOE behaviour as observed in the 
case of SGCC 
Systemisation of goals pursued by SGCC 
The goals pursued by the grid company during its obstructive interventions in processes 
of sectoral policy implementation and its ‘synchronisation’-based interference with 
policy formulation were manifold but may be grouped under three headings. Firstly, 
having emerged from a fully vertically integrated setting, SGCC did everything in its 
power to maintain its monopoly status in the different segments of the electricity 
industry and across the different grid regions. This became particularly apparent during 
its struggle to maintain the unity of the transmission, distribution and retail segments, as 
well as through its approach towards integrating the different regional and provincial 
grid companies under its own leadership (see Chapter 3).  
As vertical re-integration over the entire electricity industry was proving to be politically 
unachievable, the second-best solution for SGCC was to try and strengthen its reach 
across the industry’s sub-segments while, secondly, working towards securing a 
dominant market position in those settings subjected to any form of competition. This 
was observable during its ventures into the power generation segment where it applied 
different strategies to combine the commercial opportunities provided by emerging 
wholesale competition with its position as transmission monopolist in order to 
‘outcompete’ the other generation companies and to partially privatise profits. Similar 
occurrences took place in the retail segment, while arguably the most important 
example of this approach transpired in the nominally unbundled grid equipment 
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manufacturing segment where SGCC hid the majority of its acquisitions within the 
corporate structures of its research institutes through which it eventually dominated 
competition in that field (also see Chapter 3). Unlike the ‘core’ grid segments, the 
nominally marketised auxiliary field was not bound by administrative pricing controls 
and therefore offered lucrative sources of revenue for the firm.  
Thirdly, and relatedly, SGCC aimed to establish an industrial structure in which it could 
permanently combine its sustained operational monopoly over the different grid 
segments with reliable market dominance in adjacent ‘competitive’ segments. These 
different pursuits were finally brought together in the ‘1U4L’ agenda which combined 
the maximum vertical and horizontal industry integration possible short of complete re-
integration with a strong technological and financially profitable core over which SGCC 
had established full control due to its investments in leading equipment manufacturers 
and its command over technological standards (see Chapters 4-7). It was this particular 
combination of sustained monopoly and preferential engagement in adjacent, nominally 
competitive settings which appeared to be the main goal pursued by SGCC as a central 
SOE during its interference with the formulation and implementation of sectoral policy.  
 
An interpretation of drivers underlying SGCC’s pursuit of its corporate goals 
While not strictly part of the phenomena examined in this thesis, the empirical findings 
presented warrant a tentative interpretation regarding the drivers underlying SGCC’s 
pursuit of the different goals specified above. The evidence regarding these explanatory 
factors and their interaction is not fully conclusive, however, and further research is 
required in order to test them. 
One likely explanation for the grid company’s behaviour rests on the formal incentive 
structure for central SOEs as defined by the state-owned assets management system, 
more specifically by the guidelines according to which SOE managers are evaluated by 
SASAC (see Chapter 2). Commercial success is used here as a primary gauge of 
managerial ability and as an important measure according to which career development 
decisions for SOE managers are made by the state assets administrator. During its 
interactions with the grid company, SASAC – following its mandate – has focused 
predominantly on questions of enterprise performance and competitiveness, but at the 
same time has shown very little consideration for its decisions’ linkages with and impact 
on the sectoral policy realm. SASAC’s displayed lack of awareness regarding sectoral 
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policy as such makes it questionable as to what extent it takes the limitations that 
sectoral policy frameworks may place on enterprise performance into account during its 
managerial evaluations. Its frequent negligence of sectoral matters might indeed 
incentivise central SOE executives to pre-emptively mitigate the limiting impact of 
sectoral policy on their business operations and to make use of all available means to 
display to SASAC their ability to achieve good enterprise performance, irrespective of a 
challenging sectoral policy environment. It appears that it may at least partially be the 
dynamics of this evaluation system, i.e. the incentives it sets for enhancing profitability 
and competitiveness as well as the ways in which these measures are tied into 
managerial evaluations, that induce SOE leaders to primarily pursue commercial 
opportunities and to only secondarily respond to or even oppose sectoral policy 
requirements that call this pursuit into question. 
Another important issue to consider for explaining SGCC’s behaviour is how enhanced 
industry standing and increased profits matter personally for corporate executives, i.e. 
whether they are merely important measures of commercial success and therefore 
beneficial for career and salary prospects or whether and to what extent they also lead 
to more immediate and unregulated private gains. As noted above, there was evidence 
that some of SGCC’s actions in response to market building went hand in hand with 
illegal privatisation attempts, particularly in power generation but also in the retail 
segment where marketisation pilot projects were utilised to install ‘private’ retailers that 
were, in fact, owned by grid company managers (see Chapter 3). SGCC’s reclaimed 
dominant market share in the grid equipment manufacturing segment also created a 
setting which involved a – in this case, authorised – partial privatisation of profits, 
particularly via the procurement of UHV and smart grid equipment from publicly listed 
subsidiaries (see Chapters 3 and 5). However, as the exact distribution of ownership in 
these subsidiaries is not entirely clear, it remains a matter of speculation to what extent 
executives or their families might personally profit from the grid company’s pursuits. 
A further explanation for SGCC’s aggressive involvement in sectoral policy-making lies 
in the grid company’s historical legacy, i.e. in its organisational successorship to a vertically 
integrated industrial and administrative monopoly which, in the form of different 
ministerial entities until 1997, had combined both industry operation and 
administration. While corporatisation formally separated administrative and operational 
functions, personnel structures and administrative ranks partially stayed in place and 
probably also led to a partial survival of organisational ‘habits’ of attempting to steer 
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administrative procedures and exert control over industry structures as well as its own 
organisational fate (see Chapters 2 and 6). Relatedly, the personal ambition of SOEs’ top 
executives, in the present industry case personified by SGCC’s long-time CEO and 
current chairman Liu Zhenya, may offer an explanation. Liu, who has held leadership 
positions within the electricity sector since 1992 (in provincial electric power bureaus 
prior to corporatisation and in SGCC thereafter), 634  has acted as a very politically 
enterprising state firm executive who has displayed a strong personal drive to shape the 
workings of the industry: he is sometimes portrayed as an energy sector visionary, 
especially due to his several books in which he has presented a number of grand ideas 
on energy sector development. Importantly, as the size of China’s state-owned firms 
appears to correlate with their broader political, economic and societal relevance, 
attempts at preserving organisational unity may also have been driven by top executives’ 
desire to maintain and expand their personal political standing. 
These different factors provide tentative indications of  possible explanations for 
SGCC’s administratively competitive behaviour, although further research will be 
necessary to determine their relative explanatory power and whether other important 
drivers exist. 
 
 
8.2 The complexity of power relations between central 
SOEs and central government in relation to the 
literature 
The mechanisms of state firm influence on sectoral policy in the electricity supply 
industry outlined in the previous section, as well as the provided insights regarding the 
circumstances under which this influence grows and declines, suggest that a number of 
constructive adaptations to existing government-centred and SOE-centred explanatory 
approaches may be beneficial, particularly regarding their understanding of the general 
logic of interplay and balance of power between central government and state industry, 
as well as regarding the drivers of sectoral policy and the determinants of policy change 
in China’s strategic industries.  
                                                
634 China Vitae, Biography of Liu Zhenya, http://www.chinavitae.com/biography/Liu_Zhenya|3884, 
accessed 05/2013. 
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This dissertation’s findings demonstrate the important role played by central state firms 
in sectoral policy processes and suggest that a bi-directional deliberative model based on 
contentious interactions between central government and central SOEs is best suited 
for explaining the emergence and implementation of sectoral policy. Exclusively 
government-centred perspectives (e.g. Pearson, 2005, 2007; Hsueh, 2011; Heilmann and 
Shih, 2013; Eaton, 2013; Li, 2015), while providing important insight into the workings 
of central government, have remained largely oblivious to the substantial relevance of 
large SOEs’ participation in policy processes and the extent to which both sectoral 
policy output and outcomes can be influenced by the policy preferences of central state 
firms. SOE-centred perspectives (e.g. Downs, 2008a, 2008b; Xu, 2008, 2012; Chen, 
2010; Tsai, 2013; Zhang, 2015), on the other hand, while being correct in emphasising 
the actions and intent of large state firms as important determinants of sectoral policy in 
its emergence and application, have generally overstated these firms’ influence by 
portraying them as almost omnipotent. They have furthermore provided a skewed 
account of the mechanisms through which SOEs’ policy influence primarily occurs 
while partially disregarding the fact that the extent of this influence varies following a 
set of particular conditions. Both sides, in their own ways, have provided slightly one-
sided perspectives of China’s central level politics, especially by underestimating the 
deliberative nature of decision-making as part of which neither the policy preferences of 
central government nor those of large central state firms alone, but rather their 
particular interplay, determine the ways in which sectoral policy emerges and the ways 
in which it is applied. 
In contrast to basic claims made by the two camps about central government vs. state 
firm prerogatives in the sectoral policy realm, an essential characteristic of  the 
interaction between central government and large central SOEs as observed and 
analysed in this dissertation in a ‘most likely’ case for functional government guidance is 
that both sides generally possess the ability to obstruct each other’s pursuits in the field 
of  sectoral policy-making and in the implementation of  specific governance measures 
or industry projects. Given consistently clashing sectoral policy preferences, mutual 
blockades are standard practise, making prolonged phases of  deadlock in policy 
processes a common occurrence. Both central government’s attempts at top-down 
guidance without sufficient consideration of  industry’s stance, as well as attempts at 
bottom-up pressure from industry without consideration of  government standpoints 
tend to create impasses over sectoral policy. While regularly facing each other as 
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opponents in the policy arena, state industry and central government ultimately depend 
on each other, particularly when it comes to formulating and applying functional 
sectoral policy. In order to shape sectoral policy according to its own preferences or 
progress with infrastructure development plans, industry needs formal bureaucratic 
support from sectoral authorities, ministries or the State Council, just as these different 
government entities are heavily dependent on central SOEs’ willingness to cooperate, 
not only for the implementation of  sectoral policy decisions but also to develop an 
accurate understanding of  policy-relevant issues within the respective industry. 
Progression, in whichever direction, usually necessitates some form of  at least 
temporary overlap in policy preferences. 
Such overlap in policy preferences, however, is often intentionally ‘fabricated’ by state 
industrial actors utilising variance and lack of coordination between policy at different 
levels of abstraction in order to overcome political obstacles at the industry level. 
Utilising ‘synchronisation’ tactics and targeted venue-shopping, pre-existing and 
sectorally contentious policy or project blueprints tend to be – often successfully – 
presented to higher level authorities as ready-made solutions to newly emerging and 
particularly urgent cross-sectoral policy challenges, irrespective of sectoral authorities’ 
opinions of these blueprints in the context of existing sectoral policy. What is deemed 
cross-sectorally important at the State Council level is thereby channelled towards a type 
of industrial application that may not only be questionable in terms of its contribution 
towards reaching the respective macro-goals, but may also undermine existing industry-
level policy as well as the authority of sectoral regulators. Accordingly, many of the 
most consequential developments over the past years regarding the functional logic of 
the industry case under scrutiny in this dissertation were driven by an agenda that 
originated within state industry and was fed into the policy arena via the repeated 
application of a ‘synchronisation’ strategy by which existing sectoral and cross-sectoral 
policies were systematically played off against each other. 
 
8.2.1 The shortcomings of exclusively ‘government-centred’ 
perspectives 
This dissertation’s findings concerning the determinants of sectoral policy in its 
emergence and application deviate considerably from those of exclusively government-
centred top-down perspectives on the political economy of China’s industrial reforms 
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such as Hsueh’s (2011) focus on government’s ‘strategic value logic’, Pearson’s (2005, 
2007) various political and economic ‘imperatives’ or Heilmann and Shih’s (2013) 
emphasis on changes in central government’s macro-ideas on economic governance. 
Given that this dissertation engaged with a ‘most likely’ case for these approaches to 
apply, it appears that their accuracy and analytical value could be improved if they were 
adapted so as to account for the significance of political interactions between central 
government and large state firms, as well as for these increasingly autonomous firms’ 
intervening influence on the trajectory of sectoral policy in China’s strategic industries. 
By selectively focusing on the ‘strategic value’ of different sectors to central 
government, correlating it with sectoral-level policy outcomes and causally connecting 
both sides by assuming that central government is able to shape and steer China’s 
strategic industries at its discretion, Hsueh (2011) under-theorises several of  the factors 
that may interfere with the precise translation of  government’s policy preferences into a 
given industrial setting. Her perspective remains too apolitical as she overlooks the often 
cumbersome procedures through which important sectoral policy decisions arise and 
attempted implementation takes place. Although the structural outcomes observed in 
the case of the electricity supply industry still correspond quite well with the types of 
predictions Hsueh makes based on the high strategic value of that industry (i.e. the 
near-monopolistic dominance of state firms in downstream segments, high levels of 
industrial centralisation and an almost complete lack of market competition), they 
match for the wrong reasons. What Hsueh attributes to the alleged impact of 
uninhibited government leadership based entirely on sector-specific ‘strategic value 
logic’ largely turned out to be a result of state firms’ obstruction of sectoral policy and 
their tactical engagement with the industry-level application of cross-sectoral policy, 
utilising mismatches among policy levels and variance in institutional mandates to 
pursue an agenda that in many ways contradicted and undermined central government’s 
sectoral policy preferences, which had been aimed at a very different outcome. 
Ironically, industry’s reform plan (targeted at less market and more centralisation) was a 
much closer reflection of what Hsueh proclaims as the distinctive features of central 
government’s ‘strategic value logic’ in highly strategic settings than the State Council’s 
unsuccessful competitive regional market-based reform approach. While this is certainly 
not to argue that central government dicta were irrelevant during these processes, they 
mattered in ways that differed strongly from the type of  active and effective ‘top-down’ 
guidance described by Hsueh. 
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A comparable criticism applies to Pearson’s (2005, 2007) arguments regarding central 
government’s leadership role in strategic industries driven by different 
“financial/strategic and social/political imperatives”635 and expressed via a number of 
applied mechanisms of government authority over these sectors. This dissertation 
showed that in a highly strategic industry case central government lacked the ability to 
implement its stated sectoral policy preferences against the will of state firms which are 
not fully recognised by Pearson as politically significant entities in their own right. 
Furthermore, the most fundamental policy and development agendas pursued by central 
government at the cross-sectoral level were open to strong interference by state firms 
when it came to applying them sectorally. Given the fundamental lack of coordination 
and ongoing clashes between central government bureaucracies and state industry over 
sectoral policy and development trajectories, Pearson’s perspective of active central 
government guidance over China’s strategic industries therefore appears difficult to 
uphold. As was shown, state industry regularly follows its own policy preferences which 
may differ drastically from those of central government, and large state firms are often 
very well-equipped to profit politically during these confrontations.  
Heilmann and Shih’s (2013) study, which posited shifts in broader economic policy ideas 
among central government leaders as the main determinants for the emergence of  
cross-sectoral policy and its subsequent application to strategic segments of  the 
economy via sector-specific projects or policies, also invites partial criticism, although 
the findings presented here are mostly complementary to those of  Heilmann and Shih. 
While this dissertation remains agnostic about the question of  whether ‘ideas’, 
‘interests’ or any other underlying forces ultimately determined central government’s 
stated policy preferences,636 it did show that the causal chain between those preferences, 
once formulated, and their application was fairly complex and did not entirely resemble 
the top-down dynamic described by Heilmann and Shih. Importantly, like Hsueh (2011) 
and Pearson (2005, 2007), Heilmann and Shih fail to account for the action and intent 
of  large state firms in pursuit of  their own policy preferences as an important 
intervening factor, which this dissertation showed to be of  great significance, not only 
at the sectoral level which the authors mention but deliberately do not address in their 
study, but importantly also at the cross-sectoral level which they emphasise as the 
pathway through which shifts in macro-ideas within government matter across strategic 
                                                
635 Pearson, 2005, pp. 313-314. 
636 For a discussion of how ideas and interests relate to each other in the field of politics see John L. 
Campbell, “Ideas, Politics, and Public Policy,” Annual Review of Sociology 28 (2002): 21-38. 
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industries. Heilmann and Shih are certainly correct in emphasising the overall 
importance of  those macro-guidelines for the wider economy, but they overlook the 
fact that, in practise, they are subject to severe intervention by state industry when being 
applied. While the authors argue that shifts in central government’s cross-sectoral policy 
priorities brought about numerous industry-level specifications/applications that central 
government had already been working on for a long time and that were “just 
downloaded from government servers”,637 this dissertation showed in a ‘most likely’ 
industry case that the sectoral specifications following adaptations to cross-sectoral 
policy for the most part originated within state industry as part of  the pursuit of  
entirely different goals. Via a ‘synchronisation’ strategy, central state firms adapted their 
portrayals of  their own pre-existing sectoral policy preferences/industry projects and 
tactically supplied them to government (‘uploaded them to government servers’, one 
might say) as perfect matches for shifting macro-guidelines in broadly related policy 
areas. State industry has been highly proficient at navigating such opportunities to ‘jump 
on the bandwagon’ and at utilising the often vague nature of  central government’s 
macro-level policy priorities for its own purposes while indirectly steering sectoral 
decision-making in the process. 
 
8.2.2 The limitations of central SOEs’ proactive policy influence and 
the shortcomings of ‘SOE-centred’ accounts 
Despite the lack of observable active and effective central government guidance in the 
electricity supply industry, and in spite of state industry’s capacity to subvert the 
successful implementation of  many policy-based government orders that it disagreed 
with, it also became clear that state firms’ own political influence is subject to distinct 
limitations, particularly with regard to proactively shaping sectoral policy according to 
its preferences. By demonstrating these limitations, this dissertation exposed important 
shortcomings of the SOE-centred literature which is correct in questioning 
government’s ability to supervise large state firms, but which significantly overstates 
these companies’ policy influence.  
Xu (2008), for instance, has argued that administrative control over large state-owned 
firms, especially in the energy sector, was “long gone and the party and the government 
                                                
637 Heilmann and Shih, 2013, p. 15. 
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can no longer ‘order’ them what to do and what not to do”.638 Large state firms in the 
energy realm treated industry regulators “at best as an inconvenience and at worst as the 
impediment of  their development”, while otherwise simply ignoring them.639 Sectoral 
policies, she argued accordingly, emerged based on large state firms’ “accumulated 
actions [which] then shape the policy alternatives from which the government chooses 
and eventually formulates into policies”. As such, Xu viewed policy as being 
“formulated ex-post by government’s endorsement of  a series of  incremental and 
individual decisions” made by state-owned corporations in the field.640 Xu’s claims were 
not observable in the industry case studied in this dissertation, where it was not possible 
for state firms to simply ignore sectoral authorities in pursuit of policy that matched 
their own preferences and where bureaucratic procedures accompanying policy- and 
decision-making processes were much more than mere formalities. In fact, in what was 
earlier referred to as ‘basic conflict mode’, state industrial actors were generally forced 
to follow protocol closely while seeking formal approval from the sectoral authorities 
for any major industry project and reform suggestion that they aimed to realise. 
Moreover, approvals were generally not simply granted because state firms were 
powerful and industry-level oversight was weak or because industrial firms dominated 
sectoral or cross-sectoral authorities based on forceful persuasion. In order to change 
sectoral policy so as to follow its own preferences, central SOEs needed to tactically 
manoeuvre very real structural limitations set by existing policy and formal bureaucratic 
processes.  
Furthermore, while the SOE-centred literature suggested a number of important 
mechanisms of  SOEs’ policy influence, the main avenues this dissertation determined 
to be significant partially differed from those claims. Most of  the authors surveyed 
offered rather simplistic perspectives which largely consisted of  emphasising central 
SOEs’ direct access to the bureaucracy, their formal and informal contacts with 
government institutions/officials and their participation in policy processes.641 They did 
not, however, present much systematic evidence for their claims or specify how or why 
‘access’ translates into policy influence. Using the case of  the State Grid Corporation, 
this dissertation showed that even exquisite formal and informal connections to the 
political elite – SGCC’s own chairman, after all, has served as an alternate member of 
                                                
638 Xu, 2008, pp. 442, 445. 
639 Ibid., pp. 447-448. 
640 Ibid., p. 450. 
641 Argued with particular vigour by Kennedy (2005), but also by Xu (2008), Zhang (2015) and others. 
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the CCP’s Central Committee – and immediate participation in almost all sectorally 
relevant policy processes on their own do not suffice to allow large central SOEs to 
shape policy to their liking. Instead, it was demonstrated that while levels of access to 
the bureaucracy remained constant, state firms’ ability to shape sectoral decision-making 
remained highly contingent on whether or not they managed to convincingly 
‘synchronise’ reform suggestions with cross-sectoral policy requirements and whether 
they emerged as winners from political disputes with sectoral authorities and industry 
experts (i.e. weak influence in ‘basic conflict mode’ vs. strong influence in 
‘synchronisation mode’). This finding indicates that access to decision-makers and the 
policy process – supplemented by superior industry expertise (briefly noted but not 
shown to be significant by Kennedy (2005) and Downs (2008a)) – are perhaps best 
understood as foundations for proactive policy influence which on their own, however, 
lack effectiveness. To gain proactive influence over industry-level policy, central SOEs 
ultimately need to find ways to combine their own ambitions with government’s macro 
priorities and to argumentatively persuade top leaders that they are contributing to the 
solution of urgent cross-sectoral policy challenges. 
In order to achieve this, state firms need to be fully aware of the macro-guidelines 
provided by State Council decisions through which the top leadership aims to guide 
overall industrial developments and to which it seemingly demands total, at least, 
rhetorical obedience. These macro principles effectively set the benchmark for which 
actions and arguments are feasible during SOEs’ pursuit of their own sectoral policy 
preferences, and it appears essential for the firms to make a show of  abiding by these 
guidelines, possibly due to a necessity of  demonstrating (or at least credibly simulating) 
loyalty to the top leadership in order to not jeopardise future career prospects. At the 
same time, the generally non-operational nature 642  of  this type of  authority 
inadvertently provides opportunities for central state firms to claim symbolic legitimacy 
for the pre-existing and potentially very different goals that they were already pursuing. 
It is the strategic engagement with very real political limitations (i.e. the manoeuvring of  
variances/overlap between sectoral and cross-sectoral policy or between institutional 
mandates at different levels of  government) which allows central SOEs to effectively 
influence policy that determines the operational logic of  strategic industries.  
                                                
642 If top leaders take a particular interest, they are able to turn their ‘non-operational’ power into an 
‘operational’ one (as shown during top officials’ challenges to SGCC’s arguments during the 2014 CPPCC 
conference), although it appears that the top leadership rarely gets involved at that level and rather 
attempts to set overall strategic guidelines. 
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As such, the nature of state firms’ policy influence is much more indirect than the type 
of rather immediate impact evoked by the SOE-centred literature. It relies heavily on 
the independent political momentum of suitable macro-level policy challenges to 
provide a workable foundation for the portrayal of their own agendas as credible 
contributions to whichever cross-sectoral solution is required. In order to feed their 
policy preferences into the political arena and proactively shape policy, state firms 
ultimately need to work within the confines of  and subsequently build on existing 
government policy. These ‘indirect’ yet very effective routes of  policy influence have 
rarely been recognised as significant in the literature. While Downs (2008b), Chen 
(2010), and Xu (2012) correctly noted that large SOEs have engaged in this type of  
behaviour in order to promote their projects, they did not verify empirically whether 
this had any systematic and re-occurring effect. They furthermore failed to provide 
procedural evidence beyond a very small number of  anecdotal examples while giving 
little insight into the underlying political logic of  this type of  interaction or the 
circumstances in which it becomes applicable. In fact, none of  the mechanisms listed 
above, whether ‘direct’ or ‘indirect’ in nature, have been demonstrated empirically in any 
notable detail across the SOE-centred literature as introduced in the literature review, a 
substantial empirical gap which this research sought to remedy.  
Finally, these findings also speak to the long-established yet persistently relevant 
perspective provided by Lieberthal’s ‘fragmented authoritarianism’ framework, which 
served as a foundation for many authors with an SOE-centred focus. While Lieberthal 
(1988, 1992) and, particularly, Lampton (1992) strongly emphasised the importance of  
bargaining between bureaucratic actors (both techniques and outcomes) as a policy 
determinant, this dissertation showed that state firms find it difficult to bargain directly 
with the authorities, even when on an equal footing, and that they actually tend to avoid 
bargaining in favour of  ‘synchronisation’ tactics so as to increase their chances of  
achieving favourable outcomes. 
 
8.2.3 Concluding remarks on central government guidance and 
central SOEs’ policy influence 
In conclusion, the prevalence of state firms’ ‘indirect’ approaches towards generating 
proactive sectoral policy impact highlighted the shortcomings of both SOE-centred and 
government-centred perspectives. The former, it was shown, has exaggerated central 
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SOEs’ policy influence at the industry level while presenting overly simplistic and 
inaccurate mechanisms, while the latter has provided a distorted account of central 
government’s guidance role underlying sectoral policy in strategic industries. In the case 
study conducted in this dissertation, central government’s policy preferences – 
emphasised across the government-centred literature as the core determinant of sectoral 
policy in its emergence and application – were indeed important for both policy output 
and policy outcomes, yet in a largely non-strategic way that was shaped and exploited by 
state industry. State industrial actors showed the distinct ability to influence how central 
government’s policy priorities matter in practise, both by blocking/undermining the 
application of sectoral priorities and by shaping the way in which cross-sectoral 
priorities are applied at the industry level. State industry, it was shown, is able to turn 
with central government’s momentum at the macro-level while simultaneously nudging 
this momentum into a direction that furthers its own sectoral interests – and this has 
the potential to deeply affect the functional logic of entire industry segments.  
The ultimate impact of this ‘synchronisation’ strategy – which is grounded in existing 
policy and dependent on suitable transformations of central government’s cross-sectoral 
priorities that can be utilised as bandwagons – proved to be so extensive in a ‘most 
likely’ case that the notion of  central government’s active and effective policy guidance 
over China’s strategic industries and their operational logic as emphasised and widely 
accepted across government-centred accounts of the political economy of China’s 
industrial reforms appears difficult to uphold in its currently dominant configuration. 
This study rather suggested that the country’s central government is limited in its ability 
to guide sectoral policy, both in its formulation and application. It showed that both 
major changes in sectoral development trajectories and grand responses to macro-level 
policy challenges are not necessarily a testament to central government authority and 
that they may equally be driven by state industrial actors based on entirely different 
pretexts which are more likely to reflect corporate considerations than governmental 
strategies for sectoral development. While further research on policy processes in other 
industries will be necessary, the findings from this ‘most likely’ case suggest that more 
attention needs to be paid to the intervening influence of central SOEs’ attempts to 
shape the sectoral policy realm. The account provided in this dissertation concerning 
the mechanisms and conditions through/under which this influence materialises 
provides a foundation for such endeavours which may further reduce the uncertainty 
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about the often opaque nature of policy-making and regulatory proceedings in China’s 
strategic industries. 
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